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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY:
EXPLAINING CONTINUITY IN SOUTH AMERICAN SOCIOECONOMIC
CONDITIONS
by
Diego Zambrano
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor
The socioeconomic history of South America has been traditionally marked by the chronic
problems of poverty and inequality. South American states and societies have commonly
failed to address these issues effectively, which continue to characterize the region’s
socioeconomic outlook today. The persistence of poverty and inequality has created social
and political pressures on those designing economic policy, prioritizing short-term
“alleviating” mechanisms rather than long-term structural solutions. These same
conditions, combined with historical experiences, have created a singular cyclical dynamic
in the political economy of the region. In this context, this dissertation explores the
underlying causes behind the continuity of such socioeconomic conditions. In doing so, the
present study explores the systemic and structural conditions that influence the political
economy of South America. Therefore, this dissertation situates itself within the academic
literature on South American development, all the while it reinterprets the South American

iii

experience by focusing on the structure and the role of the state as the main factor behind
the continuity of socioeconomic challenges in the region. In this sense, this dissertation
advances the state argument to understand what factors explain the presence of
socioeconomic challenges in South America’s political economy, and to explain why there
is no change in these conditions or the political economy to tackle them.
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCING THE STATE ARGUMENT
None could equal the lyrical talent of Alexis de Tocqueville, who
wrote that the seas of pre European Latin America ‘sparkled with
the fires of the tropics; for the first time the extraordinary
transparency of the water disclosed the ocean’s depths to the
navigators. Here and there little scented islands float like baskets
of flowers on the calm sea. Everything seen in these enchanted
islands seems devised to meet man’s needs or serve his pleasures.’
Then came the Spanish, and several centuries of colonial
mismanagement had left Latin America in disarray. ‘May not
revolution be the most natural state for the Spaniards of South
America?’ Tocqueville wondered. ‘The people dwelling in this
beautiful half continent seem obdurately determined to tear out
each other’s guts; nothing can divert them from that objective.’ His
summary judgment: ‘There are no nations on earth more miserable
than those of South America.’
Tocqueville had never set foot in Latin America.1
In the last fifteen years, South America has witnessed a significant alleviation of
two of its main chronic socioeconomic problems: poverty and inequality. In 2017, a total
of 175 million people were estimated to be living in poverty in the region.2 This stands in
stark contrast to the 221 million people estimated to be living in poverty in 2002,3 marking
an important drop in the poverty rate from 44.5% in 2002 to an estimated 29.6% in 2018.4
A similar trend is observable in terms of income inequality, in which South America

1

Schoultz, Lars. 2018. In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin America.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 14.

2

OECD/ECLAC/CAF. 2016. Latin American Economic Outlook 2017: Youth, Skills and Entrepreneurship.
Paris: OECD Publishing, p. 15.

3

Smith, Peter. 2012. Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective. New
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 228-29.

4

CEPAL. 2019. Panorama Social de América Latina, 2018. Santiago: LC/PUB.2019/3-P, p. 20.

1

reduced witnessed a reduction of 3 to 4 GINI points between the years 2000 and 2012.5
These significant improvements occurred in a context of remarkable economic growth; an
expansion of commodity exports induced by Chinese consumption and price increases, as
well as increased foreign capital due to low interest rates in the United States.6 The entire
region, regardless of the uniqueness of individual cases, was immersed in what appeared
to be a significant process of socioeconomic transformation. In fact, South America was
able to resist the destructive fallout of the 2008 global financial crisis significantly better
than regions like Europe or the United States.
Despite these positive developments, the socioeconomic improvement of the entire
region does not seem to have been consolidated. According to the 2016 Human
Development Report for Latin America and the Caribbean presented by the United Nations
Development Programme, almost 30 million people of those who improved their
socioeconomic conditions in the last fifteen years will certainly fall back into poverty in
the near future.7 This becomes more worrisome when one observes the current economic
trends of the region, which show significant economic contractions for 2016 and 2017.

5

World Bank data suggests 3 points decline on average, while Data from the Socio-Economic Database in
Latin America and the Caribbean suggests an average of 4 points decrease. For a discussion on the decline
of inequality in Latin America see Tsounta, Evridiki, and Anayochukwu Osueke. 2014. What Is Behind
Latin America's Declining Income Inequality? International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/14/124, p.
7.

6

Low interest rates in the United States created an opportunity for Latin America to attract foreign capital
to the region both by providing higher returns to capital investment as well as by fostering economic
growth. For a discussion on these conditions and their demise see "Macroeconomic Resilience".
2015. World Economic Forum. May 6-8, 2015. https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forumlatin-america-2015/sessions/macroeconomic-resilience.

7

PNUD. 2016. Progreso Multidimensional: Bienestar Más Allá del Ingreso. 2016. Programa de Naciones
Unidas para el Desarrollo, p. 2.

2

Both 2015 and 2016 exhibited negative economic growth for South America; a trend that
had not occurred since the early 1980s. The primary consequence of these trends is an
increase in poverty since 2015 in which an estimated of 9 million people fell into extreme
poverty, and overall poverty increased from 174 million people to 182 million people.8 In
terms of inequality, the continent has been able to continue reducing household income
inequality, but the rate of decrease has deaccelerated, from an annual average reduction of
1.3% in household income inequality between 2002 and 2008 to an annual average
reduction of only 0.3% between 2014 and 2017.9 The consequence of these socioeconomic
trends in the region is an important aggravation in Latin American living standards. On
average, Latin America’s income per-capita was -2.3% between 2013 and 2018, making
the region the only emerging market to see its standards of living decrease in the last
years.10 Therefore, the socioeconomic improvements achieved in the first and a half-decade
of the twenty-first century seem to be evaporating in the region.11
Current socioeconomic trends in the region are being portrayed as a missed
opportunity,12 but these dynamics are actually not exclusive to the twenty-first century.

8

CEPAL. 2019. Panorama Social de América Latina, 2018. Santiago: LC/PUB.2019/3-P, p.21.

9

Ibid, p.17.

10

Martin, Eric, and Walter Brandimarte. 2019. “As Latin America Gets Poorer, Democracy Itself is Now
Questioned,” Bloomberg. May 8, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-08/as-latinamerica-gets-poorer-democracy-itself-is-now-questioned.

11

For a brief discussion on the socioeconomic trends in the region in the past decades, see Ocampo, José
Antonio. 2017. “Latin America’s Mounting Development Challenges.” In Why Latin American Nations
Fail: Development Strategies in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Esteban Pérez and Matías Vernengo,
121-140. California: University of California Press, pp. 122-27.

12

There is important discussion about the economically transformative opportunity the region missed these
past decades both in mainstream conversations as well as in academic discussions. For example, see Pérez
Caldentey, Esteban, and Matías Vernengo. 2017. Why Latin American Nations Fail: Development
Strategies in the Twenty-First Century. California: University of California Press; Winter, Brian. 2019.

3

The apparent dynamic of the modern socioeconomic reality of the region suggests a
cyclical condition and continuity. South American societies were able to take advantage of
the commodity boom of the 2000s, thereby improving their socioeconomic conditions. Yet
once these global conditions changed and commodity prices started to decrease in 2013,
the region became once more submerged in the miasma of poverty and inequality. A similar
dynamic occurred during most of the twentieth century, in which South America moved
from periods of improved economic conditions to periods of increased poverty and income
inequality. Perhaps the most evident example of this dynamic is the decline of
socioeconomic conditions in the 1980s. After World War II, the region was able to create
significant macroeconomic growth and stability under the strategies of Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) and the developmental state. However, South American states
grossed significant debt fueled both by their commitment to subsidizing industrialization
as well as the accessibility of loans due to the effect of the petrodollars created during the
1970s-oil crisis.13 The stagflation created by the oil crisis in the United States and the
United Kingdom gave way to neoliberal policies embodied by the administrations of
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Once these administrations implemented
monetarist policies, interest rates spiked and commodity prices collapsed. The entire region

“Latin America’s Decade-Long Hangover: The 2010s Started so Well, What Happened?” Americas
Quarterly. April 9, 2019. https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/latin-americas-decade-long-hangover
; and Biller, David, and Eric Martin. 2019. “Lost Decade Specter Haunts Latin America as Big Economies
Falter.” Blomberg. May 28, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-28/lost-decadespecter-haunts-latin-america-as-big-economies-falter.
13

The oil crisis of the 1970s allowed for oil producing countries to amass significant amount of revenue
from oil. This revenue was deposited primarily in commercial banks in the United States and the United
Kingdom. The stagflation created by the oil crisis moved bankers to loan funds aggressively to third world
countries. For a discussion on the dynamics of the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, see Cupples, Julie.
2013. Latin American Development. New York: Routledge, pp. 56-9.

4

entered into a debt crisis, triggering changes in socioeconomic policy directed at
macroeconomic stability. While these policies achieved its stated goal of stability, they also
exacerbated inequality, which increased by an annual average of 3% during the 1980s and
by an annual average of 1% during the 1990s.14 Therefore, from an comprehensive
perspective, a cyclical dynamic becomes apparent in the socioeconomic conditions of the
region, where improvements achieved in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, evaporated in the
1980s and 1990s. While the worsening conditions of the 1990s were offset by the
previously discussed improvement of the 2000s, current trends merit an exploration of the
present socioeconomic downturn in the region.
In this context, the study of South American political economy presents two
fundamental research problems. First, poverty and inequality have characterized the region
since colonial times, which makes it indispensable to understand the causes behind this
phenomenon. There is a long tradition of Latin American thought—which could be defined
as “export-oriented” literature—that points to the region’s reliance and structural
predisposition toward primary exports as the main reason for its characteristic poverty and
inequality.15 An important example of this literature is Bulmer-Thomas’ work on South

14

Cornia, Giovvani. 2014. “Inequality Trends And Their Determinants: Latin America Over The Period
1990-2010.” In Falling Inequality In Latin America, edited by Giovani Cornia, 23-48. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

15

Whether explicitly or implicitly, countless academic works have identified Latin America’s structural
predisposition to rely on exporting primary products to industrial or industrializing societies as the main
explanation for the region’s pervasive continuity of poverty and inequality. Some prominent examples are
Prebisch, Raúl, and Gustavo Martínez Cabañas. 1949. “El Desarrollo Económico de la América Latina y
Algunos de sus Principales Problemas” El Trimestre Económico 63(3): 347-431; Stein, Stanley, and
Barbara Stein. 1970. The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in
Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sunkel, Osvaldo, and Pedro Paz. 1970. El Subdesarrollo
Latinoamericano y la Teoria del Desarrollo. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno; Prebisch, Raúl. 1976. “A Critique
of Peripheral Capitalism.” CEPAL Review 1 https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/12273. ; Furtado,
Celso. 1977. Economic Development of Latin America: Historical Background and Contemporary

5

America’s economic history. In the book The Economic History of South America Since
Independence, Bulmer-Thomas explains why is it that a resourceful and potentially
wealthy region like South America has been historically characterized by poverty and
inequality.16 He argues that the socioeconomic challenges of the region are the result of the
combination of several factors, which are what he defines as the commodity lottery, the
mechanisms of export-led growth, and the economic-policy environment. Overall, BulmerThomas argues that the type of commodity (temperate or tropical agricultural products,
mining, or oil) present in the political demarcation of each country, the volatility of
commodity prices and the regulatory mechanisms of the international economic market,
and the internal dynamics of exploitation and distribution condition the magnitude and
dynamics of socioeconomic conditions in each country of South America. In essence,
socioeconomic challenges like poverty and inequality are attributed to the region’s
economic history of export orientation .
The second research problem emerging from the study of South American political
economy is the continuity of poverty and inequality. Both the academic literature and

Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Glade, William. 1995. “Latin America in the
International Economy, 1874-1914.” In The Cambridge History of Latin America, edited by Leslie Bethell,
321-26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Skidmore, Thomas, and Peter H Smith. 1992. Modern
Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press; Adelman, Jeremy. 2001. “Institutions, Property, and
Economic Development in Latin America.” In The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin
America, edited by Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves, 27-54. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press; Abeles, Martín, and Sebastián Valdecantos. 2017. “South America after the Commodity
Boom.” In Why Latin American Nations Fail: Development Strategies in the Twenty-First Century, edited
by Esteban Pérez and Matías Vernengo, 163-85. California: University of California Press; and Ocampo,
José Antonio. 2017. “Latin America’s Mounting Development Challenges.” In Why Latin American
Nations Fail: Development Strategies in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Esteban Pérez and Matías
Vernengo, 121-40. California: University of California Press.
16

Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 1994. The Economic History Of Latin America Since Independence. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-7.

6

policy implementation have pointed at the predominance of commodity commercialization
in South America as the reason behind the region’s socioeconomic challenges. In this
regard, there are two main factors related to poverty and inequality in South America: a)
the external conditions of commodity-export commercialization discussed above; and b)
the political economy of commodity-export revenue and distribution. There is a vast
literature discussing the external conditions of commodity-export commercialization,17 yet
the problem of understanding the continuity of these conditions is intricately related to the
political economy of commodity export-revenue and distribution. It is both politically
irresponsible and academically basic to simply accept the diagnosis pointing at South
America’s predisposition for export-orientation at the center of the region’s socioeconomic
challenges. Thus, developing a historical explanation for the continuity of this exportoriented predisposition becomes indispensable not only for understanding, but ultimately
for transforming South America.

17

Most of the literature on macroeconomic volatility focuses on the volatile nature of commodity prices.
Commodities tend to have, due to their nature as primary goods, a global business cycle with abrupt
changes in prices. For a discussion on the issue of commodity volatility see Chapter 6 of Gordon,
Wendell. 1965. The Political Economy Of Latin America. New York: Columbia University Press; van der
Ploeg, Frederic. and Poelhekke, Stephen. 2009. “Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse.” Oxford
Economic Papers 61(4): 727-60, and van Der Ploeg, Frederic. 2010. “Voracious Transformation of a
Common Natural Resource into Productive Capital.” International Economic Review 51(2): 365-81.
However, some of the literature on the nature of commodity commercialization—like the early literature of
Latin American structuralism characteristic of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC)—focuses on the issues of dependency emerging from focusing on such economic
activity. For a good discussion on the problems emerging from the reliance on the commercialization of
commodities, see Williamson, Jeffrey. 2011. Trade and Poverty: When The Third World Fell Behind.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 45-58; and Prada Alcoreza, Raúl. 2012. “El Círculo Vicioso Del
Estractivismo.” In Renunciar Al Bien Comun, edited by Gabriela Massuh, 157-87. Argentina: Mardulce.

7

ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
Preoccupations about South America’s socioeconomic challenges have been
present in the consciousness of the continent for generations. At the turn of the twentieth
century, there was a dominant pessimism in the general commentary of the region
regarding its socioeconomic condition and its capacity to transform its future.18 For most
of its contemporary history, the South American political discourse has mostly gravitated
around socioeconomic development. Both academics and policy makers have focused most
of their efforts at understanding and transforming the region’s problems of poverty and
inequality. The result is a vast tradition in approaches, movements, theories, and political
movements throughout South America’s geography and historical moments all concerned
with the region’s political economy. But over and over again, a dominant theme permeates
all the efforts at understanding and transforming the region’s socioeconomic reality:
questioning why South America appears incapable of doing so. Whether at the turn of the
twentieth century, in the 1960s after the failure of industrialization efforts, or at the turn of
the twenty-first century after the failure of the neoliberal reform agendas of the 1990s, the
question was always about failure. For instance, in the 1960s, Fernando Henrique Cardoso
and Enzo Faletto wondered why South American countries did not take the necessary
measures to guarantee a continued development under industrialization and why the ones
that were implemented ultimately failed.19 Similarly, at the turn of the twenty-first century,

18

Anderson, Charles. 1967. Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless
Nations. New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc, p. 37.

19

Cardoso, Fernando, and Enzo Faletto. 1979. Dependency and Development in Latin America. California:
University of California Press, p.4.

8

Jeremy Adelman wondered why South American societies failed to successfully use the
revenue from exports to transform the socioeconomic outlook of the region.20 Ultimately,
after one of the greatest commodity booms in the history of the region, several authors are
wondering why the region missed an incredible opportunity to move their countries toward
a sustainable and overarching development path.21
Global studies about development and trade irrefutably show that export-oriented
strategies create growth even in industrializing or developing countries.22 South America
has not been an exception to this phenomenon, the region has had various eras of economic
growth under an export-oriented strategy. But regardless of these moments of growth, over
two hundred years of studying South American political economy have created three
certainties for any informed observer: 1) the region is predisposed to rely structurally on
export-oriented growth; 2) regardless of any temporary improvements, socioeconomic
challenges like poverty and inequality are a constant in South American political economy;
and 3) regardless of the political or intellectual movement of the era, the region seems
incapable to transform its socioeconomic reality. But if trade irrefutably leads to growth,
and South America has historically relied on trading primary products, then the obvious
question is why does South America continues to suffer deep structural socioeconomic
challenges? This question has been at the center of the literature of political economy in

20

Adelman, Jeremy. 2001. “Institutions, Property, and Economic Development in Latin America.” In The
Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America, edited by Miguel Angel Centeno and
Fernando Lopez-Alves, 27-54. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 46.

21

Caldentey, Esteban, and Matías Vernengo. 2017. Why Latin American Nations Fail: Development
Strategies in the Twenty-First Century. California: University of California Press

22

Williamson, Jeffrey. 2011. Trade and Poverty: When The Third World Fell Behind. Cambridge: The
MIT Press, p. 48.

9

South America. Perhaps the earliest attempts at answering this question emerge from the
colonial era, which point at some sort of cultural inadequacy of South American’s to govern
themselves effectively. The rationale is that the Spanish and Portuguese conquest instilled
in the continent a mixture of Catholic obscurantism, autocratic absolutism, and forced labor
values that has been passed through generations creating a society of mysticism and status
seeking with rebellious passions. 23 The cultural logic was present in early representations
of South America by U.S. emissaries in the region, which described them as Catholic
societies led by corruption, warlords, deeply poor, and with weak economies incapable of
governing themselves.24 In fact, John Quincy Adams, both as Secretary of State and
President of the United States from 1817 to 1829, asserted that South Americans were
incapable of governing themselves in a successful way, stating that “the people of South
America are the most ignorant, most bigoted, the most superstitious of all the Roman
Catholics in Christendom.”25 Moreover, late twentieth century approaches like the staple
theory have also stated the cultural argument, pointing at European culture as a
fundamental factor in development outcomes in recent settlement lands like Uruguay,
Argentina, Costa Rica, or Chile.26 Overall, the cultural argument is rooted in the Black

23

Adelman, Jeremy. 2001. “Institutions, Property, and Economic Development in Latin America.” In The
Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America, edited by Miguel Angel Centeno and
Fernando Lopez-Alves, 27-54. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 28.

24

Schoultz, Lars. 2018. In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin America.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 16.

25

Schoultz, Lars. 1998. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 5.

26

López-Alves, Fernando. 2012. “The Latin American Nation-state and the International.” In Thinking
International Relations Differently, edited by Arlene Tickner and David Blaney, 161-80. New York:
Routledge, pp. 171-72

10

Legend, “a fabrication of sixteenth-century Elizabethan mythologizers aiming to debunk
Spanish claims to sovereignty in the New World… which has survived the test of time and
empirical verification with astounding agility.”27 Yet the cultural argument is deeply
problematic for several reasons; two of which are worthy of mentioning. First, the cultural
argument is based on the premise that there are certain cultural values that are better for
suited for economic growth, and that these values are intrinsically linked to some ethnic or
geographically located group. It is self-evident that this logic is not only borderline racist,
but it also implicitly suggests that certain groups of people are superior than others, and
that inferior groups are incapable of adopting the “right” cultural values to create economic
development. But the second problem of the cultural argument is actually the empirical
record. On the one hand, several Catholic cultures around the world, and even Iberian
cultures in Western Europe, have been able to achieve incredible levels of socioeconomic
development. On the other hand, several countries with various cultural values have
achieved impressive levels of socioeconomic development throughout history.28 Beyond
its morally problematic undertones, the cultural argument is baseless when confronted to
the empirical record.

27

Adelman, Jeremy. 2001. “Institutions, Property, and Economic Development in Latin America.” In The
Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America, edited by Miguel Angel Centeno and
Fernando Lopez-Alves, 27-54. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 28-9.

28

An important example of the inadequacy of the cultural argument as an explanation for development
outcomes are the successes of countries like Japan or South Korea. Most notably, the cultural argument
finds a difficult challenge in the case of North Korea, which has a very similar cultural value system to that
of South Korea, yet its socioeconomic trajectory could not be more contradictory. For a discussion on the
cultural argument see Caldentey, Esteban, and Matías Vernengo. 2017. Why Latin American Nations Fail:
Development Strategies in the Twenty-First Century. California: University of California Press, p. 2.

11

Another significant answer to the question of continuity of socioeconomic
challenges in South America points at geographical limitations as a factor for the economic
development in the region. Overall, geography arguments point at an array of geographical
factors to explain socioeconomic challenges ranging from temperature to access to the sea.
While a survey of the geographical argument and its variations is beyond the effort of this
paragraphs,29 the main thesis states that it is geographic differences, and not racial or ethnic
differences, what explain development outcomes.30 In particular, the geography argument
suggests that the determinant of socioeconomic outcomes lies in the way geographic
characteristics of an environment interact with the settlement patterns of populations.31 At
first glance, the geographical argument seems compelling given that, for instance, most
poor countries are located in tropical areas or that the poorest countries in South American
have historically been landlocked Bolivia and Paraguay. In relation to South America, the
geography argument points at the fragmented patterns of settlement given the different
geographical characteristics present within national boundaries. Any South American high
school student has read how the vastness and fragmentation of the Great Colombia, and
the difficulty to control such geographical area, is one of the causes for its ultimate collapse.
However, similarly to the culture argument, once the geography argument is confronted
with the empirical record it becomes problematic. In an effort to measure geography’s
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impact on the development outcomes of South America, Gallup, Gaviria, and Luke
findings problematize the geography argument. First, by studying geography’s impact on
Bolivia’s development, they find that tropical climates do not always generate negative
socioeconomic outcomes. Second, Colombia shows how access to coasts and port cities do
not necessarily have an geographic advantage over central areas. Third, the case of Brazil
shows that the connection between geography and diseases is far more complicated than
expected by the geography argument; meaning that it does not necessarily affects
socioeconomic outcomes.32 Ultimately, what is most striking about testing the geography
argument in South America is that “institutional and historical forces often redirect,
reinforce, or even undermine the effects of geography.”33 Therefore, if the effects of the
geography argument can be drastically shaped by institutions or history, then it is clear that
geography is, at best, an intervening variable on development outcomes in South America.
A recent and growing body of literature suggests that the reason why South
American countries continue to present socioeconomic challenges despite the positive
effects of trade on economic growth is the presence of long-run problems with exporting
commodities. Overall, this literature suggests that while exporting commodities creates
important short-term macroeconomic improvements like economic growth or positive
balance of trade, it also creates political and economic problems given the nature and
commercialization of natural resources. The resource curse argument, like the geography
argument, presents an array of mechanisms through which commercializing commodities
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negatively affect development outcomes that can be summarized as: 1) deindustrialization; 2) macroeconomic volatility; and 3) rent-seeking political behavior.34
The resource curse argument states that reliance on a growth strategy of natural resource
exports creates important de-industrialization in the long term. It argues that the problem
lies in the negative effects the surplus generated by exploiting and exporting natural
resources has on other productive areas of the economy. Especially during commodity
booms, the increased demand for expanding exports pressures the appreciation of the local
currency relative to the main medium of exchange in the international system—the dollar
is the medium of exchange in the modern international economy.35 Once the local currency
appreciates, producing non-primary products at home for consumption becomes relatively
more expansive than importing them while activities in the export sector become more
lucrative. These dynamics lead to a contraction in the non-primary industries, ultimately
leading to de-industrialization given the reallocation of productive resources to export
sectors.36 De-industrialization creates important socioeconomic dislocations based on the
reduction of the real factor productivity of the entire economy. More importantly, deindustrialization and the concentration of economic activity create important dislocations
in the labor market. Given that many extractive productive activities are significantly
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capital intensive, their capacity to create labor is relatively smaller than other industries.
The ultimate result is the creation of enclave economies, generating significant
socioeconomic challenges such as unemployment, poverty, or inequality.37
The resource curse argument also points at the macroeconomic volatility created
by a reliance on commodity exports as a problem for development outcomes. A high
dependence on the commercialization of primary products exposes countries to
considerable macroeconomic imbalances since the price of commodities fluctuates
suddenly and dramatically on the international economic market.38 Countries with
significant primary product exports tend to base their entire economic budgets and
prosperity on the successful commercialization of commodities. The volatility of
commodity prices changes the amount of revenue a country receives, constraining longterm macroeconomic planning or stability by affecting expectations. The apparent
expansion of the economy driven by export revenue hinders political leaders from
identifying proper economic policy that can guarantee sustained growth. Therefore, the
commercialization of commodities allows for periods of artificial economic growth driven
by export revenue, but policymakers tend to fail to understand the short-lived nature of the
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boom and do not adopt growth promoting policies.39 Moreover, the macroeconomic
volatility created by a dependence on exporting primary products perpetuates
socioeconomic inequality.40 Resource rich countries experience macroeconomic cycles
based on international market fluctuations, so during commodity booms inequality
decreases and economic performance improves, yet once the commodity boom disappears
inequality increases once more with aggravating consequences given distorted policy
making and expectations.
The resource curse argument also highlights rent-seeking political behavior as an
explanatory factor of negative development outcomes. The resource curse argument states
that the presence of natural resources have a negative impact on the behavior of political
actors and political processes.41 Given the immense attractiveness in revenue appropriation
and the relative ease of discriminatory access to primary activities, countries that rely on a
growth strategy of commodity exports are prone to perpetuating political processes that
increase income inequality and reduce the political power of the vast majority of the
population.42 The recourse curse argument explains that political elites influence the state
through bribery, pacifying dissent instead of incorporating it into the political system, and
reducing public accountability in order to resist structural changes that might threaten their
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privilege position as owners of extractive activities.43 Therefore, the resource curse
argument highlights that since extractive activities make it easier for elites to appropriate
revenue and discriminate vast sectors of society, then the political process is distorted and
socioeconomic distortions are perpetuated.44
In contrast to the cultural argument and the geography argument, the resource curse
argument has gained important traction in the contemporary academic literature. In fact,
most of the literature on the resource curse presents a wide array of contemporary empirical
cases that substantiate many of its claims. It is in fact evident—as it will be showed
subsequently—that the mechanisms through which a reliance on export commercialization
negatively affects development outcomes are present in South America. However, the
resource curse argument presents a fundamental problem evident in the face of different
empirical experiences. Both global and regional experiences show a significant degree of
variation in terms of development outcomes, yet they also present important presence and
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reliance on exploiting and exporting primary products. Globally, the economies of many
industrialized countries have significant primary products sectors exploited for exports.
Countries like Australia, Norway, Canada, or the United States continue to have important
export-oriented exploitative sectors in the twenty-first century, yet it is obvious that they
do not have the pervasive problems described by the resource curse argument.45 Moreover,
the historical development of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany were
largely spurred by the extraction of primary products. In fact, from the mid-nineteenth
century to the mid-twentieth century the U.S. was the leading mineral abundant economy
in the world. Moreover, Germany and the United Kingdom were capable of exploiting their
coal and iron resources to trigger their industrial development, reaching industrialization
and avoiding the pervasive limitations described by the resource curse argument.46
Therefore, it is evident that the mere abundance of natural resources or export-oriented
strategies is not sufficient to explain the developmental challenges of South America.
The developmental experience of South American countries also shows important
variation in terms of development outcomes. While there are some generalizable trends
observable throughout the region, the socioeconomic reality of Chile differs drastically
from that of Bolivia. The same is true for the socioeconomic reality of Uruguay in
comparison to that of Venezuela, and between these apparent extremes there is a wide array
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of experiences within contained regional dynamics. What makes mineral abundant Chile
significantly different from mineral abundant Bolivia? What differentiates agriculturally
oriented Uruguay from oil dependent Venezuela? The resource curse argument proficiently
explain the commonality between these countries—the continued presence of some
relatively high level of poverty and inequality—but fails short to explain the variation in
experiences. Therefore, while the resource curse argument provides important insight on
the processes that condition developmental outcomes in the presence of primary products,
it cannot explain why those processes exist in some natural-resources-abundant-exportoriented societies and not others. More importantly, while the resource curse argument
outlines the incentives for elites to subvert the political process and perpetuate development
distortions, it fails to explain why the political process in South America is unwilling or
unable to overcome such subversion and transform the socioeconomic reality of the region.
Therefore, it is indispensable to formulate an explanation capable of answering these
questions. It is fundamental to outline the continuity of South American socioeconomic
distortions theoretically under a framework capable of accounting for both the global and
regional variance in development outcomes.

GIVING THE RIGHT ANSWERS
South American countries have the declared willingness and the material capacity
to transform their societies. Neither their geography nor their cultural heritage sit as
impeding factors to achieve a different socioeconomic reality. In fact, part of their
geography actually provides immense material resources to ignite a process of structural
transformation capable of eliminating the region’s developmental distortions. History has

19

chronicled the countless approaches, theories, and political movements that have risen in
order to resolve the region’s poverty and inequality. Whether classic liberalism in the late
nineteenth century, structuralism in the early twentieth century, neoliberalism in the late
twentieth century, or progressive democratic socialism and developmentalism in the
twenty-first century, the region has witnessed many intellectual attempts at understanding
its problems and resolving poverty and inequality. Consequently, South America has been
dominated by regimes ranging from republicanism, personalistic dictatorships,
bureaucratic authoritarianism, socialist revolutions, and liberal and illiberal democracies
with the declared commitment to improve the material reality of the region. But regardless
of the variation in ideology and political movements, South America’s political economy
continues to present two of its most historic characteristics: a predisposition to rely on
exporting primary products and the socioeconomic consequences of such strategy, poverty
and inequality.47
A satisfactory explanation for this reality must be able not only to explain the
regions productive predisposition but also its incapacity or unwillingness to transform it.
In other words, it is not sufficient to point at the processes that create poverty and
inequality. What is required is the formulation of a historically totalizing understanding
that explains the causes that created the conditions for poverty and inequality to arise while
also explaining the continuity of such conditions. Poverty and inequality are the symptoms
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of a deep problématique at the root of South American societies, and the region’s
predisposition toward exporting primary products is the process through which such
problématique manifests. South American societies have a structural condition that
perpetuates these socioeconomic conditions, they organized around productive activities
that generate periods of material improvement and periods of increased poverty and
inequality. For this organizing factor to explain the continuity of export orientation and
socioeconomic problems, it needs to be present throughout South American modern
history. As it is evident with the culture argument, the geography argument, and the
resource curse argument, variance cannot explain continuity and continuity cannot explain
variance. There must be a condition driving the continuity of the processes and
consequences of socioeconomic distortions.
The organizational factor that has been consistent throughout South American
history is the state. South American societies organized around a state that grew structurally
and functionally around productive activities that generate poverty and inequality. In other
words, the South American state developed structurally and functionally around the
exploitation of primary products for export. Therefore, any structural transformation of
South American socioeconomic reality would unavoidably imply a structural
transformation of the state. Throughout South American history, the South American state
found structural ground and functional articulation around the legitimation and material
resources it derived from exploiting natural resources for export. Every ideological or
political movement that has reached the state in South America has confronted the same
reality although inadvertently: the structural conditions that maintain the material viability
of the state are the same ones that perpetuate the processes that cause socioeconomic
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distortions in the region. Instead of arguing that the continuity of South American
development challenges is the result of cultural values, geographic conditions, or elite
behavior anathema to development, the state argument suggests that the continuity of a
predisposition for exporting primary products and its socioeconomic consequences are
because of the structural organization of the state.
The state argument is rooted in two important bodies of academic literature: the
literature on the formation of the South American state and Dependency theory. The
literature on the South American state is focused on how the state developed, particularly
pointing at its post-independence period of inception and its late nineteenth century
consolidation. Overall, there are two observable approaches within the literature on the
formation of the South American state: 1) a more traditional, historical, and literary work
approach that studies historically grounded narratives of state formation; and 2) a neoinstitutionalist approach focusing on rational choice and the economies of state
formation.48 Despite the methodological and epistemological differences, the traditional
and neo-institutional approach present a consensus regarding the formation of the South
American state. First, most accounts on state formation agree that the ideology of those
building the state influenced, to some extent, the decisions taken in the process. Most of
the literature points at the liberal preference of the post-independence criollo leadership in
South America as a factor in the formation of the state. Second, the literature points at the
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end of the nineteenth century as the period in which the South American state
consolidated.49 Therefore, the literature on the formation of the South American state
points at the nineteenth century as a fundamental period of study in order to understand the
role of the state in development outcomes in the region.
There is another fundamental factor for the study of the role of the state in
development outcomes highlighted in the literature on the formation of the South American
state. Although there is no explicit affirmation of this, there is an unequivocal consensus
regarding the structural basis for the South American state. Most of the literature on the
formation of the state in the region discusses whether the European models of state
formation apply to the South American experience. While many find incidental
coincidences between the two experiences, the verdict is the same: the South American
state did not follow the European model, but instead grew and consolidated as a
consequence of the first wave of globalization, developing in tandem with external
variables.50 Specifically, the literature on the formation of the South American state
highlights that the state developed in the nineteenth century in parallel with the expansion
of the international economy, and in particular with the expansion of the primary products
export sector that swept region in the second half of the century.51 In fact, controlling the
exploitation of natural resources became fundamental for the South American state. The
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colonial experience impregnated regional leaders of the importance of controlling the value
and exploitation of natural resources for the state to function properly, making it imperative
for the domination of the export economy at the center stage of state formation.52 Hence,
the state argument not only requires studying the nineteenth century but also the intricate
relation between the South American state, the international economy, and the exploitation
of natural resources.
The state argument is also rooted in Dependency theory’s focus on the interplay
between internal and external factors in the formulation of development outcomes.
Dependency theory argues that development outcomes in South America are the result of
historical processes that maintain the region in a position of producer of primary resources.
Similarly to the literature on the formation of the South American state, Dependency theory
also considers the nineteenth century as a critical period to understand the socioeconomic
reality of the region. It is at this moment in time when the interconnectedness between
South America and the international economy is consolidated. While the colonial period
was also an important point in the expansion of global capitalism that connected South
America with the rest of the world, it is in the nineteenth century that the region was forced
to play in the international game. This subjugation maintained the region incapable of
escaping a condition of socioeconomic relegation, and the international context played a
negative role in shaping such reality.53 Therefore, Dependency theory focuses not only on
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how internal structures affect developmental outcomes, but also how the international
context affected both internal structures and socioeconomic realities. In other words,
Dependency theory focuses on studying internal structures but rejects the idea that they
developed in a vacuum. The fact is that the internal structures that maintain the
predisposition to export primary products in South America are the result of the
interconnectedness of between external and internal factors, and they reflect a historical
process of domination between different social classes and how they interact with the
internal and external environment.54 If the state argument explains the continuity of
socioeconomic distortions in South America and positions the structure of the state at the
center of the analysis, then it must also focus on the context in which the state emerged and
consolidated to elucidate the influence of external factors in its formation.
The state argument is not in dissonance with the literature on South American
political economy. There is a long tradition embedded in the consciousness of regional
scholars that considers the South American state as the most powerful actor of the political
and economic systems.55 The state argument follows this tradition by recognizing not only
the centrality of the state in changing socioeconomic structures, but also as the fundamental
actor in the continuity of productive processes that perpetuate South America’s
development challenges. In this sense, the theoretical logic of the state argument rests on
the premise that organizing a society around exploiting primary products for export
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generates problems like poverty and inequality. While there is a vast array of academic and
political movements that have highlighted this problem, the state argument suggests that
the structure of the South American state perpetuates the productive processes of extraction
and the socioeconomic consequences of poverty and inequality. The reason behind the
state’s unwillingness or incapacity to transform the productive processes of South America
to address the continuity of development challenges in the region lies in its structural and
functional dependence on such processes. The South American state grew and consolidated
structurally and functionally around the exploitation and export of primary products, and
transforming these realities would require a deep structural transformation of the state. The
actors that reach the state have little if no incentive to endanger their political survival by
embarking on a structural transformation of the state that would not guarantee the state’s
viability, and by consequence, their own political success. This dynamic is aggravated in
an international economic context where there are massive incentives to maintain
exploitation processes in the form of consumption demand for primary products.
Moreover, the international context not only incentivizes South American states to
maintain their predisposition towards export-oriented productive activities. The
international context, through the action of other actors in the international economic
system, restricts the possibility for implementing alternative policies that could transform
the region’s socioeconomic reality. Dependency theory highlights the active role that
industrialized and countries play, through asymmetric relations of power, in perpetuating
the region’s socioeconomic reality. However, this is not exclusive of Dependency theory;
many critics of the contemporary international economic system denounce how the current
infrastructure of the global economic relations is designed to perpetuate the privilege
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position of industrialized countries relative to that of peripheral societies.56 Industrialized
countries maintain their privilege position by denying policy alternatives to peripheral
countries that they implemented openly while industrializing. A clear example of this are
current trade regulations, which prohibit domestic governments from shaping industrial
growth by protecting, subsidizing, or directing domestic capital to strategic areas vis-à-vis
international capital.57 Therefore, the structure of the international economic system not
only incentivizes but also forces South American states to maintain the export-oriented
productive processes that create poverty and inequality. In this sense, Figure 1 presents an
illustration of the major propositions theorized by the state argument.
Figure 1. Illustration of the State Argument
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The previous discussion about the contemporary socioeconomic trends in South
America highlights the cyclical dynamic of economic growth and poverty and inequality
in the region. More importantly, contemporary socioeconomic trends in the region
highlight the continuity of two important characteristics of South America’s political
economy: a predisposition toward exporting primary products and socioeconomic
distortions like poverty and inequality. The literature establishes the predisposition toward
exporting primary products as the cause for development challenges. However, the
cultural, geography, and resource curse arguments do not explain why—given the region’s
awareness of the pervasive consequences of relying on exporting commodities—South
America maintains an export-oriented political economy. In other words, if the oldest
development policy aspiration of the region has been to direct the resources extracted from
international trade into the articulation of a sustainable domestic economy,58 then why is it
that South America has been historically unable to do so?
Building from the resource curse argument, the literature on the formation of the
South American state, and Dependency theory, the state argument states that the structural
and functional formation of the South American state around extractive activities explains
the continuity of the characteristics of the region’s political economy. The state relies on
the functionality and material resources that the extractive economic activities provide, and
changing them requires threatening transforming the state and threatening its viability.
Ultimately, the international economy incentivizes the maintenance of the state structure
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through commodity consumption while also limiting the possibilities for change by
prohibiting and punishing alternative policies.
The state argument presents a historically totalizing explanation to the continuity
in South America’s socioeconomic distortions. Yet a historically totalizing explanation
requires not only the provision of a continuous condition capable of explaining continuity
but also a theoretical framework that encapsulates the region’s socioeconomic processes
under an encompassing understanding of the world. In order to create such encompassing
framework, it is necessary elucidate both the historical processes that sustain the state
argument and the theoretical premises that illuminate its contextual and continued
importance. Moreover, for the state argument to gain relevance as an explanatory approach
for the political economy of South America, it is necessary to articulate the specific
mechanisms through which the logic of the state argument becomes observable in reality.
These mechanisms then need to be confronted to the empirical reality in order to gauge
their validity as well as the overall traction of the state argument. In light of all this, it is
evident that building the entire intellectual structure on which the state argument rests is a
considerable effort; one that requires the allocation of resources such as time, dedication,
and academic justification. Thus, before moving forward with this endeavor, it is necessary
to outline the justification for the state argument and for studying South American political
economy in general.

THE CENTRALITY OF THE STATE ARGUMENT
It has been established that there is a long tradition of studying the socioeconomic
reality of the region embedded in the consciousness of South American thinkers and policy
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makers. The region has been the object of study for a multitude of intellectual approaches
emerging within and outside South America. In fact, the most important South American
contributions to the academic disciplines of Sociology, Economics, and International
Relations are intrinsically related to the region’s political economy. Given the vast
literature on Latin America’s political economy, is it necessary to allocate all of the
required resources toward another study on the region’s socioeconomic reality? It is not
improper to consider whether there is anything else to say about South American historical
development. Yet the contemporary socioeconomic dynamics of the region provide
evidence a continuity in development distortions that require investigation. There are also
other disciplinary, theoretical, and practical considerations for embarking on another
historical study of South American political economy. Thus, the justifications for
approaching this subject vary in terms of abstraction and generality, and can be
consolidated as: 1) the current state and nature of the discipline of International Relations;
2) the current state of the field of South American political economy; 3) the role of the state
in political economy; and 4) the practical implications of South American political
economy.
The first justification for studying South American political economy is the
ethnocentric nature of International Relations as an academic discipline. The history of
International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline is characterized by common points
of reference for any practitioner in the field. These points of reference are the inception of
the field with the first Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth, Wales, in 1919,
the evolution of the field with the predominance of Realism in the first debate, then the
preeminence of behavioralism after the second debate, and then the eclecticism of the third
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or paradigmatic debate. The academic lineage of the discipline is told as a sequence of clear
episodes that moved the field forward, portraying an idea of progress that many question.
Important discussions problematize the general myth about the history of the academic
field International Relations, pointing to significant inconsistencies in the narrative.59 In
particular, these works highlight the myths surrounding the foundational debates of the
discipline, pointing to their simplification of the prominent arguments of the era as well as
the false notion of victors emerging from the debates.60 The recurrence of this and other
malpractices in the historiography of the discipline comes from the constant retelling of
familiar yet usually under scrutinized arguments about the field. Perhaps the clearest
example of this malpractice is the pivotal role of Stanley Hoffmann’s article “An American
Social Science: International Relations” in the history of the field. In the first section of the
article subtitled “Only in America,” Hoffmann argues that a discipline like International
Relations could have only emerged in the United States because of certain unique
institutional, methodological, and political characteristics of the United States context.61
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While Hoffman’s argument is ad hoc and therefore problematic,62 he points at a crucial
deficiency at the center of International Relations: ethnocentrism.
Although not explicitly, Hoffmann points to the problem of ethnocentricity in
International Relations in his discussion about presentism in the discipline. Hoffmann
argues that International Relations has been absorbed by the principles, preoccupations,
and methodologies of the United States because of its predominance in the world.63 Such
predominance in the discipline creates problems of presentism and omission.64 By being
predominantly Euro-U.S. centered, the field fails to ask questions that are important to the
rest of the globe, and it fails to question the applicability of its core principles to other
political entities that differ drastically with the United States. In the relatively recent
context of disciplinary self-reflection in International Relations, the problem of the field’s
ethnocentrism is of particular importance, and many authors from different academic and
geographical backgrounds have pointed to the U.S.-European dominance of the field and
the many problems it creates.65
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The above mentioned trend of self-reflection about the history of the field has called
for the inclusion of different sources of knowledge. The inclusion of different voices in the
discipline is an imperative, given that their inclusion ultimately improves the field’s
capacity to answer to as many issues as possible affecting as many people as possible.66
Despite the thrust of self-reflection literature and the demand for other voices, at some
point the discipline failed at studying International Relations “from third world
perspectives.”67

However, more recent works suggest an effort at “decentering”

International Relations, increasing the voices in the field and incorporating explanations
based on a multitude of empirical realities.68 The effort is twofold: on the one hand, to
incorporate non-Western academic voices in the production of theoretical knowledge; and
on the other hand, to engage core principles in the field and challenge them through nonWestern empirical contexts. Therefore, concepts like the state, war, anarchy, or power are
confronted with the experience of political entities in various historical, cultural, and
regional contexts transcending the European Westphalian model. Moreover, the primacy
of power as an extension of material capabilities such as military prowess is challenged by
the prioritization of development by the Global South. The logical implication of this
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exercise, then, is the reconfiguration of the academic panorama of International Relations,
transforming the composition of core principles, dominating narratives, and even research
agendas.69
As a subfield of International Relations, political economy has been marked by the
preponderance of knowledge formation from the United States and Europe. Peripheral
areas like South America have been primarily used as a testing ground for grand theory.
The fact is that South America is constantly used as a case study, as a negative case for
counterfactual analysis, or simply as outliers in the generation of theory.70 The centered
and ethnocentric nature of International Relations requires studying political economic
realities based on peripheral experiences. Therefore, studying the historical processes of
South American political economy entails not only engaging and transforming core
concepts of the discipline, but also generating theoretical knowledge that is actually suited
to understand the region’s contemporary reality. Decentering International Relations
requires more that implying that European models of state formation cannot explain South
America; it requires the creation of a South American model of state formation that
provides an analytical framework to understand the region’s chronic socioeconomic
distortions.
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Both as a sub-field of International Relations and as a unique area of inquiry, the
field of South American political economy has a rich tradition and a vast body of research.
Overall, the socioeconomic reality of the region has been the formal subject of study of the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA) since the early
twentieth century, it marked the agenda of post-WII Area Studies, Developmentalism, and
Modernization theory, it has been the main concern for Dependency theory since the midtwentieth century, and it has informed the Neoliberal agendas framed under the
Washington Consensus of the late twentieth century. Moreover, the so called progressive
movements that characterized the political landscape of the twenty-first century have been
primarily preoccupied with the region’s political economy. However, as an area of inquiry,
South American political economy presents two important limitations that require
addressing: a) the historical use of external models; and b) the current state of the field of
South American political economy. South American political economy has been
historically marked by its reliance on external knowledge and models to understand and
transform its socioeconomic reality. With the exception of the Dependency theory, “[s]ince
its inception as part of the global economy in the sixteenth century, South America has
looked elsewhere for models to understand and imagine itself or to emulate.”71 It is
therefore indispensable to provide the field of South American political economy with
models based on its own reality, capable of explaining the historical processes behind its
current socioeconomic reality. But regardless of the long tradition of South American
political economy or its reliance on external inspiration, the field itself is in decline. While
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South America has been experiencing significant socioeconomic dynamics, political
economy studies have been declining in recent times relative to other areas of inquiry in
the region.72 Authors like Juan Pablo Luna, Maria Victoria Murillo, and Andrew Schrank
have identified the growing gaps of knowledge created by the decline in studies focusing
on South American political economy.73 Therefore, it is not only necessary to provide the
field of South American political economy explanations based on the region’s own reality
that are capable of explaining the historical processes of its development outcomes. Doing
so would reinvigorate a historically important area of inquiry in South American thought,
honoring its long tradition and moving the field forward.
Examining the continuity of socioeconomic conditions in South America and
building the state argument as a theoretical function of the region’s experience provides an
opportunity at decentering International Relations while reinvigorating political economy
as a fundamental area of inquiry. The research formulated in the United States about South
American political economy has come to regard the South American state as a secondary
actor in the region’s development outcomes. In this sense, the predominant literature in the
United Sates considers the South American state as an institution that is too weak and too
constrained by external forces to act and transform the region’s socioeconomic reality. This
is a clear example of how International Relations and U.S.-centered knowledge distorts the
understanding of non-center areas of the world, given that for South American scholars the
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state has not lost its central role as the most important actor in the region.74 Therefore, the
state argument developed in this study also influences the sub-field of political economy
by stressing the role of the state in development outcomes. With the advent of
Neoliberalism in the late twentieth century, common discourses on globalization have
relegated the state as a mere obstacle for development. The state’s role in the economy is
considered to be limited for development to exist, and if the state intervenes significantly
in economic processes, then it ultimately produces negative socioeconomic outcomes. A
litigation on the positive or negative state actions in development is beyond the point of
the state argument. The state argument is concerned not on the specific steps the state enacts
in economic policy, but on the structural organization on the state and how such condition
limit state action. What is important for the state argument is not whether the state enacts
strategy A or strategy B, but whether it can effectively implement one or the other.
Therefore, the state argument is concerned with the state structural condition and
functionality; a debate that precedes the dominant discourses on specific state intervention
in development outcomes.
However, what is imperative for the state argument to South American political
economy is the recognition of the central role of the state in development outcomes.
Regardless of which type of specific policy or strategy a state adopts, the state is at the
center of the development process, and this was an uncontroversial fact in the post-WWII
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era.75 While it is important to generate knowledge from non-center experiences that
reinvigorate socioeconomic debates, it is imperative to focus on the state as a fundamental
actor in South American political economy. In other words, it is fundamental for the study
of political economy to bring back the state to the center of the development process.
Recovering the centrality of the state in development is not only a function of its past
recognition as such, but also because whether it is considered to be a central player or not
in intellectual thought, in reality the state continues to be a crucial actor in the historical
processes of South America. The fact is that without the modern state, and more
importantly without a structurally functional modern state, contemporary economic
markets would be impossible. States are the guarantors of predictable exchanges that mold
and assure modern productive processes. In fact, without modern states there are no
contemporary citizens, and without contemporary citizens there are no collective processes
of wealth accumulation, distribution, and consumption. The modern state is the only
organization capable of using force and violence to maintain the rules and regulations that
permit any contemporary economic activity. Without states, economic exchanges and
productive process would look completely different from what they are in the
contemporary international system.76 Yet the centrality of the state in South American
political economy is not only abstract or as a mere regulator. Incidental recounts of
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historical processes in the nineteenth century, for example, show the central role of the
state in South American economic activities. Specifically, the nineteenth century South
American state played an instrumental role in fostering the development of the external
sector in order to obtain maximal growth while also directing the allocation of the influx
of foreign capital that swept the region between 1850 and 1914.77 The incidental recounts
of the role of the South American state in socioeconomic outcomes inform the state
argument, which in turn influences the field of study of political economy by bringing back
the centrality of the state in the development process.
The state argument presents a challenge to a centered International Relations
discipline by explaining a non-centered reality based on its own experience while
reinvigorating the study of South American political economy through its focus on the
centrality of the South American state in development. Yet mobilizing the entire academic
infrastructure requires not only a better interpretation of a reality but ultimately a
justification on its practical impact. The fact is that the state argument speaks to the core
of South America’s socio-political movements. Throughout history, understanding and
changing its socioeconomic reality has been at the center of regional sociopolitical
movements. Socioeconomic distortions and development challenges have been at the
center of South America’s foreign policy throughout its history.78 For regional leaders, the
resolving socioeconomic problems through autonomous autonomy action has been a
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fundamental concern informing and conditioning their foreign policy. Therefore,
developing the state argument is not only an intellectual exercise, it is an indispensable
process in order to approximate the region to practical steps directed at changing its
socioeconomic reality. South American societies cannot continue to depend on narratives
that are not theoretically based on the regional historical processes behind its contemporary
socioeconomic reality. In other words:
Work on the importance of ideas has more than adequately demonstrated
that the manner in which we view the world plays an immense role in
determining whether we choose to change it and how we seek to interact
with it. A South America understood through European or North American
eyes is not an accurate representation – not because Eurocentric spectacles
are worse than any other but simply because they are shaped by assumptions
foreign to the continent. 79
Continuing to understand socioeconomic challenges through European or North American
explanations not only distorts the way the region thinks about itself, but it ultimately limits
its capacity to act upon transforming its reality. Thus, the state argument becomes not only
an intellectual necessity but a practical imperative. The majority—if not all—of South
America’s contemporary leaders identify the region’s socioeconomic distortions as the
most important challenge their political movements are confronted with.80 If they continue
to rely on distorted understandings of the contemporary socioeconomic reality of the
continent, it is unlikely they will be able to articulate the mechanisms to transcend poverty
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and inequality; and in fact they have not.81 In this sense, Figure 2 illustrates the relevance
of the state argument.
Figure 2. Illustration of the Importance of the State Argument
THEORETICAL
Decentering International Relations

Reinvigorating South American
Political Economy

Bringing the State
back into Political
Economy

Influence
Policy

PRACTICAL

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
The state argument presents a historically totalizing explanation for the continuity
in South America’s socioeconomic distortions. The state argument rests on the premise
that countries with a reliance on producing primary products for exports face significant
development challenges that ultimately generate poverty and inequality. Based on this, the
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state argument questions why is it that societies that have been historically characterized
by a predisposition towards exporting activities like South American countries have not
been able to change their economic structures in order to transcend chronic poverty and
inequality. In this sense, the state argument states that South American societies have
organized around economic activities directed at exporting primary products. Specifically,
the state argument states that South American states developed both structurally and
functionally around productive activities directed at exporting primary products.
Therefore, transforming South American societies in order to overcome its socioeconomic
distortions requires a structural and functional transformation of the state. Yet this
structural and functional transformation of the state is difficult to achieve given important
internal and external conditioning factors. In terms of internal conditioning factors, any
structural and functional transformation of the South American state requires the
willingness and capability of individual actors within the state to articulate such process.
Even if the capacity to execute a structural and functional transformation of the state is
assumed, it is difficult to envision a context in which individual actors within the state face
an incentive structure that motivates them to threaten the viability of the state in order to
transform it. Moreover, the international economic system also affects the structural and
functional transformation of the state, conditioning its organization through increased
demand for primary products and limiting policy alternatives through global economic
rules and regulations. In this context, the state argument proposes that the South American
state developed functionally and structurally around extractives productive activities
directed at exports, and given the internal and external structures of incentives and
conditioning factors, the state maintains its foundational organization. This foundational
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organization of the state around extractive productive activities directed at exports creates
perpetuates society’s reliance on commodity commercialization and explains the
continuity of socioeconomic distortions in South America.
The logical premise of the state argument requires important theoretical, causal,
process, and empirical elaboration. The first step on the formation of the state argument
requires the formulation of a specific understanding of the world, one in which
socioeconomic processes are interconnected and totalizing. Since there is a long tradition
in South American political economy, the search for a theoretical formulation for the state
argument starts there. Chapter 1: Searching the State Argument presents a chronological
discussion of the different theoretical approaches that have explained socioeconomic
distortions in South America. The discussion of the different theoretical approaches that
have explained development challenges in South America stresses three important
elements required for the formulation of state argument: 1) what is the role of extractive
economic activities; 2) what is the role of the state; and 3) what is the role of international
context. By paying close attention to these three elements, Chapter 1 considers the
Dependency approach to provide the best theoretical framework to formulate the state
argument. However, the literature on Dependency theory is almost insurmountable, and
the approach has suffered significant rejection in International Relations. Therefore,
Chapter 2: Refining the State Argument presents a reformulation of Dependency theory as
a valid framework to understand and explain South American political economy. In
particular, Chapter 2 addresses the main criticisms of Dependency theory, refines its
concepts and theoretical formulations to adapt them to contemporary relations, argues that
Dependency theory is not a theory but an analytical approach, and then stresses its
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continued validity given its influence on contemporary discourses on development. The
next step in the formulation of the state argument is to articulate the specific processes,
concepts, and mechanisms through which it explains the continuity of socioeconomic
distortions in South America. Chapter 3: Designing the State Argument elaborates the
epistemological and methodological approach of this study in the formulation of the state
argument. It presents a quantitatively dominant sequential mixed method with multistrand
design in which historical analysis informs the theoretical formulation of the state argument
and multivariate statistical and time series regressions tests the validity of its propositions.
Then, Chapter 3 operationalizes the structure and functionality of the South American
state, highlighting the mechanisms to measure and test the state argument propositions.
Ultimately, Chapter3 discusses the periodization of analysis, assigning specific concepts,
methods, indicators, and tests to each period. The state argument affirms that the first
explanatory factor of the continuity of socioeconomic distortions is the formation of the
South American state around export-oriented productive activities. Therefore, Chapter 4:
Building the State Argument presents a historical analysis elucidating the process of state
formation in the region. Chapter 4 presents the first step of the quantitatively dominant
sequential mixed method with multistrand design of this study, in which the main premise
of the state argument is formulated. Therefore, Chapter 4 studies the period of state
formation and consolidation, which in the case of South American is the nineteenth
century. The historical analysis formulates the structural organization of the South
American state, showing how it grew around exporting primary products. Ultimately, the
state argument states that the structural organization of the South American state affects its
functionality and perpetuates the region’s predisposition toward exporting primary
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products. The maintenance of this predisposition explains the continuity of poverty and
inequality in the region. Hence, Chapter 5: Testing the State Argument presents a series of
quantitative methods based on statistical analysis that test the causal relationship between
the structural and functional organization of the South American state and poverty and
inequality. Informed by the historical analysis in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presents the second
step of the quantitatively dominant sequential mixed method with multistrand design of
this study, in which the main causal relationship of the state argument is empirically tested.
Therefore, Chapter 5 measures the traction of the state argument in explaining
contemporary socioeconomic dynamics in South America. In this sense, Chapter 5 first
shows how South American states continue to maintain a reliance on exporting primary
products in the twenty-first century, and then it shows how countries where the state is
structurally organized around extractive activities and functionally incapable present
higher levels of socioeconomic distortions. Ultimately, Conclusion: Reflecting on the State
Argument summarizes the logical premises, theoretical formulations, and empirical causal
relationships of the state argument. It then discusses subsequent areas of research,
particularly in terms of the periods of state reorganization and social changes of the
twentieth century in South America.
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CHAPTER 1
SEARCHING THE STATE ARGUMENT
There is a vast literature on the study of South American political economy.
Countless studies focus their attention on examining the reality of the continent based on
general theoretical understandings of development. In fact, the second half of the twentieth
century witnessed an impressive expansion of theoretical approaches focused on South
American political economy that both challenged core theoretical models as well as
reinterpreted the region’s experience. Hence, South American political economy presents
a wide array of theoretical positions and policy strategies like structuralism and import
substitution industrialization, Dependency theory and its countless variations,
Modernization theory and Developmentalism, Neoliberalism and market reforms,
Extractivism and export oriented growth, and Neo-Developmentalism with NeoExtractivism. Rather than presenting each individual theory and approach separately, the
next section discusses the evolution of development thinking in South America by
following the chronological emergence, debates, and political application of these
perspectives from the early twentieth century up until today.
A systematic examination of the literature on South American political economy
requires at least an informal structure to present the concepts, analytical propositions, and
practical implications of each approach. Therefore, the subsequent discussion follows an
informal chronological structure in which each approach is presented following these
elements: first, the global and regional context are described in order to observe how
international conditions interact with domestic factors. Second, the approach is introduced
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by discussing its particular diagnosis of the problem and its differences with any previous
approach. At this point the main theoretical, conceptual, and analytical aspects of the
approach are discussed. Third, based on the diagnosis of the problem, the challenged
theory, and the theoretical aspects, the discussion presents the practical implications and
policy prescriptions of the approach. As mentioned before, the order in which each
approach is presented is chronological, and any paradigm shifts are contextualized with the
international and regional dynamics.
Overall, this chapter points at the global context in which a theoretical paradigm
appeared, highlights the causes behind poverty and inequality identified by the theory,
discusses their policy prescription and their application, and contrasts the theoretical
contestation they represent. There are three main justifications for this informal
chronological structure in the discussion of the vast literature on South American political
economy. First, the state argument states that the continuity of South American
development challenges is explained by the continuity in the structural and functional
organization of the state. However, the state argument contends that the state did not
develop in a vacuum, the international context played a significant role in its formation,
consolidation, and maintenance. Presenting the literature chronologically while discussing
the global context under which each theoretical evolution took place elucidates the globallocal dynamic embedded in the state argument. Second, only a historical discussion of the
different approaches that explain socioeconomic challenges in South America can
illuminate aspects of continuity in the literature. Since the state argument suggests that it
is the continuity of export oriented economies what creates poverty and inequality, then it
is indispensable to present the literature on South American political economy historically
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and chronologically in order to identify continuous factors. Third, the practical implications
of the state argument require to identify the policy prescriptions of the different theoretical
approaches on South American political economy throughout history. Only by identify
how these approaches proposed changes to South America’s socioeconomic reality can the
state argument point at a different trajectory. In this sense, the next section presents a
discussion of the most influential theoretical approaches in the history of South American
political economy.

THE LITERATURE ON SOUTH AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
The academic literature on South American political economy is immense ranging
from works on the economic history of colonial America to examinations of contemporary
dynamics. In order to establish the theoretical framework of the state argument, it is first
necessary to review the existing literature in order to illuminate on aspects of continuity
present since the late nineteenth century. Therefore, the starting point is South America’s
implementation of a classical liberal economic model from the moment of independence
until the early twentieth century. The penetration of the industrial revolution in South
America transformed the region and its socioeconomic structures. Industrial development
in Europe from the 1840s onwards created both a concentration of capital and labor towards
industry as well as an increase in the demand for agricultural products.82 This created two
main effects in the economies of peripheral areas such as South America: first, there was a
massive migration of Europeans towards peripheral areas looking for jobs in the production
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of primary products for European industrial consumption. This migration allocated
European labor that was dislocated due to the industrial focus of the European economy
throughout Latin America.83 The second effect of Europe’s industrial allocation of
resources in other regions of the world was the massive investment in industrial activities
related to the extraction of primary products. The massive influx of financial investment
that Europe located in the Western hemisphere was directed toward commodities
exploitation.84 The allocation of European human and financial resources toward the
exploitation of primary goods shaped the socioeconomic structures of the South America.
The commercial relationship between Europe and South America was
characterized by trade. Under the influence of Ricardian classical economics, South
America specialized in the export of primary products towards Europe, while Europe
specialized in manufactured products exported, among many other areas, to South
America.85 This is not to say that this model was imposed on the region by Europe. On the
contrary, the philosophical and theoretical principles of classical economics were
significantly appealing for the South American elite that emerged after the independence
movements.86 Particularly attractive were the ideas of Adam Smith, who promoted a
division of labor by breaking the production process into different specialized stages.87
This division of labor was also applied as an international principle, in which South
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America and Europe would focus on a specific stage of the production process based on
their comparative advantages. Therefore, the transformation of the region is the result of
the dynamic of the international economic system in combination with regional conditions.
The fact is that South American economies were already predisposed to be export-oriented
since the development of the colonial productive system.88 Such predisposition, combined
with the ideological preferences of regional elites and entrepreneurs who strongly favored
Smithian economics,89 favored the concentration of exporting primary products.
The implementation of the classical liberal economic approach forced South
American countries to organize their societies around these activities. The region
implemented free trade policies that guaranteed a free flow of goods, labor, and financial
resources within a classical liberal institutional framework. The state involvement in the
economy was focused towards the acquisition of productive land from indigenous and
peasant groups, financing export activities, and maintaining cheap labor through migration
and anti-union policies.90 Classical liberalism was the dominant ideological preference of
South American elites at the start of the twentieth century despite the circulation of
protectionist ideas. Liberal policies were supported by a massive demand of commodities
in the global economy, which increased the revenue of local and foreign elites involved in
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the industries of beef, wheat, sugar, coffee, oil, copper, and bananas.91 Ultimately, the
liberal model that characterized South America from the 1860s conditioned these countries
to use the foreign exchange obtained from the commercialization of commodities to import
industrial and manufactured goods.
Significant transformations in the twentieth century challenged the classical
economic model that characterized South America since the mid-nineteenth century. The
catalyst for the entire challenge to the liberal approach was World War I. The war
precipitated the decline of Great Britain as the global hegemon, thereby also undermining
the foundational principles governing South America’s political economy. The first
consequence of Great Britain’s demise was the emergence of the United States as the global
hegemon and economic superpower. The United States’ economy was different than Great
Britain’s since it could compete with South America in the production of primary products.
While Great Britain’s economy presented an important integration with South American
economies, the United States had a more diverse economy that reduced the need for
importing primary products.92 The second consequence of the demise of Great Britain was
that the global economy moved toward protectionism, modifying the entire processes of
international trade. These transformations culminated in 1929 with the stock market crash
and the global economic depression of the 1930s. These circumstances—the rise of the
United States, the collapse of Great Britain, the emergence of protectionism, and the global
economic depression—were catastrophic for South America’s political economy.
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The consequences of World War I reduced the global demand for primary products,
creating a significant decline in commodity prices. South American export markets
disappeared by 1929, which significantly reduced the region’s capacity to import
manufactured and industrial goods because of the reduction of foreign exchange.
Internally, the region suffered widespread poverty, unemployment, misery, and social
unrest. The global and regional context eliminated the attractiveness of the liberal ideology
in the South America because of their poverty-stricken reality.93 It is in this context of
global recession and regional poverty that the first major theoretical challenge to the
classical liberal approach emerges. In 1936, John Maynard Keynes’ book The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was published in response to the failure of
classic liberal economics. Keynes challenged the primacy of the free market as a selfregulating positive force, and considered investment as the main driver of economic
growth. In fact, in sharp contrast to classical liberal economic theories, Keynes argued that
governments should play a role in economic development in order to promote investment
during economic downturns as a counter-cyclical measure.94
Keynesian economic theory became influential around the world, becoming the
ideological premise of the global economy under the Bretton Woods system. The positive
experience of the Marshall Plan created optimism for a similar injection of investment to
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produce economic development in the periphery.95 Keynesianism not only challenged
classical liberal economic theory on the role of the state but also on the sources of growth.
For classical liberal economic theory the main driver of economic growth was trade. Yet
after the experience of the early twentieth century, many economists started to point at
capital accumulation and investment as the main drivers of economic growth.96 The
preference for capital accumulation and investment as the main drivers of economic growth
informed Walt Rostow’s 1960 book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist
Manifesto. In the book, Rostow argues that there is an identifiable linear path through
which all societies can achieve development.97 Rostow developed his unilinear and
ahistorical theory of stages by studying the developmental evolution of industrialized
countries in Europe and the United States. This path consisted of a series of stages through
which traditional societies transitioned in order to trigger economic development and reach
the stage of mass consumption. Rostow’s theory of stages listed five stages: the traditional
stage, the preconditions for take-off stage, the take-off stage, the drive to maturity stage ,
and the age of mass consumption stage. According to the theory, in order to trigger
economic development, countries needed to allocate capital and technology in industrial
activities of high productivity in the preconditions for take-off stage and the take-off stage.
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The allocation of resources in industrial activities of high productivity would ignite a
transformational transition from traditional economies to economies of consumption.
The theoretical influence of Rostow’s theory of stages informed the study of
peripheral societies under Modernization theory. Overall, Modernization theory argued
that economic development was a process characterized by industrialization, urbanization,
and the abandonment of traditional structures.98 The Modernization approach stated that
the development challenges of peripheral nations were due to the presence of traditional
sectors in their societies. Authors like M. J. Levy or James S. Coleman argued that
traditional nations were characterized by societies with low per capita income,
technological rigidity, high levels of agrarian production, and low literacy.99 Traditional
countries based their societies on principles derived from religiosity or sacred cultural
norms, and Modernization considered it imperative to eradicate such structures and
establish modern sectors based on secularism and rationality. In this sense, authors like
Gabriel Almond and David Apter pointed at the specialization and distinctiveness of
political structures rooted in a secular-libertarian principles as the main characteristic of
modern societies.100
The Modernization approach considered development to be a transition from
traditional to modern socioeconomic structures. Yet the transition from traditional societies
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to modern societies was usually difficulted by dualism.101 Arthur Lewis described dualism
as discernable characteristic of developing societies in which there was a cohabitation of a
predominantly traditional sector with a smaller modern sector. For Modernization theory,
dualism creates socioeconomic tensions that can only be resolved through a deep societal
transformation by completing the transition from traditionalism to modernity. Lewis
argued that economic dualism was evident in traditional societies because there were high
levels of labor in rural activities that constantly depressed labor on urban activities. Only
when there was massive migration from rural to urban productive activities the tensions of
the dualistic economy would secede and economic development would appear.102 But this
transition, or the fulfillment of the take-off stage in Rostow’s theory, were considerably
challenging in peripheral countries.
The problem in peripheral economies was the lack of preconditions for the takeoff stage to succeed. Scholars within the modernization approach started to realize that it
would be challenging to replicate the successes of the Marshall Plan in developing
countries because of significant market rigidities that affected capital accumulation and
capital allocation in peripheral countries. Hence, Modernization theory called for
establishing a policy of foreign direct investment so that foreign capital could resolve the
issues of capital accumulation in peripheral countries.103 However, while capital
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accumulation was to be resolved by foreign direct investment, the market failures that
affected capital allocation were still present in peripheral countries. Given the need to
allocate foreign capital effectively in developing countries, policy makers and scholars
advocate for peripheral states to intervene in the process. Therefore, Developmentalism
emerged in the context of post-World War II as an approach to resolve the market rigidities
present in developing countries. Informed by modernization, Keynesianism, and
Structuralism, Developmentalism envisioned the developmental state as the mechanism to
effectively allocate foreign capita toward industrial activities with high productivity. For
Developmentalism, the developmental state was required to promote capital accumulation,
to direct industrialization through public and private investment, and to protect infant
industries through subsidies and tariffs.104
Keynes’ thinking and Developmentalism were particularly influential in Latin
America, informing the thinking of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). In 1949, Raúl Prebisch and Gustavo Martínez Cabañas stated that
the classic liberal economic approach that characterized South American economies since
the nineteenth century made it impossible for region to achieve independent
development105 Prebisch and Martínez identified the unequal terms of trade between the
centers of economic activity and the periphery as the main impediment for development in
South America. ECLAC’s diagnosis of South American development challenges argued
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that while the productive improvement of industrial activities in the center had triggered
economic growth in the periphery through the center’s consumption of primary products,
the rate of decreasing returns of primary products created considerable constraints for
South American development.106 The consequence of the unequal terms of trade between
center and periphery was that the more time progressed the decreasing terms of trade of
commodities in relation to industrial products would reduce the consumption capacity of
South America by reducing its capacity to import manufactured and industrial goods. For
example, Prebisch and Martínez show that while from 1876 to 1880 a peripheral country
could consume 100 manufactured products from the commercialization of a specific
number of commodities, by 1946 this figure had dropped to 68.7.107
This was a significant challenge to the classic liberal economic approach, since the
empirical reality was not following the logic of its theoretical propositions. According to
classic liberal economics, the increase in productivity of manufactured and industrial goods
would lead to a decline in their relative costs. However, Prebisch and Martínez showed
how

while technological innovation significantly increased the productivity of

manufactured and industrial goods, their prices did not decrease relative to primary
products. In fact, if the theoretical logic of the classic liberal economic approach was true,
commodities should have seen a price increase relative to manufactured or industrial goods
because the productivity of primary goods production did not increase at the same rate as
the productivity of manufactured goods production. If the productivity of manufactured
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goods production increased more than the productivity of primary goods production, the
classic liberal economic theory states that the prices of primary goods should increase
relative to those of manufactured goods. As it was shown by Prebisch and Martínez, the
classic liberal economic theory did not happen. The cause behind the failure of the classic
liberal economic theory, according to Prebisch and Martínez, was the increase of revenue
for entrepreneurs and those controlling the factors of production in industrial and
manufactured activities. The consequence of this was that industrial centers were able to
retain the revenue of their economic activities while the peripheral economies saw their
revenue increasingly flowing for the acquisition of manufactured goods.108
Therefore, the diagnosis of South American development elaborated by Prebisch
and Martínez, and therefore adopted by ECLAC, evolved into Structuralism. The
Structuralism approach states that the unequal terms of trade between the center and the
periphery made it impossible for the periphery to achieve development, which called for
South America’s own industrialization policy. To achieve industrialization, South
American countries had to adopt a policy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), in
order to move away from the production of commodities towards the production of
industrial and manufactured goods.109 Informed by Keynesianism, Developmentalism, and
Modernization, ISI consisted of an industrialization model in which the state would protect
infant industries through tariffs and subsidies in order to ignite development. The role of
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the state was to direct resources, both financial and human capital, away from commodity
commercialization towards more productive industries.
The policy prescription of ISI played a significant role in the development of South
American countries during the post-World War II period, but the development strategy of
the region transcended industrialization and protectionism. Modernization theory also
gained traction in South American academic circles, and the concept of marginality
influenced both theory and practice. The DESAL School, based in Chile after the founding
work of Roger Vekemans, produced a series of studies on modernization in South America.
Following the idea of dualism described by Modernization theory, the DESAL approach
argued that peripheral societies are dichotomized between sectors that are incorporated and
sectors that are marginalized from social, political, and economic participation. Therefore,
marginality refers to the social groups that have a receptive passive participation in the
social process, creating little access to education, health, or income.110 While authors like
Gino Germani considered marginality to be a consequence of the modernization process,
the DESAL approach considered South American marginality to be a colonial heritage in
the region.111
The concept of marginality developed by the DESAL appraoch had significant
policy implications for Developmentalism and Modernization. Modernization theory based
its policy prescriptions of “asistencialismo” in the understanding of marginality.112 Hence,
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the state was responsible for articulating policies directed to increase the participation of
marginalized groups in society by increasing their passive participation with the objective
of making them active participants in society. However, authors like Mattelart and
Garreton argued that integrationist policies faced significant challenges because of rigid
class structures and dualism in South America.113 Hence, the policy prescription of the
Modernization approach were directed at removing these barriers, calling for the state to
create collective bargaining organizations for individuals in marginalized groups, to create
significant institutional reforms to integrate marginalized groups into society, and to
dislodge the dominant classes. These Modernization theory policy prescriptions had real
practical implication, inspiring the process of land reform in Chile in the 1960s and in Peru
in the 1960s and 1970s.114
Therefore, during the post-World War II period, South American countries
embraced Developmentalism, Structuralism, and Modernization as their main strategies
against the failures of the classic liberal economic approach that dominated the region since
the mid nineteenth century and well into the 1930s. Informed by Developmentalism,
Structuralism highlighted the external structural disadvantages of South America under the
free trade regime of the global economy. In order to solve these disadvantages,
Structuralism called for protectionism and industrialization under ISI, challenging the
theoretical premises of classic liberal economics by stressing the role of the state in
directing economic development. Moreover, Modernization theory focused on the internal
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structural distortions of South American societies, and how these traditional societies
impeded development in the region. In terms of economic growth, Modernization theory
also called for the state to direct capital accumulation and labor away from traditional
economic activities and towards industrial activities with high productivity. Ultimately,
given the characteristic dualism of South American societies, the Modernization approach
considered it imperative for the state to also apply integrationist policies in order to allow
for marginalized groups to have active participation in society.115
The development that was supposed to be achieved by the application of
Developmentalism was not part of the socioeconomic reality of South America by the late
1960s and early 1970s Under the theoretical expectations of Modernization and the policy
prescriptions of Structuralism, South America was expected to, among other things, attain
greater independence in foreign trade, transfer economic decision making back to the
region,116 integrate socially marginalized groups, transition into a modern society, and
democratize. These expectations, to various degrees, were ultimately not achieved
throughout the continent. First, the region was unable to break from the process of
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commodity commercialization, primarily because the demand for primary products
increased dramatically during World War II 117 Ironically, the fact is that the combination
of ISI policies and the deterioration of exchange rates actually increased the region’s
dependence on foreign trade. The revenue obtained from exporting commodities was
directed at importing industrial inputs that were fundamental for industrialization policies
to succeed, ranging from technological inputs to semi-manufactured primary products.118
Moreover, given the increased implementation of protectionist policies around the world,
South American infant industries found it very difficult to allocate their manufactured
products abroad, reducing their market presence, their revenue and ultimately their capacity
to reduce production costs. 119 Second, the region failed to achieve significant autonomy in
the execution of its political economy. The Developmentalism approach was also interested
in transferring the centers of decision-making from the external sectors of the economy to
the internal sectors of the economy in order to generate sustainable development in South
America. However, the emergence of vertical corporations that integrated the entire
production process and their penetration in the continent increased the foreign control of
the industrialization process, reducing the capacity and autonomy of internal actors and
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ultimately the state.120 The fact that the modern corporations controlled technological
inputs, investment capital, and administrative knowhow increased their power in relation
to South American states. Therefore, rather than creating sustained and autonomous
development, industrialization in South America strengthened the position of foreign
capital by insulating it from competition through protectionism while it concentrated
revenue and expatriated profit.121 Third, Developmentalism did not integrate marginalized
sectors of society given its bias toward traditional elites and the urban sector. The state
effort during Developmentalism and industrialization focused primarily in the big cities of
the region, creating massive internal migration from rural to urban areas. The massive
internal migration that started in the 1950s transformed South American countries from
predominantly rural to urban societies. However, the formal sector of the economy in urban
centers was not equipped to absorb the massive influx of labor coming from rural areas
given the capital-intensive nature of industrial Developmentalism.122 Beyond the failure of
industrialization policies to absorb displaced labor, the integrationist policies promoted by
Modernization theory also biased toward urban centers, deviating public resources away
from rural areas. A clear example of this was education, since public investment was
directed at improving urban public education, benefiting urban middle-classes and elites
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while depriving rural social sectors.123 Ultimately, Developmentalism did not modernize
political structures in the region and it failed to usher the promised democratization. The
fact is that traditional elites continued to yield significant power and privilege in detriment
of democratizing political participation. The failures of Developmentalism and the
consequences of its political implementation are best described by economic historian
Rosemary Thorp:
while the growth record overall was impressive and while the institutional
story was one of radical change in many areas, industrialization and import
substitution were inserted into and reinforced the existing extremely
unequal economic and social system. Even brave efforts at land reform did
not modify the essential picture of poverty and exclusion. Women and
indigenous groups remained relatively dispossessed, and urban labor
market trends tended to create new inequalities 124
By the late 1960s, the productive reality of South America under
Developmentalism was characterized by the exhaustion of the policies of ISI.125 The main
problem for industrial policy in the region was the production structure of manufactured
goods. On the one hand, internal demand for industrial products did not increase and
external demand was blocked by protectionism, maintaining production costs high given
the incapacity to exploit economies of scale and ultimately reducing potential industrial
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revenue. On the other hand, the cost of intermediary industrial inputs did not decrease,
putting pressure on access to foreign exchange. Therefore, South American states absorbed
the cost of intermediate industrial inputs and the cost of protectionism through fiscal
deficits and public debt.126 The result was that states in the region became at the same time
financial intermediaries subsidizing industrialization, compensatory actors through
redistribution, and producers of capital through public investment.127 In order to cope with
the increased financial responsibilities and the growing fiscal deficits, South American
states started to print money in order to finance public investment and industrialization,
generating in return high levels of inflation and capital flight.128
It is not a surprise that by the late 1960s the region had lost faith in Structuralism
and

Modernization,

and

two

theoretical

approaches

emerged

to

challenge

Developmentalism: Dependency theory and Neoliberalism. While the emergence of
Neoliberalism took place particularly after the debt crisis of the early 1980s, Dependency
presented a theoretical challenge to Developmentalism in the 1960s.129 While Dependency
agreed with ECLAC’s diagnosis of the socioeconomic reality of South America, it
considered that ECLAC’s policy prescriptions of industrialization, improved terms of
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trade, and increased foreign investment exacerbated national dependency. For Dependency
theory, the underlying problem with ECLAC’s policies prescriptions was their view of
certain conditions in South American societies as impediments for economic development
that needed to be resolved. However, Dependency theory considered these conditions the
reflection of deeper structural problems created by capitalism and perpetuated by ECLAC’s
policy prescriptions.130 However, Dependency theory challenged the entire Modernization
approach by problematizing its diagnosis on South America’s socioeconomic reality, by
contesting its theoretical propositions, by criticizing its underlying premises, and by
rejecting its policy prescriptions. First, Dependency challenged Modernization’s
theoretical understanding of national units as autonomous or independent actors by
stressing the importance of the international context and by highlighting the dependence of
South America in relation to global economic centers.131 Second, Dependency considered
Modernization theory to be ahistorical, unilinear, parochial and irrelevant for the reality of
South America. Much like mainstream approaches to International Relations, the episteme
of Modernization theory reflected the experiences of Europe and the United States, creating
ahistorical and context-insensitive development models and policy prescriptions could not
transform the region. On the contrary, Dependency theory stressed that the international
context in which industrialized countries developed changed dramatically to the point that
late industrializers would not be able to follow the same path. Specifically, Dependency
writers considered the South American context to be diametrically different to that of the
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developed world—given the region’s colonial heritage and its contemporary position in the
international division of labor—therefore arguing that developmental models based on the
U.S.-European experience were irrelevant to the region.132 Second, Dependency theory
challenged the policy prescriptions of Modernization theory and problematized the
approach’s assumptions regarding political and development outcomes. Dependency
rejected the causal relationship between modernization and democracy,133 and authors like
Oswaldo Sunkel and Rodolfo Stavenhagen problematized Modernization’s policy
prescriptions directed at resolving dualisms and marginality. Contrary to Modernization
theory, Sunkel and Stavenhagen considered that marginality was structurally embedded in
South American societies by the penetration of foreign capital in the region.134 Since
Modernization theory advocated for the penetration of foreign capital in South America in
order to trigger the take-off stage, Dependency considered marginality to be a consequence
of Modernization theory.
But perhaps the biggest difference between Dependency theory and Modernization
theory was their theoretical and ideological background. The theoretical and ideological
basis for Dependency theory lies in the works of Karl Marx and his study of human
relations through capitalism. Marxism studies the relations of domination and subjection
within the context of material conditions, arguing that labor—as it allows for the interaction
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of the self with nature and with others—is the defining human activity. Marxism considers
it imperative to study productive processes and labor relations, since they are the
mechanisms through which individuals satisfy their material needs.135 Therefore, the idea
of labor as the most defining activity for individuals because of its capacity to satisfy
material needs is the theoretical justification for Marx to study human relations through
capitalism. While a discussion of Marx’s theory of capitalism is beyond the objective of
these paragraphs,136 it is necessary to highlight that the areas of focus within Marxism are:
1) the study of class structures in advanced economies; 2) the study of the relationship
between advanced and backward economies; and 3) class structures in backward countries.
The theory of imperialism developed by Vladimir Lenin—which explains the expansion
of capitalism in the need to extract cheap primary products, to expand consumption
markets, and to repatriate financial profits from peripheries to economic centers—studies
the second area Marx’s theory of capitalism.137 However, Lenin’s theory of imperialism
studies the expansion of the capitalist system from the perspective of the economic centers.
In contrast, Dependency theory focuses on the second area of Marx’s theory of capitalism
but does so from the perspective of the periphery. Therefore, the main theoretical basis of
Dependency theory considers human interaction to be conditioned and regulated through
productive relations. In this sense, capitalism becomes a fundamental aspect of human
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relations given its transformative effect on productive processes. Development distortions
like poverty and inequality are considered to be the result of human interactions, and
Dependency theory studies the viability and feasibility of capitalist expansion in peripheral
regions like South America in order to understand the region’s socioeconomic reality.138
However, Dependency theory also challenged some of the causal propositions of Marxism,
presenting a theoretical influence but also an analytical refinement. For instance, Marx
considered that once capitalist technology was either developed or introduced in a society,
then capitalism became an unstoppable force of transformation. On the contrary, many
Dependency theory authors considered that the development or introduction of capitalist
technology capable of transforming the region’s socioeconomic reality was unviable given
the structure of the international economy.
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South America is one of important contention and debate within Dependency theory,
marking the degree of variation in dependency analyses.
Beyond the substantive and important differences among dependency authors, there
are consistent propositions regarding Dependency theory’s diagnosis on South America’s
socioeconomic reality. As it was mentioned before, the Dependency approach was based
on the premise that development outcomes are not the result of self-contained national
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processes. For dependency authors, the interconnectedness of

national process and

international power structures are the main drivers of the socioeconomic reality of South
America. In this sense, power relations and the productive exploitation of capitalism are
central analytical factors for Dependency.140 Therefore, the condition of underdevelopment
that characterized South America was the consequence of how global centers power
interacted with regional structures. Specifically, Dependency argued that European
colonization positioned South America in an economically disadvantageous position in the
international division of labor. Once colonization ended, post-colonial relations
perpetuated the same colonial economic structures through the alignment of foreign centers
of power and national elites.141 At the center of Dependency’s analysis was the expansion
of capitalism, which was considered to be the justification for perpetuating structures of
labor exploitation in South America. In this sense, the fact that South America was
characterized socioeconomic distortions was not because the region was unable to
transform traditional structures, but because those traditional structures were perpetuated
by international capitalism in order to maximize productive processes.142 Ultimately, the
policy prescriptions of Dependency theory also presented important differences among
authors within the approach. From radical violent revolution to progressive dependent
development, dependency scholars recommended policies directed at addressing South
America’s position in the international division of labor. According to Dependency theory,
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the only path to development was through a processes of separation from the world
economic system that permitted South American states to amass sufficient autonomy to
replace capitalist elites so that a socialist state could be established.143 As long as South
America maintained its position in the international division of labor as a provider of
primary product for industrial production in developed centers of power, the region would
continue to suffer from important socioeconomic problems like poverty and inequality.
Therefore, the Developmentalism crisis in the 1960s and early 1970s, combined
with the critical emergence of the Dependency approach, created different political
consequences. First, countries like Brazil and Colombia continued applying
Developmentalism’s policy prescription, but they implemented important corrections by
promoting manufacturing and other non-traditional exports. Other countries like
Argentina, Chile, and Peru, followed the socializing, statist, and redistributive strategy
prescribed by Dependency theory in order to transition from dependent capitalism to
socialism. However, the Dependency inspired political movements did not last long, and
they were mainly overthrown by military dictatorships, and countries like Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Peru moved away from their short-lived socialist strategies by the 1970s.
With the apogee of Dependency theory and the demise of Developmentalism, the
Neoliberalism approach also emerged as a contestation to the dominant discourses of the
region. A third group of countries like Costa Rica and Venezuela became important
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expressions of the Neoliberalism approach even when Dependency was still important in
the region.144
The changing economic environment of the international system in the 1970s and
the subsequent debt crisis of Latin America in the 1980s signaled the definitive collapse of
Developmentalism, ISI, and any attempt at Dependency inspired socialism in the region.
The debt crisis represented the worst socioeconomic crisis in South America since the
Great Depression, with the difference that it was now affecting a predominantly urban
population in the region.145 The causes of the debt crisis can be found both in the changes
in the international economic market as well as in the embrace of Developmentalism and
Dependency in the region. First, the international economic system suffered a dramatic
trembling in in the 1970s because of the economic deceleration and rising inflation of core
industrial countries. The increase in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 created massive stagflation
in the industrial centers of powers, and traditional Keynesian policies were ineffective in
resolving the economic crisis.146 The administrations of Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher applied strict monetary policies that increased interest rates to control inflation
and applied fiscal policies aimed at triggering growth.147 The ideological and theoretical
support for Reagan and Thatcher’s policies was to be found in the works of Milton
Friedman and other influential economists from the University of Chicago, which
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represented

the

core

intellectual

thrust

behind

Neoliberalism’s

challenge

to

Developmentalism and Dependency. Neoliberalism argued that the socioeconomic
problems of South America in the 1980s were the consequence of maintaining incorrect
prices in the region. The problem was created and sustained by state intervention in the
process, particularly given that subsidies to industrialization underestimated the cost of
capital and overestimated the cost of labor. Therefore, the Neoliberalism approach
considered it necessary for South America to allocate resources toward labor intensive, and
not capital intensive, productive activities.148 But for this to happen, Neoliberalism
prescribed for South American states to reduce their role in regional development. The
diagnosis of the Neoliberalism approach contended that the development challenges
plaguing South America were the consequence of wrong policy choices implemented by
states, and so the state needed to reduce its active participation in economic processes and
to allow the free market to correct these distortions.149 The consequence was, as John Toye
argued, that during the 1970s a “counter-revolution” emerged in development studies that
challenged Developmentalism and its policy prescriptions like tariffs, subsidies, quotas,
and the emphasis on investing in physical capital. 150
The stagflation of the 1970s and the monetary policies of the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations created significant changes in the international economy that directly
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affected South America. First, the economic contraction of the industrial centers created
by the oil crisis significantly decreased the prices of commodities and the entire export
volume of the region declined. Lower export volumes meant that Latin America’s terms of
trade in 1983 were 26% lower than what they were in 1978.151 A reduction of 26% in the
terms of trade meant that the revenue that was used to import industrial inputs, to import
consumption goods, and to service public debt simply evaporated. Not only did
consumption and industrial output decreased, but since the state was indirectly subsidizing
the labor market given its subsidies on industry, the reduction of the terms of trade also
created massive unemployment. Second, the monetarist policies of the industrialized
countries created a sharp increase in interest rates by reducing capital liquidity. Once
interests rates increased, the cost of the public debt that South American countries acquired
during the Developmentalism era became more expensive, and the amount of resources
directed at debt service in the region increased from 6.9 billion dollars in 1977 to over 39
billion dollars in 1982.152 But the cost of public debt was not the only problem the debt
created. A considerable part of foreign inflows in the region during the late 1970s and early
1980s were devoted for consumption of non-essential goods.153 Rather than investing in
productive activities, South American countries consumed their way through the period of
Developmentalism fueled by high commodity prices, state subsidies, and an irrational
expectation for unlimited economic growth. Third, the de-regulation policies implemented
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by certain countries like Argentina and Chile in the 1970s increased the vulnerability of
their financial systems once the debt-crisis exploded in 1982.154 When Mexico declared it
had run out of foreign exchange on Friday, August 15, 1982, foreign bankers panicked in
fear of a massive regional default. Since commodity prices decreased, public revenue
evaporated, and the cost of public debt increased, South America could no longer enjoy the
access to cheap foreign capital that it had in the early 1970s. Foreign Bankers, given the
reduced capacity of Latin American states to collect revenue and then pay the service on
public debt, closed credit options to the region thereby decreasing net capital inflows to the
region by 33.3 billion dollars between 1981 and 1983.155 The consequences of all of these
changes were devastating to the productive structure of the region. The fact is that in less
than five years, South American societies lost significant export volume, massive losses of
export revenue, important drops on commodity prices, rising costs of public debt service,
and a limited access to foreign credit while poverty, inequality, and unemployment
increased significantly.
Neoliberalism’s diagnosis of the region’s socioeconomic problems focused on the
nature and magnitude of debt, its budgetary consequences, and the role of the state. For
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, the most worrisome aspects of the economic crisis in the region
was the size or nature of public debt in South American budget balances. Public debt per
se was not a problem since other regions in the world had acquired debt by the 1980s. The
problem was that Latin America’s debt was significantly bigger, totaling 351 billion dollars

154

Ibid. pp. 107-09.

155

Ibid. p. 101.

75

while the rest of the developing world owed 383 billion dollars.156 The size of the debt and
the nomination in United States dollars made the region more susceptible to dollar
appreciations. Moreover, since Latin America’s debt was mostly contracted with
commercial banks, they were signed under floating interests rates, which made the region
incredibly vulnerable to changes that were completely outside its control like interest rates’
hikes. Therefore, Neoliberalism authors focus not only on the magnitude of the economic
crisis, but in understanding how the policies that allowed for the crisis to emerge were
enacted in the first place. In this sense, Kucynski argued that the cause of the region’s
massive problem with public debt resided in the Developmentalism policies directed at
favoring manufactured production for internal markets.157 Specifically, ISI policies
weakened agricultural production while limiting export revenue from manufactured goods
by maintaining industrial production uncompetitive due to protectionism. Moreover, under
Developmentalism the state artificially manipulated the value of its currency in order to
favor imports for non-essential consumption, which ended up being financed by budget
deficits and public debt. Ultimately, the Neoliberalism approach criticized the central role
of the state under Developmentalism, arguing that the state grew too much because of the
active role it assumed in the productive process. Since the state decided to address
socioeconomic distortions like poverty and inequality under Developmentalism, it tended
to employed more workers than it required in order to absorb labor. The consequence was
a huge state with massive labor costs that also artificially overestimated the cost of labor
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and subsidized basic services. In this context, Neoliberalism argued that it was a matter of
time before such a big and economically connected state suffered from corruption and
inefficiency, ultimately exacerbating the crisis and reducing the state’s capacity to resolve
it.158
As mentioned before, Neoliberalism prescribed the reduction of the role of the state
in economic processes. In the specific case of South America, the particular policy
prescriptions of neoliberalism were encapsulated into what came to be known as the
“Washington Consensus.” Coined by John Williamson in 1990, the “Washington
Consensus” was a summary containing a ten-point policy proposal created from the
neoliberal views that emerged in the Institute of International Economics Conference
organized in Washington, D.C. in 1989.159 The ten points of the consensus called for South
American societies to adopt fiscal discipline, to reallocate public expenditure toward public
education and public health,160 to implement tax reform, to let financial markets regulate
interest rates, to liberalize exchange rates, to liberalize trade, to open the economy to
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foreign direct investment, to privatize public owned enterprises, to deregulate the economy,
and to protect property rights.161 The policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus
were based on the economic experience of developed countries like the United States after
the stagflation period of the 1970s. Since the United States was able to experience
economic growth by applying policies that informed the Washington Consensus, the
Neoliberalism approach contended that South America would also experience a positive
socioeconomic transformation. The proper application of the policy prescription of the
Washington Consensus was assumed to promote

exports, to trigger private

entrepreneurship and investment, and to attract foreign direct investment, all of which
would result in socioeconomic development.162
The policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus gained significant relevance
throughout South America mainly as a consequence of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and its structural adjustment packages. After Mexico declared it had no resource to
service its public debt, the IMF successfully negotiated a bailout deal, and the rest of the
continent moved to receive similar rescue packages. The mechanism that the IMF proposed
to solve the crisis was to restructure South America’s commercial debt by issuing more
debt contracted with the fund. In this sense, the IMF would issue new loans to South
American countries so that they could meet their commercial compromises, but in
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exchange the region needed to enact significant structural adjustments programs (SAP).163
The SAPs became known as the IMF conditionalities, and while they varied depending on
each country, they followed the basic tenets of the policy prescriptions of the Washington
Consensus. Given the magnitude of the economic crisis and the need for IMF funds, South
America embarked on a decade of unprecedented free market reforms between the mid1980s and the 1990s.164 The fact is that these reforms were a direct reversal to the political
economy that dominated the region for more than fifty years, but South American leaders
in the region embraced the “Washington Consensus” up to a point in which it was
implemented ideologically rather than pragmatically.165 While the implementation of the
policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus varied across the region, its
achievements are subject of much discussion.166 On the one hand, the macroeconomic
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imbalances of the 1970s and 1980s were controlled given that budget deficits and inflation
decreased and foreign direct investment increased dramatically.167 On the other hand, in
the 1980s per capita income decreased by 10%, nearly a third of the region’s population
fell in poverty by 1990, and almost 10 million children suffered malnutrition.168 Ultimately,
the SAPs almost tripled the region’s debt and forced the reallocation of resources away
from public health and education toward debt service.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the failure of the Washington Consensus was
evident throughout South America. As it was the case with the achievements of the policy
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, there is immense debate regarding the reasons
behind their massive failure. First, many argued that the policy prescriptions of the
Washington Consensus failed because of poor implementation given that, for example,
many fiscal and labor reforms were not even enacted.169 Second, the failure of the policy
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus were the result of a lack of preconditions for
free market economics to success. Building from the work of Milton Friedman, Luigi
Manzetti argues that for free market capitalism to succeed there needs to be institutional
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accountability. Since the region did not have the proper institutional framework for
accountability, Manzetti argued, corruption was rampant, and elites manipulated the
reform process in order to maintain their privilege and create creating inefficient
monopolies.170 Similarly to Manzetti, Jorge Katz argued that the economies of the region
lacked the necessary technological and innovative preconditions for market economies to
succeed, therefore making the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus
ineffective in transforming the socioeconomic reality the continent.171 Third, the failure of
the Washington Consensus was attributed to the scope and nature of the policies
prescriptions. On the one hand, Joseph Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik considered the reform
program to be incredibly narrow in focus, only considering macroeconomic stability. For
them, the failure of the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus was attributed
to the absence of reforms directed at addressing income distribution, economic volatility,
institutional processes, or innovation.172 On the other hand, Ronaldo Munck argued that
the failure of the Washington Consensus was not necessarily because of the particularities
of the policy prescriptions, but because of the Neoliberalism theory that informed them.
While the Neoliberal approach stated that the implementation of the free market
represented a stabilizing force, Munck argued that the policy prescriptions of the
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Washington Consensus actually destabilized the economies of the region since they
increased their vulnerability and their volatility.173 Similarly to Munkc, James Cypher,
challenged the Neoliberalism approach given its theoretical assumption that free markets
have independent regulatory mechanisms. By implementing neoliberal reforms, the policy
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus through the adoption of SAPs deprived the
region of the autonomy to manage the devastating effects of the economic crisis by making
them hostage of foreign financial markets.174
Regardless of the conditions that explained the failure of the Washington
Consensus, the reality was one of immense social convulsion in South America by the
1990s.175 The socioeconomic crisis of the 1990s was conducive for important theoretical
modifications to the Neoliberalism approach. Based on the positive economic experience
of certain South East Asian countries as well as the mediocre performance of the
developing world under neoliberalism, international economic institutions and scholars
alike started to stress the centrality of good governance as an important precondition for
economic success.176 The good governance shift also impacted the policy prescriptions of
the Neoliberal approach and the Washington Consensus in particular. Informed by the
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good governance shift in neoliberalism,

Dani Rodrik identified what he called the

“Washington Consensus 2.0.” which was an augmented set of neoliberal policy
prescription for the developing world. The policy prescriptions of the Washington
Consensus 2.0 highlighted the centrality of good governance, and considered the efficient
and transparent behavior the state to be a fundamental precondition for economic
success.177 However, the socioeconomic crisis in the region was also conducive to the rise
of various political movements that challenged the Neoliberal approach. A heterogeneous
group of forces rose to power at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s with an common
ideological and political thread: their unequivocal rejections of neoliberalism and the
Washington Consensus.178 The self- proclaimed progressive movement started with the
1998 election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, followed by the 2000 election of Ricardo
Lagos in Chile—later succeeded by Michele Bachelet—then the 2002 election of Luis
Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil, and the subsequent elections of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina
Fernandez in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Tabare
Vazquez and Jose Mujica in Uruguay, and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay.179 All of these
governments considered it indispensable to move away from neoliberalism by promoting
a new development model that stressed the centrality of the state in transforming the
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socioeconomic reality of the continent. While many considered the new development
model to be neo-structuralism180 or post-neoliberalism,181 the fact is that the political
economy preferences of these progressive governments is best described as NeoDevelopmentalism.
The South American political economy of the twenty-first century has been
characterized by Neo-Developmentalism, an approach that represents the coalescence of
two main historical strategies in the region: Extractivism and Developmentalism.182
Informed by Developmentalism, the Neo-Developmentalism approach states that it is
indispensable for the economic success of the region to recover the role of the South
American state in development. However, the Neo-Developmentalism approach
challenges the policy prescriptions of industrialization that were at the core of
Developmentalism. Neo-Developmentalism’s diagnosis of the socioeconomic distortions
of South America states that such conditions are the result of the combination of the failure
of Developmentalism and the exacerbation of poverty and inequality generated by
Neoliberalism.183 Therefore, it is the responsibility of South American states to address the
socioeconomic problems of the region directly through policies that alleviate poverty and
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inequality. While Developmentalism and Dependency considered it imperative to break
with

the

region’s

predisposition

toward

exporting

primary

products,

Neo-

Developmentalism imagines a state that makes Extractivism the center of its political
economy. The policy prescriptions of the Neo-Developmentalism approach focus on
appropriating the revenue from the export of primary products and direct them toward
social policies. In this sense, Neo-Developmentalism mirrors the policy implications of the
nineteenth century reliance on primary products. But instead of the state simply collecting
a tax from extractive activities, the Neo-Developmentalism approach calls for the state to
actively engage in the extractive process in order to appropriate as much revenue as
possible to be directed toward social policy. The active role of the state in the exploitation
of natural resources is considered a form of Neo-Extractivism, and it is the central
productive activity of the Neo-Developmentalism approach. 184
The Neo-Developmentalism approach emerged as a direct challenge to the
ideological predominance and political application of Neoliberalism in South America.
The theoretical and ideological justifications for Neo-Developmentalism are found in the
works of current economists and scholars identified with development pragmatism.185. In
theory, development pragmatism focuses on issues that are not foreign to previous
approaches such as institutional development, globalization, socioeconomic distortions,
and industrialization. Specifically, development pragmatism prescribes policies directed at
generating industrialization, yet it calls for states to direct public and private investment
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toward industries with dynamic efficiencies.186 However, development pragmatism faces
important challenges for the application of industrial and development policies because the
rules and regulations of the contemporary international economic system have limited
policy alternatives. The fact is that the expansion of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s
erected trade norms against agricultural and farmer protection, while the current
international trade structure provides increased protection to the interests of foreign capital
by, among other conditions, guaranteeing capital mobility.187

Under development

pragmatism, the consequence of the limited policy space that South American countries
have to address its socioeconomic distortions is that states have been pushed to adopt NeoExtractivism as a mechanism to appropriate and direct resources.
As mentioned before, Neo-Developmentalism has been the dominant approach in
the South American political economy of the twenty-first century. In the last decade and a
half, Neo-Extractivism has been the main productive activity of South American societies,
and the volume of primary products extracted and commercialized has increased
considerably in the region.188

Historically, Extractivism in South America was

characterized by the role of foreign capital—through multinational corporations—in the
production and commercialization of primary products. Under traditional Extractivism,
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multinational corporations were able to appropriate most of the revenue from exploiting
and commercializing primary products, which would be mostly extradited to the global
centers of powers. In this sense, the state appropriated revenue mainly through exploitation
taxes and export duties, making it imperative for the state to maintain the internal structures
that guaranteed foreign capital investments and free trade. Neo-Extractivism presents a
more active role of the state in the exploitation process, increasing the avenues for revenue
appropriation from royalties and taxes to extractive state corporation.189 Through various
degrees, most countries in South America have implemented Neo-Extractivism depending
on the particular dominant extractive activities present in the region. Three main
approaches to Neo-Extractivism have been observable in South America throughout the
twenty-first century, First, countries like Chile, Brazil, and Colombia present an increased
role of the state in extractive processes, but they continue to allow for multinational
corporations to participate in the economy. Second, countries like Venezuela and Bolivia
are characterized by a more radical form of Neo-Extractivism in which the state has become
the main actor exploiting natural resources and it is highly involved in the appropriation of
most of the revenue. Third countries like Argentina which continue to present a more
traditional for of Extractivism where the state shares the ownership of the most important
extractive corporation.190 While there is an important degree of variation in terms of NeoExtractivism in the continent, all South American states are heavily involved in the
redistribution of the revenue extracted from the commercialization of primary products.
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Through an innumerable amount of social programs and redistributive policies of
conditional cash programs, South American states have adopted the policy prescriptions
the Neo-Developmentalism approach on social justice. In fact, it is the embrace of NeoDevelopmentalism—both in terms of appropriating extractive revenue and redistributing
it—that South American states have claimed and maintained political legitimacy in the
twenty-first century.191
The effects of the policy prescriptions of the Neo-Developmentalism approach are
subject to important discussions in the academic literature. For most of the twenty-first
century there have been significant achievements in terms of poverty and inequality,
primarily because of the growing presence of the state in the labor market.192 However,
these improvements have been superficial, particularly after 2012-2013 when exports and
commodity prices started to decline.193 As it was previously discussed, there have been
increases in poverty and inequality in the last few years, and the regional economy has
contracted significantly since 2015. Moreover, the continent is the only emerging market
where its population has seen a real lost in their standards of living since 2013. In other
words, while the rest of the developing world has increased its standards of living, South
Americans have lost important socioeconomic improvements achieved at the beginning of
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the twenty-first century. The labor market has also suffered in recent years, where the South
American informal sector has had a significant expansion. What is most sticking is that
Neo-Developmentalism has increased the region’s reliance on exporting primary products,
perpetuating the structural organization of the state around export rents. Since 2013, South
America has presented the same dynamic that characterized its political economy
throughout the twentieth century: once international demand for primary products slows
down and commodity prices budge, socioeconomic achievements evaporate. The
socioeconomic achievements of the Neo-Developmentalism approach

can be

characterized as the “elevator effect”: when there is an expansion of the export sector given
an increase global demand of primary products and commodity prices rise, all social groups
improve their material condition. But as soon as global conditions change, the most
vulnerable sectors of society fall back into poverty and informality, showing how the social
structure of distribution remains the same.194

THE STATE ARGUMENT AND THE LITERATURE ON SOUTH AMERICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY
The most influential approaches in South American political economy present some
profound theoretical and analytical differences among them. The ideological spectrum of
the dominant development narratives in the region present figures as contradictory as
Vladimir Lenin and Milton Friedman. Yet all of these approaches are bound by a common
denominator: their focus at resolving poverty and inequality in South America. For any
194
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observer of the socioeconomic reality of South America, the particularities of the policies
implemented by the countless political and ideological movements in the region appear
divergent, contradictory, and even comical. How can anyone expect for South American
societies to resolve their socioeconomic issues if every couple of decades a new approach
gains relevance and sweeps the political movements of the region? Cynically, the only
continuity in the region’s political economy is that the poor stay poor and the rich get richer
selling commodities. Add in corruption, machismo, and violence and these are indeed the
most miserable nations Tocqueville described a couple of centuries ago.
The fact is that the reality of South American political economy is not as varied and
divergent as it might seem. The chronological discussion on the literature on South
American political economy reveals important continuities for the observant eye. Beyond
the fact that all the approaches want to solve poverty and inequality, they all hint at a crucial
factor, an indispensable precondition, a central player in South American development: the
state. The Developmentalism approach considered the state at the center of the
development process; the only actor capable of mobilizing the necessary resources to
resolve socioeconomic distortions. The Dependency approach considered it indispensable
to take over the state, separate it from the elites that favored foreign interests, and use it
eliminate the region’s foreign dependence. The Neoliberal approach requires the state to
enact profound reforms to the productive apparatus of the region, reforms without which
development was simply unimaginable. In fact, once the policy prescriptions of the
Washington Consensus failed to achieve its stated objectives, the Neoliberal approach
pointed to the state and demanded for it to apply good governance for free markets so as to
create economic growth. Ultimately, Neo-Developmentalism considers the state the most
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important actor in South American society, promoting policies that put the state at the
center of the exploitative and redistributive process.
The Neo-Developmentalism approach stresses the centrality of the state in the
literature on South American political economy. Consider the theoretical, political, and
ideological identity of the political movements that achieved political power and the
control of the state in South America in the twenty-first century. These were all leftist
movements in which their leaders—at some point in their history—used some form of
protest or violence to challenge the status quo that perpetuated poverty and inequality in
South America. Most strikingly, these movements and their leaders were informed by
profound criticisms of the traditional productive processes in the region, and in particular
of Extractivism. Leftist and progressive movements criticized Extractivism for its capacity
to create enclave economies, to perpetuate marginal labor conditions, and to subordinate
local power to foreign markets and interest. Yet once these leftist progressive movements
reached positions of power, they exacerbated all of the conditions they once criticized by
embracing Neo-Developmentalism. To various degrees, the self-proclaimed progressive
movements that characterize twenty-first century politics in South America have either
maintained or exacerbated socioeconomic problems in the region by implementing NeoExtractivism activities like export-oriented monoculture agriculture or mineral
extraction.195 In fact, these progressive governments have actually perpetuated the
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condition of South America as an exporter of primary products,196 which was their main
argument against traditional Extractivism.197 In cases like Ecuador or Bolivia, for instance,
the embrace of Neo-Developmentalism by so called progressive governments has in fact
increased the concentration of assets, capital, and land, and drove the state to direct
confrontation with indigenous groups.198 Therefore, even when explicitly anti-Extractivism
movements obtain political power and control of the state in South America, the region
seems to have been unable to break from the structures that perpetuate socioeconomic
problems.
In this context, South America appears to be trapped in state of Magical Realism, a
place where ideologies and political movements come and go and still everything remains
constant. In face of how even the most rhetorically vehement proponents of antiExtractivism, social justice, and autonomy were completely ineffective in transforming the
region in the twenty-first century, it seems tempting to suggest that the main explanation
for South America’s socioeconomic problems is, in fact, South Americans. The
interpretation for the literature on South American political economy suggests that
regardless of the theory, the approach, or the policy prescription, South Americans are
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always failing at resolving poverty and inequality.199 The fact that they have tried
everything and have not done so correctly points at the validity of the historically prescient
Elizabethan Black Legend of Iberian America. But to accept the Black Legend is to accept
that at some level, people that were born and raised in a specific geographical location are
incapable of resolving their social problems. Moving from such an argument to suggesting
that South Americans are an inferior ethnic group or race is not that difficult, and it would
reject the biological evidence that points to the contrary. Therefore, the real problem is that
all of the theoretical approaches discussed above fail to understand a crucial factor in South
American political economy: the problem is the state. It is not that the people that obtain
political control over the state are genetically and culturally predisposed to be corrupt and
inefficient leaders. It is not that South American societies are culturally predisposed to
accept servitude, subjugation, and exploitation. It is not that South Americans are not
biologically or sociologically equipped to overcome the geographical patterns of their
continent. The problem is that the way South American societies organized created
structures of incentives that favored exploitative processes that perpetuate poverty and
inequality in the region.
The one question that all the previously discussed theoretical approaches failed to
address is why there is no change. From Developmentalism to Neoliberalism, all of the
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approaches suggested in one form or another that the economic crises that plagued South
America were due to some sort of failure in the implementation of its policy prescriptions.
Either the region was unable to escape its dependence on exporting primary products or it
failed to implement market reforms efficiently. It is rare to see an author within a particular
theoretical approach reflecting on the premises of its preferred policies and wondering
whether the crises were, not because of poor implementation or state failure, but because
the logic and expectations of the approach were unrealistic. Instead of focusing on
demanding for the state to be more efficient or to categorize South Americans as
intrinsically incompetent or corrupt, the state argument questions whether all of the
aforementioned approaches were demanding something that the South American state is
simply not equipped to perform. The state argument agrees with all the previous theoretical
approaches in the centrality of the state in the development process. But by focusing the
analysis on the structure of the state, the state argument suggests that before examining any
failure at policy implementation, what the study of South American political economy
requires is an examination of the structure of the state.
The fact is that by studying the formation of the South American state, it is evident
that it was specifically designed to maintain the best possible environment for exporting
primary products. The South American state consolidated in the second half of the
nineteenth century thanks to the expansion of international commerce. After independence,
the South American state did not have a specific function to fulfill; the region was insulated
from international warfare and countries in the region did not engage in total war in order
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to secure their territorial integrity.200 Therefore, the South American state found its purpose
on the expansion of the international economy, and regional statesmen used the imperatives
of participating in the international economy to provide the modern state with a
fundamental function.201 In this sense, the relationship between the South American state
was mutually constitutive: the state was made by the international economy and the
international economy benefited from the state. On the one hand, the conditions of the
international economy provided a structure of incentives for South American elites to
create a state that could guarantee their participation in global trade. On the other hand, the
state was the instrumental mechanism used by elites to secure the exploitation of natural
resources that were most demanded in the international economy. In this sense, the
formation of the South American state was the result of state makers using the techniques
that were plausible in the context of an nineteenth century capitalist expansion.202
In retrospect, and informed by Dependency theory, this period has been
characterized by many as a conspiracy of elite greed and international coercion. The
consolidation of the South American state has been considered as a process in which
corrupt dictators sold out the massive natural wealth of the continent to foreign capitalist
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powers.203 However, this is an opportunistic and unfair characterization of the leaders of
the era. No doubt many of them were corrupt autocrats that wanted their aggrandizement
above all, but the reality was that the way they consolidated the state was also the
consequence of their context. The post-independence period was one of massive social
fragmentation with regional and local powers claiming authority over the territory.
Capitalist strongmen rejected the idea to centralize power by strengthening the state
because they feared it would be counterproductive given the region’s history of guerilla
warfare and because they had already invested in local militias.204 For much of the first
half of the nineteenth century, the context of fragmented societies with regional caudillos
and a weak central state characterized the political landscape of South America. Therefore,
when the international economy started to expand massively as a consequence of Britain’s
industrial revolution in the second half of the nineteenth century, South American states
found a mechanism of state consolidation: trade. Central states were able to claim
legitimacy and rally political support through the implementation of economic strategies
that were centered on trade.205 Therefore, the predisposition of the South American state
toward protecting and promoting export oriented activities responds to the rational
calculation of nineteenth century statesmen that wanted to achieve state consolidation.
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For all of the negative problems that contemporary scholars point at the strategies
that are centered on trading primary products, the fact is that in the late nineteenth century
trade gave the South American state a function and a purpose without which it could not
have consolidated the way it did. The economic role that the South American state assumed
was designed to function within the international capitalist system it participated in, and
the only space available in that system where the region could have an advantage was
providing natural resources.206 Therefore, if the efficiency and effectiveness of a state is
measured by how well it performs the tasks that it was designed to achieve, then the South
American state is one of the most effective states in the modern history of capitalism. For
almost two hundred years the South American state has guaranteed the supply of natural
resources used throughout the entire international capitalist productive system. South
American natural resources have fueled the industrial expansion of Britain and to a lesser
extent Western Europe, and more recently they have fueled the Chinese economic miracle.
Perhaps before determining that the problem is that policy prescriptions fail, any
examination of South American political economy must examine the role of the most
important socio-political organization of the continent and measure whether it can
accomplish any given policy prescription. The problem arises when it is now known that
the function of the South American state was designed to perform creates processes that
perpetuate socioeconomic distortions like poverty and inequality. Thus, informed by the
long literature on South American political economy, it is now indispensable to build the
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state argument. In this context, Table 1 summarizes the literature on South American
political economy in relation to the state argument.
Table 1. Summary of the Literature on South American Political Economy
NeoDevelopmentalism Dependency
Neoliberalism
developmentalism
Period
1930s – 1960s
1960s – 1970s
1970s – 1990s 2000s – 2010s
Neo-Extractivism
Industrialization/
Delinking and
Open market
Policy
and social
modernization
socialism
reform
programs
Proble
Reliance on
Position in the
State
Vulnerability and
m
commodity export global economy
intervention
foreign control
Fall of
Great Depression
Crisis of
The Debt
Context
Washington
and WWII
Developmentalism
Crisis
Consensus
Exploit resources
Good
State
Protect industry Socialist takeover
and distribute
governance
revenue
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CHAPTER 2
REFINING THE STATE ARGUMENT
The discussion on the literature on South American political economy illustrates the
centrality of the South American state in the development thinking of the region. Whether
implicitly or explicitly, the state has always been a fundamental player in South America’s
socioeconomic history. The most dominant approaches in the continent have attributed to
the state a contradictory role; the state is the main problem solver in the region yet it is also
the main troublemaker. It is the only actor capable of directing a profound process of
socioeconomic transformation but it is also the actor that is always responsible for the failure
of any prescribed policy. The state argument illuminates this paradox by simultaneously
accepting the centrality of the state in development while also problematizing its structural
and functional organization. It is indeed correct to point at the state as a central player in the
region’s socioeconomic reality, but the South American state is functionally and structurally
organized in a way that makes it difficult for the state to abandon certain productive
processes. Therefore, it is crucial for the state argument to focus on the formation of the
South American state, given that it is at this moment in history when the state adopts its
characteristic structural and functional features. Yet as it was mentioned before, external
conditions were fundamental in the formation and consolidation of the South American
state, given that local state makers found purpose and legitimacy in participating in the
international economy. Then, studying the formation and consolidation of the South
American state requires to focus on how internal conditions interacted with external stimuli
in the formation of the state. In fact, for the state argument to present a historically totalizing
explanation of South America’s socioeconomic reality, it indispensable to understand the
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formation and consolidation of the state in the context of an expanding international
capitalist economy. The sociopolitical fragmentation of the post-independence period is not
sufficient to explain why the South American state adopted a structural organization that
favored productive processes geared towards exporting primary products. Only by including
the increasing demand of commodities driven by the Industrial Revolution in the analysis
of the South American state can the state argument explain the historical process of state
formation in the region. From the discussion on the literature on South American political
economy it is evident that the Dependency theory approach provides a theoretical and
analytical framework suited for the internal-external dynamic embedded in the state
argument. But Dependency theory has an negative intellectual baggage that needs to be
addressed before moving forward in the formation of the state argument. Therefore, it is
indispensable to discuss the history of the movement in order to highlight its useful insights,
to put to rest some of the criticisms against the approach, and to elaborate on the relationship
between the state argument and Dependency theory.
Contemporary discussions on Dependency theory are marked by the idea that the
approach is no longer useful to explain the socioeconomic reality of the developing world.
In this sense, in the United States, Dependency theory is seen as a “dead” or “passé”
paradigm in International Political Economy.207 This is not an exclusive feature of
contemporary discussions on Dependency theory; the reception of the approach in academia
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in the United States considered it to be either unscientific or too political.208 Therefore, there
is a long tradition in academic thought in the United States that considers Dependency
theory to be inadequate or ill-equipped to understand and explain the socioeconomic reality
of the developing world. The consequence has been to declared the approach “dead,”
considering it an appendage of critical theories that is mentioned in passing as an expression
of Latin American intellectualism. Regardless of the predisposition of academia in the
United States to consider everything outside its core narratives and methodologies as
unscientific or irrelevant, the fact is that Dependency theory imprinted the evolution of
South American intellectualism and instilled itself in the social consciousness of the
region.209 Yet the relevance of Dependency theory is not only a function of its continued
presence in South American thinking. It is possible that the region clings to an outdated
analytical framework in order to blame foreign intervention for its dire socioeconomic
reality, but that is not the case. The discussion on the literature on South American political
economy—and the discussion on Neo-Developmentalism in particular—shows that many
of the analytical insights of Dependency theory continue to be present in the region’s
socioeconomic reality. Many of the concepts of Dependency theory, while relegated to
historical accounts, continue to explain the most characteristic features of the region’s
problems.210 For instance, South American countries have increased their reliance on
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exporting primary products in the twenty-first century, deepening the degree of dependency
with external conditions.211 In fact, current discussions on South American political
economy continue to stress the problems of distribution and productivity differences
between center and peripheral economies, highlighting the discriminatory and concentrating
nature of economic activities in the region.212 Therefore, although academia in the United
States considers the approach to be irrelevant, the socioeconomic reality of South America
shows just how important Dependency theory is when studying the developing world. Yet
it requires more than just pointing at how the approach describes certain aspects of the
socioeconomic reality of the region to justify Dependency theory as the theoretical
framework for the state argument. So the next sections are dedicated to the arduous task of
defending the validity of the Dependency approach by presenting its important
contributions, by highlighting its central debates, by responding to the most relevant
criticisms, and by refining its analytical propositions in face of the state argument.

IN DEFENSE OF DEPENDENCY THEORY
The history of Dependency Theory has been written many times in the academic
literature on International Political Economy. The continued presence of Dependency
theory in the United States academia shows how the approach represents what many have
called the most important contribution to social sciences by Latin America.213 Similarly to
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the history of the discipline of International Relations referenced before, the history of
Dependency theory consists of many widely known points; from identifying a pioneer or
“father” of the movement to explaining why it was considered a new paradigm and why it
lost its relevance. Yet also similarly to the history of International Relations, the widely
known history of Dependency theory is also filled with oversimplifications, inaccuracies,
and ahistorical references characteristic of a myth rather than an analytical framework.214
The importance of Dependency theory as a new paradigm explaining the socioeconomic
reality of the region emerged in the 1960s with the popularization of the works of authors
like Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. However, by the
moment the Dependency approach gained relevance particularly in the United States, there
were already many authors like Ragnar Nurkse, Hans Singer, Karl Gunnar Myrdal, or
Albert Hirschman with a long tradition of criticizing Modernization theory and explaining
the problems of the developing world with the analytical concepts of Dependency
theory.215 This long tradition of criticizing Modernization theory was placed at the center
of Dependency theory’s contributions, stressing the ahistorical, parochial, U.S.-European
centrism, and irrelevance of Modernization to Latin America. Yet the general criticisms
of Modernization theory were rooted in a long and rich debate within the Dependency
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approach, making it difficult to highlight one particular criticism of Dependency against
Modernization beyond the overarching arguments mentioned before.
Authors in the Dependency approach were very active in criticizing existing
paradigms like Modernization and Developmentalism, but they also engaged in meaningful
discussions with other Dependency authors. The consequence is a rich literature with a
heterogeneous body of analytical concepts and theoretical explanations. A revision of all
of the different avenues of discussion within Dependency theory is a herculean task, and
one that is beyond the objective of this section. However, if the state argument is to be
formulated within the theoretical framework of the Dependency approach, it is necessary
to engage in a discussion on the main arguments of the theory.216 There are many divisions
within Dependency theory among authors who either accept or reject the viability of
capitalist development in the periphery, and particularly on the mechanisms of dependency
that explain socioeconomic structures in the region.217 These major debates within
Dependency theory are best captured by the divide described by Robert Packenham as
orthodox and unorthodox dependency and described by Cristobal Kay as reformist and
Marxist dependency.218 Authors of orthodox dependency are characterized by their stress
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on asymmetric relations of power and relations of subjugation and exploitation. The most
important exponent of orthodox Dependency theory is Andre Gunder Frank, who presented
an analysis of Latin American underdevelopment as a consequence of the economic
industrialization of the United States and Western Europe. Informed by the work of Paul
Baran, and in particular the book The Political Economy of Growth, Gunder Frank argued
that advanced capitalism restricted the economic development of peripheral economies by
aligning with domestic elites in order to maintain access to cheap resources, expatriate
surpluses, and control their economies through investment. Therefore, Latin American
underdevelopment was not a deviation from a specific process of economic development.
On the contrary, Latin American underdevelopment was a required condition for the
industrial centers of power in the international economy to enjoy a privileged position of
development. Gunder Frank’s analysis stated that it was colonialism that introduced
capitalism in the region, and that Latin American integration in the international economic
system perpetuated its condition of dependence and underdevelopment through the
exploitation of natural resources. The condition of underdevelopment was therefore
maintained by the permanence of the international structures of global capitalism between
the industrial centers and the periphery. 219 Thus, Latin American underdevelopment was
not a deviation from development, but a byproduct of the economic development of certain
areas of the global economy; development and underdevelopment are different sides of the
same coin.
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In particular, Gunder Frank provided one of the most incisive challenges to
Modernization theory with his analysis of dualism and traditional structures. The
Modernization approach considered development challenges to be a consequence of the
cohabitation of traditional and modern structures in Latin America. In this sense,
Modernization considered it imperative to transcend traditional structures such as the
hacienda in order to ignite the process of development in the region. Gunder Frank
challenged Modernization theory by pointing at the capitalist and modern nature of these
traditional structures. He argued that it was in the colonial era that these supposedly
traditional structures were created and perpetuated in the region, and that they were
functionally organized to generate profit and inputs for European capitalism. Therefore,
structures like the hacienda or the plantation, which served as the characteristic traditional
structure in the analysis of Modernization theory, were not pre-capitalist structures
blocking development but modern societies designed to fuel European capitalist
development.220 The implication of Gunder Frank’s analysis was a set of policy
prescriptions that differed drastically from those of Modernization theory. Once the
supposedly traditional structures are understood as capitalists mechanisms designed to
support European development, then the integrationist policies of Modernization designed
to transition from traditional to modern societies loses all meaning. Hence,
underdevelopment could not be resolved by emulating European development because
European development created the structures that perpetuate underdevelopment in Latin
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America.221 Other authors like Ruy Mauro Marini followed Gunder Frank’s analysis on
the causes of underdevelopment, arguing that the industrialized center of the international
economy—through unequal terms of trade, labor exploitation, and sub-imperialism—
perpetuates underdevelopment in Latin America.222 Informed by the nature of exploitative
structures in Latin America, orthodox Dependency concluded that emulating an Europeaninspired capitalist development in the region was impossible since it would require to
perpetuate underdevelopment. The consequence of the impossibility of capitalist
development in the periphery was to consider the political future of Latin America to be
trapped in a dichotomy of accepting oppressive sub-imperialism or conducting a radical
violent socialist revolution.223
It is the possibility for capitalist development to emerge in Latin America that
marks the most important division within Dependency theory. Unorthodox Dependency is
characterized by the recognition that capitalist development could occur in peripheral
societies. Therefore, in order to develop their propositions, authors within unorthodox
Dependency engaged in profound debates with the analysis of orthodox Dependency. The
most influential author of unorthodox Dependency is Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who
presented the most important response to Gunder Frank’s arguments. In general, Cardoso
argued that the idea that capitalist development was not possible in Latin America was
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erroneous given that capitalist dependent development was already happening in various
countries of the region.224 Specifically, Cardoso challenged Gunder Frank’s proposition
that local elites were incapable of promoting any type of capitalist development in Latin
America, and pointed at the positive effects of multinational corporations in the industrial
advances of the region. Therefore, Cardoso criticized Gunder Frank’s propositions
considering violence or oppression to be the only viable political outcomes in dependent
nations,225 and developed a somewhat different understanding of Latin American
dependence and underdevelopment. The book Dependency and Development in Latin
America by Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto is the most important representation of
unorthodox Dependency. For Cardoso, capitalist development was not impossible in Latin
America, but he considered capitalist dependent development to be a different expression
of capitalism than that of European capitalism. The different aspects of dependent
development, he argued, were the result of the interaction between specific internal
structures in Latin America and external conditions of the global economy. In this sense,
Cardoso parts with the mechanic and deterministic conclusions of Gunder Frank, instead
providing a more nuanced understanding of dependency situations based on the
examination of the role of alliances created between external conditions and local dominant
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classes, stressing the importance of local power dynamics such as labor relations.226 Rather
than focusing on the subjugation of peripheries in the international economic system to the
interests of core powers, Cardoso focuses on the particularities of capitalist manifestations
in peripheral societies.227 Therefore, Cardoso was more concerned in understanding
political and power dynamics in peripheral countries than on proposing an explanation of
underdevelopment based on an idea of international control and domination. In this sense,
Cardoso stressed the necessity to avoid two fallacies in Dependency analysis: 1) the idea
of socioeconomic realities in peripheral societies to be the consequence of mechanic
conditioning by external forces; the notion that peripheral societies are just a mirror
reflection of foreign interests; and 2) the proposition that every single particularity of the
socioeconomic reality of societies is the result of self-contained historical contingencies.
Socioeconomic realities, Cardoso stated, are the result of historical processes in which
national and international factors interact in a mutually constitutive relationship.228
The revision of the debate between orthodox and unorthodox Dependency presents
two different understanding of underdevelopment in Latin America. For orthodox
Dependency, the socioeconomic distortions of peripheral societies are explained by the
expansion of capitalism, and for European capitalism to succeed, Latin American
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underdevelopment must be perpetuated. For unorthodox Dependency, the expansion of
European capitalism created situations of dependency in Latin America, but the specificity
of these situations are the consequence of the interaction between local power dynamics
and foreign conditioning factors. Beyond the specific differences between orthodox and
unorthodox authors, they both present significant continuities showing the overarching
influence of Dependency theory. The most important continuity in analyses rooted in
Dependency theory is the presence of a specific theoretical understanding of human
relations. Rooted in Marxism, Dependency theory understand socioeconomic outcomes to
be the result of labor relations between individuals, and more importantly, between
societies. This is the driving thread between all Dependency analysis; whether national or
international, production relations define the historical processes of societies. More
specifically, Dependency theory suggests that contemporary socioeconomic outcomes,
regardless of their specificities, are the result of productive relations under capitalism.229
Therefore, the most important aspect of Dependency theory is perhaps the most
counterintuitive: Dependency theory is not a “theory.”
By naming it Dependency theory, there was a growing expectation that the
approach in fact formulated theoretical causal relations more in accordance with the
dominant propositions present in Behavioralist U.S. academia. Many authors within the
movement formulated such parsimonious causal relationships, but discussion within the
movement highlighted that Dependency transcended such propositions and embodied an
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approach.230 Therefore, Dependency theory presented not a theory but a theoretical
problem: how to study capitalist expansion and the situations that existed in certain
structural conditions of interaction between socioeconomic forces.231
The main implication of understanding Dependency theory as a theoretical
approach is that dependency is not a specific variable or outcome. In the Dependency
approach, dependency represents a descriptive category for certain societies under the
expansion of modern capitalism. In other words, dependency is “a form of relationship in
the context of which other phenomena such as economic expansion and development,
which are variable properties, are important and are subjects the subjects of study.”232
Therefore, the Dependency approach understand dependency to be the specific situation
under which capitalism manifests in peripheral societies, and it is under this situation of
dependency that certain factors influence, affect, or condition development outcomes. In
this sense, the Dependency approach provides a historical context and a theoretical
framework for the study of South American political economy. Particularly relevant for the
study of South American political economy is Dependency’s contextualization in the study
of the relationship between the capitalist economic system, the export enclave syndrome,
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and the socio-political distortions under the domestic/international spectrum.233 But before
contextualizing the study of South American political economy under the Dependency
approach, it is necessary to address the criticisms that the analytical propositions of the
movement have received in the past. Only addressing such criticism makes it possible to
evaluate the validity of Dependency’s theoretical formulations and analytical propositions
in the study of South American political economy.
Just like there is a long Dependency tradition in the social consciousness of Latin
America, there is also a long tradition of criticisms against the movement in International
Political Economy. Conducting an exhaustive review of the criticisms levied against
Dependency theory is nearly impossible, but Cristobal Kay provides a summary of the
litany of accusations against the approach. In a wide array of contexts, and from a
multiplicity of voices, Dependency theory has been accused of being:
tautological, economistic, ahistorical, utopian, devoid of class analysis,
populist or Narodnik, nationalist, myopic, one-dimensional, ideological,
eclectic, mechanical, sophist, a negative teleology, idealist, anti-capitalist,
a Marxified structuralism, non-Marxist or non-materialist, careless in the
use of Marxist theory, unable to break with bourgeois development, without
empirical grounding, theoretically imprecise, unclear, contradictory, too
global or holistic, deterministic, methodologically and conceptually eclectic
– a tower of Babel, lacking clear policy recommendations for overcoming
dependence, stagnationist, circulationist, and so on. 234
Many of the charges against Dependency theory are fair, and they have been dealt at length
throughout the literature.235 However, it is necessary to address some of the criticisms that
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were unfairly levied against Dependency theory in order to rescue its valuable insights. As
mentioned before, Dependency theory is consistently considered as a “dead” paradigm in
the study of developing countries. Authors like Omar Sánchez identify several reasons for
the approach’s apparent demise. For Sánchez, the experience of certain South East Asian
countries in the second half of the twentieth century shows how the propositions of
Dependency theory were erroneous.236 The premise of this criticism states that Dependency
theory assumed it to be impossible for countries in peripheral situations to be able to
position themselves at the center of the international division of labor. But there are two
main problems with Sánchez’s use of the South East Asian experience as a contradiction
of Dependency’s propositions. First, Sánchez seems to obviate the Asian financial crisis of
the 1990s, and in particular, how such financial crisis reinforces Dependency’s diagnoses
on how situations of dependency exacerbate financial vulnerability and sensitivity.237 But
most importantly, Sánchez fails to engage with an important body of literature that
challenges the idea that the South East Asian experience somehow diminishes the validity
of Dependency theory.238 Particularly with the South East Asian experience, Sánchez fails
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to appreciate that the socioeconomic success of these countries was in fact the result of a
combination of the policies prescribed by ECLAC and their access to industrial consumer
markets, and more importantly, the political outcomes in these countries showed the
relevance of Gunder Frank’s analysis of underdevelopment and autocratic oppression.239
Yet the most important observation against Sánchez’s criticism of Dependency
theory is its superficiality. Sánchez’s criticism of Dependency theory based on the
experience of certain South East Asian countries is based on Gunder Frank’s premise that
under capitalist conditions, peripheral countries were condemned to their subjugated
position of underdevelopment.240 The problem is that Sánchez ascribes Gunder Frank’s
proposition to the entire Dependency approach, and by doing so shows once again that he
ignored important literature on the subject. Sánchez seems to have missed the entire debate
between orthodox and unorthodox Dependency, a debate in which most of Dependency
authors had already rejected Gunder Frank’s proposition by 1970s.241 In fact, one of the
most important pillars of Cardoso’s work was the recognition that capitalist development
was possible in peripheral countries, a point of major debate within the Dependency
approach.242 To be fair, orthodox Dependency was in fact the most popular narrative of the
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Dependency approach in the United States,243 making Gunder Frank’s work one of the
most read Dependency authors in English given its accessibility.244 But by the time
Sánchez writes in 2003 that Dependency has been “relegated to footnote status in the field
of development studies” and that “dependency is rarely even mentioned today,”245 the vast
majority of the Dependency literature is already available in English, and important books
discussing all the aspects of Dependency that he fails to mention are now part of many
published works in the United States.246 Therefore, it is inexcusable to omit an important
part of the literature of Dependency theory while arguing that the approach is just a footnote

243

Packenham, Robert. 1992. The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development
Studies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 190.

244

Kay, Cristobal. 1989. Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. London:
Routledge, p. 125.

245

Sánchez, Omar. 2003. “The Rise And Fall Of The Dependency Movement: Does It Inform
Underdevelopment Today?” Estudios Interdisciplinarios De America Latina 14 (2): 31-50, p. 39.

246

The superficiality of Sánchez’s argument regarding the South East Asian experience is also evident in
his other criticisms about Dependency theory. Sánchez argues that one of the reasons Dependency theory
declined as an analytical field is the formalization of economics. Since Dependency theory could not
formalize its propositions to the standards of economics, Sánchez argues, the approach lost its explanatory
power. However, in 1977, Cardoso had addressed such criticisms by discussing the parameters of the
Dependency approach and methodology. Cardoso, Fernando. 1977. “The Consumption Of Dependency
Theory In The United States.” Latin American Research Review 12 (3): 7-24, pp. 15-6. The same problem
of superficiality is true regarding the charges against Dependency theory because of its political
implications. Authors like Cardoso and Sunkel saw a proletariat socialist political revolution simply
unviable, and Sunkel even believed in reforming capitalism instead of following a violent revolution or
socialism. Kay, Cristobal. 1989. Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. London:
Routledge, pp. 130-39. In fact, it is ironic that authors like Sánchez point at the example of countries in
South East Asia to challenge Dependency theory while at the same time criticizing the movement because
of its political implications. It is pseudo-academic to separate the political processes through which
countries like South Korea, Singapore, or Thailand achieved capitalist development while defending
classical theories of development and criticizing Dependency. Modernization theory implies a logical
consequence of democratization as a result of capitalist development, yet Singapore and Thailand are far
from exemplary liberal democracies. Also, Dependency was criticized because certain authors within the
movement called for political violence to achieve autonomy under capitalism, but countries like South
Korea implemented authoritarian political violence in order to achieve their now-praised capitalist
development.

115

in contemporary debates of International Political Economy. But the most problematic
aspect of certain criticisms against Dependency theory is that they also show a degree of
superficiality by ignoring important literature in the approach. For example, Desmond Platt
argues that Dependency theory incorrectly portrays the conditions of the postindependence economies of Latin America, and that the approach exaggerated the role of
external factors over internal conditions. Platt states that Dependency misrepresents the
outward predisposition of Latin American economies in the first half of the nineteenth
century. He argues that this predisposition is most characteristic of the economies of Latin
America in the later decades of the nineteenth century, not in the post-independence
moment.247 But such criticisms obviate important works by authors like Oswando Sunkel
and Pedro Paz, Celso Furtado, and to a lesser extent Cardoso and Faletto, who all identify
the post-independence context to be one of economic stagnation in the region.248
Despite the superficiality of some criticisms against Dependency theory, there are
others that represent fair challenges to the approach’s propositions. A clear example is the
challenge against Dependency theory for its reliance on Marxism, which is a form of
cultural dependency. It is an irrefutable fact of history that Marxism developed from the
experience of industrialized economies with the explicit intent to study capitalism in
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developed societies. Dependency theory criticized Modernization theory for, among many
other things, studying development based on the experience of the U.S. and Europe. Yet
by relying on Marxism as a theoretical influence, Dependency theory was using the insight
and logic of an approach that derived its formulations from a context that was irrelevant
for the Latin American reality.249 Cultural Dependency, Brazilian literary critic Silvio
Romero argues in 1881, describes how Latin America uses foreign—usually European—
knowledge to understand its reality.250 Therefore, given Dependency’s inspiration in
Marxists concepts, Claudio Véliz charges against Dependency authors by describing them
as just another iteration of the cultural dependency that they themselves forcefully
challenged.251 In this sense, cultural dependency poses an important criticism against
Dependency theory, and more importantly to its claims about studying capitalism by
challenging core concepts in social science. But it is important to highlight that while the
cultural dependency criticism considers Dependency theory to be too Marxist and therefore
Eurocentric, several orthodox Marxists criticize Dependency for being vulgar Marxism or
not Marxist enough. A discussion on the Marxist criticisms against Dependency theory
highlight the actual influence of Marxism on Dependency theory and also mitigate the
charges of cultural dependency.
Many Marxist authors criticized Dependency theory and considered it to be vulgar
Marxism. In general, these types of criticisms argued that Dependency, when compared to
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Marxism, was excessively based on notions of spatial relations and exchange rather than
on production relations, therefore being devoid of class analysis given its focus on
nations.252 Perhaps the most serious criticism is that of Ernesto Laclau, who argues that
Gunder Frank’s Dependency confuses the concepts of capitalist production with capitalist
circulation, equating capitalist modes of production with participation in the international
economy. For Laclau, Gunder Frank’s mistake was that he considered Latin America’s
participation in the international economy during the colonial period as the introduction of
capitalism in the region. Laclau argues that Latin America was not introduced to capitalism
in the colonial era because the production processes of the region were not capitalist
structures. Therefore, just exchanging goods in the international economy was not
participating in international capitalism because the productive structures in Latin America
were still precapitalistic. Yet Laclau’s criticism, like many other Marxists critiques, is
exaggerated; a discussion on precapitalistic structures highlights the Dependency
approach’s capacity to generate theoretical propositions to understand capitalism in the
periphery.
Laclau’s differentiation between capitalist production and capitalist circulation is
exaggerated for various reasons. First, as it was discussed before, Gunder Frank’s work
shows how the hacienda and the plantation, the precapitalistic productive structures that
Laclau identifies, were in fact modern structures created by colonial capitalism. Just
because servitude and subsistence agriculture were not comparable with industrial labor
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relations in Europe does not mean that they are traditional, indigenous, precapitalistic
structures. Second, Laclau’s distinction between capitalist production and capitalist
circulation separates two aspects of the same phenomenon. By focusing on circulation
rather than just production, Dependency theory introduces another factor of capitalism that
gains relevance when observing non-Western experiences: commodity distribution and the
circulation of money.253 Third, the Dependency approach was able to introduce the notion
of class relations as being affected, conditioned, and mitigated by spatial relations. While
Marxism consider classes to be the dominant factor in productive relations and criticized
Dependency theory for its nationalism, the Dependency approach actually showed how
political relations along the lines of national borders and political states affects the
expansion and evolution of capitalism.254 Therefore, while Laclau’s criticisms were
exaggerated, the Dependency approach was able to transcend Marxism by generating
important concepts to understand capitalism. In other words, the Dependency approach
represents a “conceptual revolution in a scientific understanding of large-scale questions
of capitalist development.”255
The implication of Dependency’s conceptual revolution in relation to the criticisms
of cultural dependency is that cultural dependency exaggerates Marxism’s influence. It is
unquestionable that Dependency authors were influenced by Marxism, but there is also
vast historical tradition of Dependency thinking in Latin America. First, Franz
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Hinkelammert argues that Dependency’s main focus was not, like orthodox Marxism, to
study capitalism in developed societies. On the contrary, Dependency’s main focus was to
challenge the idea for capitalist development in peripheral societies since they considered
it intolerable. Therefore, Dependency authors found in Marxism certain theoretical
propositions that helped them to study Latin America’s reality, but the important theoretical
development of the approach meant that they were not orthodox Marxists. 256 In fact, the
Dependency approach was not exclusively inspired by Marx’s or Lenin’s studies on
industrialized societies. The the works of authors like Paul Baran, José Carlos
Mariátegui,257 or Raúl Presbich were fundamental for the development of the Dependency
approach and they all formulated their analytical concepts by studying peripheral societies.
The fact is that Latin America has a long tradition of thinkers that question the region’s
condition of subjugation. The movements of the first and the second emancipation
presented a profound preoccupation about issues of national autonomy. This tradition also
influenced the formation of the Dependency approach, informing its theoretical
propositions on hierarchy and global power relations.258 Therefore, it is evident that the
Dependency approach was more than another expression of Marxism: it was and continues
to be an independent and influential framework to study political economy.

256

Beigel, Fernanda. 2006. “Vida, Muerte, y Resurrección de las ‘Teorías de la Dependencia’.” In Crítica
y Teoría en el Pensamiento Social Latinoamericano, edited by Bettina Levy, 287-326. Argentina:
CLACSO, pp. 300-01.

257

Robert Packenham points at José Carlos Mariátegui as the father of Dependency theory. Packenham,
Robert. 1992. The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, pp. 10-1.

258

Beigel, Fernanda. 2006. “Vida, Muerte, y Resurrección de las ‘Teorías de la Dependencia’.” In Crítica y
Teoría en el Pensamiento Social Latinoamericano, edited by Bettina Levy, 287-326. Argentina: CLACSO,
pp. 291-94.

120

THE CONTINUED WISDOM OF THE DEPENDENCY APPROACH
The previous discussion on the superficiality and exaggeration of many of the
criticisms against the Dependency approach highlights the magnitude of the movement as
a framework to understand the socioeconomic reality of peripheral capitalism. In particular,
the discussion on cultural dependency highlights how the Dependency approach introduced
important analytical concepts and theoretical propositions to the study of global capitalism.
Yet perhaps the most important contribution of the Dependency approach is the
understanding of International Political Economy as the tension between the logic of
sovereignty and the logic of capitalism.259 Overall, the Dependency approach criticizes the
concept of sovereignty as a universal principle enjoyed by every political organization in
the world. The traditional understanding of sovereignty promised to all political actors the
aspirations of self-determination and self-realization. But the Dependency approach
challenges the traditional understanding of sovereignty by introducing dynamics of
capitalism and power relations. In fact, Dependency authors focused on the processes and
mechanisms through which global capitalism prohibits peripheral countries from fulfilling
the promises of sovereignty.260 While the universal narrative of sovereignty and statehood
dominant in International Relations portrays a world of independent political and economic
units interacting autonomously in the fulfillment of its objectives, the Dependency
approach introduces the impositions suffered by non-Western actors while pursuing their
sovereign promises. For the Dependency approach, “the idea of independent political and
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economic communities is anathema…[and] demonstrate[s] that capitalism possesses a
global logic and is a joint construction of core and periphery.”261 Therefore, the validity
of the Dependency approach is not only the result of the superficiality or exaggerations of
its criticisms, but also the consequence of Dependency’s important contributions.
The reconceptualization of sovereignty implicit in the Dependency approach is a
fundamental aspect of the study of political economy. As mentioned before, the dominant
definition of sovereignty implies a world composed of self-contained political units that
behave autonomously in order to fulfill the promise of self-determination. But Dependency
stresses how problematic it is to understand sovereignty as the existence of independent
political units interacting in the international economy.262 If political units are really
autonomous and can enjoy true self-determination and self-fulfillment, then any lack of
material or ideal realization is the result of individual action. More importantly, if
sovereignty is in fact the existence of self-contained independent political units, then the
positions of privilege that certain units enjoy in the international system are the
consequence of their exclusively independent actions. The logical implication, and indeed
the problematic nature of the traditional concept of sovereignty, is that if all political units
are truly autonomous, then development outcomes like inequality are justified since
privilege is based on individual merit. It is here where Dependency’s most important
contribution emerges: by rejecting that the world is composed of truly autonomous and
independent political units, the Dependency approach challenges the status quo and
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criticizes inequalities in the global economic system.263 By forcing an analytical
recognition of an interconnected international economy, the Dependency approach shows
the constitutive nature of privilege and underprivilege. By transforming the traditional
concept of sovereignty, the Dependency approach introduces non-Western contexts as a
constitutive part of the development outcomes. All of the sudden, the world is no longer a
story of certain actors succeeding because of their ingenuity and others “falling behind” or
“failing to achieve” some status. The Dependency approach contribution rests in showing
the connections between wealth accumulation and exploitation; it rests in showing how
socioeconomic outcomes are reproduced and perpetuated through geographical structures
of power.
It is evident that the Dependency approach presented important conceptual and
analytical contributions to the study of global capitalism. However, the most important
justification for the validity of the Dependency approach as a relevant theoretical
framework to study socioeconomic realities in peripheral societies is the influence the
movement continues to have on contemporary narratives on development. The fact is that
the predominance of Neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s pushed the Dependency
approach to an undeserving ostracism. But while the Dependency approach itself was
considered dead, several concepts and ideas of the movement found validity in mainstream
discourses on development studies, and they continue to be relevant in contemporary public
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debates and academic publications.264 For instance, the contemporary relationship between
China and many other developing countries shows important parallelisms with the
theoretical formulations of Dependency theory. In particular, the aggressive pace of
Chinese industrialization has created a massive demand for primary products, incentivizing
Latin America to focus on extracting primary products for their export. The consequence
has been an important process of increased dependency on selling commodities to China
parallel to an important process of de-industrialization in the region.265 Therefore, very
much in line with the postulates of dependent development formulated by Cardoso and
Faletto, the economic growth of Latin America is now conditioned by any expansion or
contraction of the Chinese economy.266 Thus, contemporary debates on development
continue to be informed by the ideas of the Dependency approach.
The influence of the Dependency approach on the growing body of the resource
curse literature is considerable.267 As it was discussed before, the literature on the resource
curse examines how certain extractive productive processes create socioeconomic
conditions that affect development outcomes. In this sense, by the 1940s and then again by
the 1960s both Structuralism and Dependency theory identified how exporting primary
products constrained access to foreign exchange, and how this ultimately conditioned Latin
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American economies.268 Similarly, the literature on the resource curse stresses how the
commercialization of commodities produces important pressures on the local economy to
de-industrialize and favor manufactured imports, ultimately limiting development because
of unstable commodity cycles.269 Moreover, the Dependency approach focused on
examining not only situations of dependency but also how sensitive and vulnerable were
peripheral countries to such conditions. In this sense, Dependency authors explored how
different situations of dependency, whether conditional situations or situations of
subordination, affected development outcomes in peripheral societies. In particular,
Raymond Duvall discussed the theoretical implications of factors of vulnerability and
sensitivity under dependency situations. The degree to which a peripheral society suffered
significant costs by any variation in the external conditions represented a dependency
situation of vulnerability. The fact that peripheral societies responded at certain changes in
external conditions represented their degree of sensitivity under dependency situations.270
Once again, the literature on the resource curse presents an important influence from the
Dependency approach given its focus on studying vulnerability and commodity price
volatility. An important body of literature under the resource curse argues that societies
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with a high reliance on exporting commodities face significant financial risks because
commodity prices fluctuate drastically in the world economy.271 The volatility of
commodity prices puts enormous pressures on socioeconomic outcomes in peripheral
societies because they limit their capacity to design and implement development strategies
with stability. In fact, the literature on the resource curse even argues that the volatility of
commodity prices creates socioeconomic distortions such as inequality, reducing it under
commodity booms but then increasing it when prices drop.272 Therefore, similarly to
Raymond Duvall’s discussions on sensitivity and vulnerability, the literature on the
resource curse actually explains the specific mechanisms through which societies under
dependency situations are conditioned by changes in external conditional factors.
Ultimately, the Dependency approach focused on studying how certain dependency
situation influenced elite behavior, and how elite behavior perpetuated situations of
dependency. In particular, authors like Andre Gunder Frank, Oswaldo Sunkel, and Gabriel
Palma discussed how elites tend to distort political development in order to maintain the
structures of dependency.273 The literature on the resource curse states that elites seek to
manipulate the political process through bribery and by reducing accountability in order to
appropriate most rents from extractive activities while perpetuating the structures that
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create socioeconomic distortions.274 The fact that the literature on the resource curse
presents arguments that follow the logic of many ideas of the Dependency approach
validates the premises of the movement as a relevant theoretical framework to study
contemporary political economy.
Similarly to the literature on the resource curse, the contemporary literature on
globalization studies, and particularly authors identified as globalization skeptics, presents
important ideas from the Dependency approach. First, both globalization studies and
Dependency focus on studying how the global forces of capitalism affect local structures
and how these structures adopt, adapt, and respond to external influences.275 Second,
similarly to the Dependency approach, many authors under the literature on globalization
argue that the expansion of modern capitalism tends to be detrimental for the development
of peripheral nations.276 In particular, authors like Ha-Joon Chang argue that industrialized
countries have erected a set of rules and regulations in the international economy in order
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to maintain their privilege and restrict the economic development of peripheral nations.277
More importantly, Chang even challenges the Neoliberalism approach by arguing that none
of the industrialized countries in the world followed neoliberal policy prescription when
they were industrializing. It was not until these countries were developed that they adopted
the policy prescriptions of the Neoliberalism approach with the sole purpose of expanding
their material wealth while maintaining their dominant position in the international
economy. 278 The predisposition of industrialized countries to pressure peripheral countries
into adopting policies that asymmetrically benefit developed economies described by
Chang is similar to the discussions on domination and subordination present in the
Dependency approach. In particular, Theotônio dos Santos argues that under situations of
dependency, peripheral countries cannot simply escape the domination of core countries.
The articulation of external interests, Dos Santos argues, affect the situation of dependency
and ultimately condition socioeconomic outcomes in peripheral societies.279 Therefore, the
conditions of the contemporary international economy described by Chang are a
characterization of the relations of domination elaborated by Dos Santos.
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Similarly to Chang, Robert Wade is also skeptical of the expansion of modern
capitalism and its effects on developing countries. Wade argues that the regulations of the
current international trade regime condition the development of peripheral by reducing the
policy choices for developing nations.280 Specifically, Wade argues that the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) diminish development policy alternatives
for developing countries. First, Wade argues that TRIPS increase the cost of knowledge
while failing to increases the rate of innovation or knowledge transfer from industrialized
centers to peripheral countries.281 The consequence of the lack of knowledge transfer
through the extensive protection of intellectual property rights is that developing countries
become even more dependent on knowledge from industrialized centers. At the same time,
the rising costs of knowledge also increase the net outflow of resources from peripheral
countries to industrialized centers. Second, when discussing TRIMS, Wade argues that
these policies hinder peripheral development even more because they prohibit establishing
conditions to foreign capital. In this sense, peripheral countries cannot require foreign
capital to invest based on specific developmental goals to benefit local objectives, limiting
the spillover effect of foreign capital and perpetuating the periphery’s dependence on the
financial resources from industrialized countries.282 Wade’s analysis of how the current
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rules and regulations of international trade shares several ideas with the analysis of the
Dependency approach regarding global capitalism. First, the rising knowledge and
technological dependency described by Wade as a consequence of TRIPS is an argument
presented by Dos Santos described as “the new dependence” or the “technologicalindustrial dependence” which emerged in the mid twentieth century with the advent of the
multinational corporation.283 More importantly, Wade describes how the obligations
imposed on peripheral countries by the current rules and regulations on international trade
are easily enforceable, while the responsibilities acquired by the industrial center are not.
In particular, Wade argues that while one of the responsibilities of the developed countries
is to guarantee the transfer of technology and knowledge to developing countries, the
reality is that technology is only moving between industrialized economies without any
repercussion.284 The dynamic of technology transfer in the current international trade
system highlights the importance of Dependency ideas like power relations, asymmetric
benefits, and structures of subordination and domination.
The validity of the Dependency approach as a theoretical framework to study
political economy is evident. The Dependency approach successfully introduced important
concepts and unique analytical propositions to study the expansion of capitalism in
peripheral societies. By presenting the expansion of capitalism in peripheral societies as a
theoretical problem, the Dependency approach introduced concepts of mutually
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constitutive power relations in development outcomes. Most importantly, it made it
imperative for any study on political economy to focus on the historical context of
peripheral societies as an explanatory factor in their socioeconomic reality. But many other
Dependency concepts and ideas informed important bodies of literature on development
such as the literature on the resource curse or globalization studies. In fact, the Dependency
approach is the most significant contribution to post-colonial thought,285 informing PostColonialism and Post-Developmentalism studies.286 Therefore, the Dependency approach
provides a theoretical framework that understands socioeconomic realities to be the
consequence of historical processes in which external and internal structures interact and
generate specific development outcomes. In this sense, the Dependency approach considers
development outcomes to be the result of how the expansion of capitalism interacted with
local factors, and how those factors influenced the evolution of capitalism in their specific
context. The state argument states that the socioeconomic reality of South America is the
consequence of the structural and functional structure of the state. The formation and
consolidation of the South American state is a historical process in which local factors
interacted with changes in the international economic system resulting in a society
organized around exploiting commodities. Then, it is evident that the Dependency
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approach provides the state argument with the theoretical grounding to explain the
historical formation of the South American state. However, before moving forward towards
the consolidation of the state argument as a Dependency explanation, it is necessary to
resolve a theoretical issue of the Dependency approach: the role of the state.

THE STATE ARGUMENT AND THE DEPENDENCY APPROACH
The Dependency approach understood the socioeconomic reality of Latin America
to be the result of the interaction between the external forces of capitalist expansion and
the internal power structures of the region. In this sense, it argued that the predisposition
of South American societies to rely on exporting primary products was the result of the
region’s insertion into the global economy. More importantly, the Dependency approach
highlighted the capitalist nature of exploitative productive structures, stressing how global
capitalism incentivized and perpetuated the creation of the economic activities that
subjugated the vast majority of South Americans. But the historical understand of the state
in the Dependency approach presents significant theoretical formulations that require
important revision in relation to the state argument. Overall, the nation-state was central to
Dependency analysis, which maintained the logic of the state as a fundamental actor in the
process of development.287 However, the role that the Dependency approach ascribed to
the state was dichotomous: the South American state of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
represented a problem for the development of the region, but it also represented the most
important aspect of the prescribed solution. Dependency argued that the state was a
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function of dominant classes in the region, and that these classes controlled the state in
order to perpetuate capitalist structures of exploitation. Given that the dominant classes
aligned their interests with the interest of external actors, the state was there merely as an
expression of global capitalism. Therefore, the state was problematic because the alliance
between the dominant classes that controlled it with foreign interests represented an
obstacle for development in the region.288 The central problem with the state for the
Dependency approach was that authors in the movement saw it incapable of transforming
the socioeconomic reality of South America. Since the state was controlled by dominant
classes which aligned their interests with foreign actors, the link between the national state
and the imperialist system is impossible to escape.289 The approach had little faith on the
capacity and willingness of the dominant classes to transform the socioeconomic reality of
the region since that would require for them to eliminate their privilege position in the
global economy. And here lies the paradox of the role of the state in the Dependency
approach: before the region could address any of the external conditions that limited its
development, it was indispensable to transform the state in order to modify internal
structures.
The Dependency approach considered it imperative to transform the state in order
to affect change in South America’s socioeconomic reality. Only by achieving a level of
national autonomy could the region organize its economic processes in a rational and
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sovereign structure that improved the region’s development outcomes.290 The problem
with promoting development through autonomous and rational states was that, according
to Theotônio dos Santos, not a single country in the entire global South could be
characterized as a real sovereign nation.291 Therefore, the problem of South American
development was a political one: the state needed to autonomously transform the structures
of capitalist expansion but there were no autonomous states in South America. It is in this
analytical context that the Dependency approach prescribes for South American societies
to first capture the state in order to increase its autonomy with the confidence that, while
international forces shaped the structures that maintained socioeconomic distortions,
delinking from global capitalism would grant the political conditions to create
development.292 The Dependency approach presented variation on the specific processes
through which South American societies could increase state autonomy—either violent
revolution or moderate reforms—yet a common denominator was to establish a socialist
state. A socialist state could be able to increase its autonomy by by delinking from global
capitalism while also transforming the socioeconomic reality of the region. This socialist
state would shape policy based on the interests of all sectors of society except those of the
sellout elites.293 Thus, only a socialist state would be able to separate from the conditioning
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forces of capitalism, to create true autonomy, and to engage in a transformative process of
development.
But the policy prescriptions of a socialist state promoted by the Dependency
approach present important theoretical contradictions and empirical inadequacy. Once
again, the Dependency approach thought it possible for a socialist state to separate from
capitalist expansion and create development in South America. Yet considering it possible
to separate from global capitalism and obtain true, unchallenged, self-contained autonomy
is a direct contradiction to one of the most incisive theoretical propositions of Dependency.
As it was discussed before, the Dependency approach challenged the idea of sovereignty
as a universal principle enjoyed by all self-contained political units. In this sense,
Dependency understood autonomy as a relational concept conditioned by hierarchies and
power asymmetries. More importantly, the movement highlighted the mutually
constitutive nature of socioeconomic relations under capitalism. For privilege to exist, there
must be underprivilege, and development outcomes are the consequence of capitalist
relations, not self-contained universal and ahistorical processes. Therefore, by prescribing
for South American socialist states to delink from global capitalism in order to develop,
the Dependency approach is in fact contradicting one of its most important contributions
to the study of capitalism: interconnectedness is unavoidable. To various degrees, capitalist
relations are at the center of development outcomes, and by promoting delinking,
Dependency is not actually pivoting socialism as a system of self-contained units but
actually ignoring many of its crucial insights on power relations and hierarchies in the
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global economy.294 But more importantly, by promoting delinking through a socialist
takeover of the state, the Dependency approach portrayed a convenient but unrealistic
understanding of human relations. The entire logic of the policy prescriptions of the
Dependency approach assumes that socioeconomic distortions in the region are the result
of the greed of certain domestic classes and the exploitation and domination of external
actors.295 Yet based on the understanding of domination as a mutual relation and not an
imposition, Dependency portrayed external actors and certain internal actors as irrational
and only moved only by greed. This characterization of internal dominant classes was taken
to an extreme, considering all internal and external capitalist classes tantamount to evil
while the rest of social structures in the region were considered blameless victims.296
The political prescriptions of the Development approach not only ignored the
movements most important contributions, but they have been contradicted empirically by
contemporary development in the South America. The discussion on NeoDevelopmentalism showed how the political realization of self-proclaimed progressive
movements does not necessarily guarantees a socioeconomic transformation. On the
contrary, what the discussion on Neo-Extractivism shows is how once the political
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movements that were informed by Dependency reached the state, they increased
socioeconomic distortions by exacerbating capitalist exploitative structures that increased
dependence and decreased autonomy. It is true that many of the individuals within these
movements were incredibly corrupt, and that their corruption definitely affected policy
implementation in the region. However, corruption is not a sufficient explanation for the
unwillingness of ideologically marked movements to transform productive structures in
the region. The corruption argument not only feeds into the idea of South Americans as
intrinsically incapable of self-governance—and therefore perpetuating the Balck Legend—
but it also distorts the study of South American political economy. It is unquestionable that
extractive productive processes are more prone to bribery and clientelism, but it is also true
that these activities provided the most resources for the self-proclaimed progressive
governments to guarantee their political success. These movements, once they reached the
state, were faced with a structure that incentivized maintaining exporting primary products
because the viability of the state depended on those activities. Transforming the state’s
structural organization would risk the material resources necessary for the success of these
political movements. Let’s not forget that these governments proclaimed legitimacy on
their capacity to redistribute the revenue from natural resources in order to alleviate poverty
and inequality. Transforming the productive structures that perpetuate socioeconomic
distortions presented a risk for these governments: to lose the material resources that
guaranteed their political viability in the short term. In a context where controlling the state
is the most viable avenue for wealth, prestige, and power,297 engaging in a deep
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transformation of the organizational structure of the state is simply too risky an endeavor
to consider. Therefore, the corruption argument and the policy prescriptions of the
Dependency approach distort the study of South American political economy by focusing
on the wrong factors and providing the wrong explanations.
The state argument challenges the theoretical and empirical problems of the
Dependency approach by refocusing the study of South American political economy
towards historical processes and durable structures. By focusing on the structure of the
state and its implications for maintaining exploitative socioeconomic processes, the state
argument ascribes rationality to the behavior of all social sectors in South American
societies. It could very well be argued that the problem with South American development
not only lies in the inadequacy of its leaders but also in the complete absence of
accountability claims by the rest of the population.298 The region has been politically
independent for almost two hundred years, and it is then unlikely to suggest that the
socioeconomic problems of the region are just because of corrupt elites and imperialist
foreign interests. In other words, is it likely that for over two hundred years the vast
majority of social classes in South America have been completely powerless and therefore
victims of greed and domination. Informed by the Dependency approach and the historical
processes of the region, the state argument challenges this characterization of development
outcomes in the region and brings national agency at the center of the study of political
economy. The problem with the policy prescriptions of the Dependency approach is that
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they assume the region to be a passive actor in its own destiny.299 The state argument turns
around the passive role of South American societies by placing the structure of the state at
the center of the development process. In doing so, the state argument stresses the role of
domestic structures and how different social sectors interact with them as the definitive
factor affecting socioeconomic outcomes. Following Dependency, the state argument
examines how external factors influenced the formation, consolidation, and historical
behavior of state structures, but it places the explanatory power of development outcomes
on how national structures interact with all internal and external factors.
Therefore, the state argument represents a theoretical refinement to the Dependency
approach. The state argument not only keeps accordance with Dependency concepts of
autonomy and hierarchies, but it also provides the tools to differentiate among different
situations of dependency. One of the problems of the Dependency approach was its
incapacity to differentiate between countries with external reliance and high development
levels and countries with external reliance and low development levels. In fact, the
theoretical contradictions of the policy prescriptions of the Dependency approach made it
impossible to differentiate between the nature and the magnitude of the socioeconomic
distortions of countries in situations of dependency.300 Since all countries under situations
of dependency are affected by external conditions, differences in the nature and magnitude
of their socioeconomic challenges are explained by how internal structures interact with all
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sectors in the global economy. In this sense, the state argument reinterprets the insights of
Cardoso and Faletto,301 yet by focusing on the structure of the state, the state argument
resolves the theoretical contradictions of the policy prescriptions of the Dependency
approach. Therefore, the Dependency approach provides important theoretical concepts for
the state argument, but the state argument reformulates the most problematic aspects of
Dependency by focusing the study of South American political economy on the structure
of the state. It is now indispensable to build the state argument by elaborating on its internal
logic, by articulating the particularities of its propositions, and by designing the
mechanisms to operationalize and measure the validity of its causal formulations.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGNING THE STATE ARGUMENT
The state argument argues that the continuity of socioeconomic distortions in South
America is the consequence of the structural and functional organization of the state.
Specifically, the state argument points at the structural and functional organization of the
South American state around the exploitation of primary resources for export creates and
maintains socioeconomic distortions in the region. The logic of the state argument suggests
that the region’s predisposition toward commercializing commodities is the result of how
the state formed under the context of the expansion of global capitalism. Given the lack of
defensive purpose for the state after the wars of independence, the South American state
found legitimacy and functionality through the promotion of economic growth by securing
the success of economic activities directed at exporting primary products. The nature of
exploitative economic activities creates economic vulnerability, the concentration of wealth,
productive concentration and exploitation, and socioeconomic distortions. Therefore,
countries that focus the majority of their productive activities on exporting commodities
exacerbate economic dislocations that affect development through de-industrialization,
macroeconomic volatility, and rent-seeking political behavior. The consequence is a
continuity of socioeconomic problems like poverty and inequality regardless of important
commodity cycles of booms and busts. Such negative consequences from focusing on
exporting primary products have been known for decades in South America, yet the region
continues to maintain a predisposition toward exploitative productive activities. Therefore,
a thorough examination of South American political economy requires to question not only
what creates poverty and inequality, but why such problems continue to affect the region.
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At this point, it is necessary to formalize the study of South American political
economy in general and how the state argument responds to the most pressing questions in
the field. The problem of socioeconomic distortions in South America is a historical
conundrum that requires an explanation based on a historical process capable of explaining
its continuity. Therefore, at the heart of any study of South American political economy lies
a first paradox: the continent possesses immeasurable resources yet its socioeconomic
problems appear to be insurmountable. The answer to such paradox informs the rest of the
study on South American political economy, given that understanding the causes of
socioeconomic distortions is imperative for addressing the region’s development. In other
words, any study of South American political economy must first ask: What causes
socioeconomic distortions like poverty and inequality in South America? As it was
discussed before, there is a vast literature on South American political economy focused on
elucidating the causes of poverty and inequality in the region. With the emergence of the
resource curse argument as the most contemporary example, the literature points at the
reliance on exporting commodities as the main reason for the presence of poverty and
inequality in South America. In fact, as the discussion on the literature on South American
political economy revealed, the most dominant theoretical approaches of the twentieth
century pointed at either the region’s reliance on commodity export or at the state’s failure
as the causes for poverty and inequality in the region. These observations in the literature
are not contradictory, but they require elaboration to articulate the role of commodities and
the role of the state into a historical explanation of the continuity of poverty and inequality.
In this sense, the state argument accepts the premise of the resource curse argument
regarding the processes that create poverty and inequality while building from the existing
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literature about the role of the state in maintaining the structures that perpetuate
socioeconomic distortions.
The reliance on exporting primary products responds to the major paradox of South
American political economy. While the region has immense resources, the nature of
productive activities to extract them concentrate their revenue and create poverty and
inequality. Yet a second paradox emerges from the literature on South American political
economy emerges: if there is a vast literature that points at how relying on exporting
commodities creates poverty and inequality, then why is it that such problems continue to
affect the region’s socioeconomic reality in the twenty-first century. The fact is that at least
since the 1940s with the work of authors like Raúl Prebisch, the region has been aware of
the detrimental effects of exploitative economic processes. Despite such historical
knowledge and the historical commitment of many political movements to transform the
socioeconomic reality of the region, South America continues to present a political economy
primarily based on exporting primary products and redistributing trade revenue. In light of
the second paradox of South American political economy, it becomes indispensable to ask:
Why does South America continue to rely on exporting primary products given its negative
effects on poverty and inequality? The state argument responds to this question by pointing
at the structural and functional organization of the state as the explanation for the continuity
of exploitative productive processes in South America. In this sense, the logic of the causal
mechanism of the state argument states that the South American state found legitimacy and
functionality in the promotion of exploitative productive processes. The consequence of this
promotion was that the structure of the South American state developed around the
exploitation of primary products, deriving most of its material resources from exporting
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commodities. But these exploitative productive processes—through de-industrialization,
macroeconomic volatility, and rent-seeking political behavior—distorted South American
development and created poverty and inequality. By the early twentieth century, the region
was intellectually aware of the pervasive effects of its reliance on trading commodities, and
the most dominant political and ideological movements of the era vowed to transform South
America’s socioeconomic reality. However, the structural and functional organization of
the South American state maintained the reliance on exporting primary products, and after
decades of political and ideological variation, the region’s political economy continues to
be characterized by a predominance of exploitative productive activities and poverty and
inequality.
Embedded in the state argument is a criticism of the literature on South American
political economy. Informed by the Dependency approach, the state argument points at the
importance of historical and global processes in explaining the region’s socioeconomic
reality. The state argument stresses how the expansion of capitalism affected the formation
of the South American state, and how the omnipresence of the contemporary global
economy continues to condition development policy choices in the region. However, the
state argument also challenges certain aspects of the Dependency approach by
problematizing the structure and function of the South American state. The Dependency
approach considered the South American state to be controlled by elites that aligned their
interest with external actors, therefore subjecting the vast majority of South Americans to
processes of exploitation. In contrast, and in light of the empirical reality of NeoDevelopmentalism in the twenty-first century, the state argument suggests that it is not the
ideological or individual preferences of elites, but the structure and function of the state
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what explains the continuity of socioeconomic distortions like poverty and inequality. In
this sense, the state argument is rooted in the theoretical understandings of the Dependency
approach, but it advances its logic by stressing the relational nature of global capitalism and
how it manifests in the structure of the state.
In this sense, the discussion of Neo-Developmentalism highlights a third paradox of
South American political economy: the behavior of socioeconomic conditions appears to be
cyclical, with periods of sustained improvement succeeded by periods of important
decreases in the rates of poverty and inequality. The sustained socioeconomic improvements
that characterized the South American political economy of the 2000s have suffered
important contractions in the second half of the 2010s. In light of this third paradox of South
American political economy, it is important to ask: Why does the socioeconomic reality of
South America present a cyclical dynamic? Informed by the Dependency approach and the
resource curse argument, the state argument responds to this question by pointing at how
global capitalism conditions the formation and consolidation of productive structures in
South America. Given the mutually constitutive nature of global development outcomes
stressed by the Dependency approach, it becomes important to consider: How does global
capitalism conditions development outcomes in South America? More importantly, given
the logic of the state argument, it is imperative to ask: Which factors of global capitalism
conditioned the formation and consolidation of the South American state? The state
argument points at the incentivizing and conditioning structures of global capitalism and
how such factors influenced the formation of the South American state and how they
continue to incentivize the maintenance of exploitative productive processes. In particular,
the state argument highlights how the growing demand of commodities by industrializing
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centers of power in the international economy incentivizes South American states to
exacerbate their reliance on exporting primary products. Moreover, the state argument
highlights the current rules and regulations of the international trade system to show how
South American states are punished if they implement policy alternatives.
The formalization of the state argument requires the operationalization of the
paradoxes of South American political economy. In this sense, before articulating the causal
mechanisms of the state argument, it is important to formalize the central questions of the
study of South American political economy and its tentative answers. The central question
of this study of South American political economy asks why does South America continues
to rely on exporting primary products given its negative effects on poverty and inequality?
The state argument responds by pointing at the structure and function of the South American
state as the reason for the continuity of exploitative processes in the region. Therefore, the
state argument hypothesizes that the South American countries that present states with the
most structural and functional organization around exporting primary products should
present the biggest exploitative economic sectors. Moreover, the state argument then
hypothesizes that the South American countries that present states with the most structural
and functional organization around exporting primary products should present the highest
levels of socioeconomic distortions like poverty and inequality. In this sense, Figure 3
illustrates the causal mechanism hypothesized by the state argument.
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Figure 3. Illustration of the Causal Mechanism of the State Argument
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Moreover, the state argument hypothesizes that certain factors of global capitalism
affect state formation and consolidation. In particular, the state argument hypothesizes that
in a global context of greater demand for primary products, the countries in South America
that present the state with the most structural and functional organization around exporting
primary products should present an increase in the activities of exploitative economic
sectors. The state argument further hypothesizes that under such global context of greater
demand for primary products, the countries in South America that present the state with the
most structural and functional organization around exporting primary products should also
present the highest levels of socioeconomic distortions. However, the conditioning effect of
global capitalism illuminates an important socioeconomic trend in South America. Holding
the previously mentioned hypothesized conditions constant, the state argument
hypothesizes that in a global context of greater demand for primary products, the countries
in South America that present the state with the most structural and functional organization
around exporting primary products should present the greatest decreases in the rate of
socioeconomic distortions. In this sense, in moments of expansion of the global demand for
commodities, the countries that present the most reliance on exporting primary products
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should present the biggest changes in the rates of poverty and inequality. Thus, informed
both by the Dependency approach and the resource curse argument, the state argument
hypothesizes the volatile relationship between global conditions and regional development
outcomes. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between global conditions and development
outcomes in South America.
Figure 4. Illustration of the Relationship between Global Conditions and Development
Outcomes in South America
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The formalization of the state argument elucidates the relationship between the
structure of the state and development outcomes in South America. Informed by the
Dependency approach and the resource curse, the state argument introduces the role of the
state at the center of the study of South American political economy. The state argument
rests on the premise that given the internal and external conditions of South America before,
during, and after the wars of independence in the early nineteenth century, the state formed
and developed around economic activities geared toward exploiting and exporting natural
resources in the region. Therefore, the implications of the state argument transcend the three
paradoxes of South American political economy discussed before, given that it also requires
the examination of the formation of the South American state. The state argument does not
assume that the South American state developed around extractive productive activities; the
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state argument requires to examine the historical process of state formation in the region.
Since the state argument is premised on the examination of the formation of the state, then
it is necessary to ask: How did the South American state form and develop? The state
argument suggests that the South American state formed around the production of
commodities. In particular, the state argument highlights that the state consolidated as a
function of the interest of local actors that favored exporting primary products to the
expanding industrializing global powers of the era.
Therefore, the formalization of the state argument points at the different areas of
study on South American political economy that need to be examined in order to formulate
a historical explanation for the region’s socioeconomic problems. First, the state argument
points at the colonial era to understand the antecedents that conditioned the internal
structures under which the South American state formed. Second, the state argument points
at the nineteenth century as a crucial moment of South American state formation given that
the region gained political independence and consolidated the state. In fact, the nineteenth
century is also a crucial moment of study given the global conditions of capitalist expansion
that influenced the formation and consolidation of the South American state. Third, the state
argument highlights the importance of Neo-Developmentalism in the twenty-first century
given the continued reality of South America’s socioeconomic distortions. The shifts in
global demand for commodities between the 2000s and the 2010s also present an important
era for the study of South American political economy. In this context, it is necessary to
outline the parameters under which to build and test the validity of the logic of the state
argument. A totalizing explanation requires an array of approaches to formalize both the
historical processes that shaped South American states and the academic analysis that
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measures the explanatory traction of the state argument. The next sections outline the
parameters to formulate and to test the state argument.

THE PARAMETERS TO STUDY THE STATE ARGUMENT
The state argument requires the formulation of a theoretical understanding of the
formation of the South American state while also testing the validity of its propositions. In
order to elaborate the state argument as a totalizing explanation of the contemporary
socioeconomic reality of South America, it is necessary both to advance the theoretical
understanding of the field and to measure the explanatory power of the structure of the state
in development outcomes. In other words, the paradoxes and complexity of South American
political economy require an academic approach capable of reformulating theory while also
testing the validity of such theoretical propositions. In particular, the study of the state
argument requires a multimethodology research design capable of providing the necessary
mechanisms to generate inferential power that validates the logic of its premise and causal
propositions. A multimethodology research design provides important advantages for the
study of South American political economy in general and for the formulation of the state
argument in particular. First, a multimethodology research design allows for the formulation
of exploratory and confirmatory questions that can generate and validate theoretical
propositions simultaneously.302 Second, a multimethodology research design allows for the
triangulation of data and methodologies, increasing inference certainty by reducing the
randomness of variances. In fact, methodological triangulation increases the explanatory
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power of causal mechanisms by reducing the impact on correlation derived from the nature
or inconsistencies of certain methods.303 Therefore, by studying the state argument under
a multimethodology research design, it is possible to formulate theoretical propositions
about the formation of the South American state, it is possible to elaborate on the
relationship between the structural formation of the South American state and development
outcomes, and it is possible to measure the magnitude and significance of the structure of
the South American state on socioeconomic distortions like poverty and inequality in a
single study.
Although there are various multimethodology research designs, the formulation of
the state argument requires a design that addresses the complexity and temporality of South
American political economy. The fact is that the complexity of the paradoxes of South
American political economy and the temporality of the formation and consolidation of the
South American state differ greatly from one another. Therefore, the multimethodology
research design of the state argument follows a sequential logic in order to address all
aspects of the argument. A sequential multimethodology research design comprises at least
two phases of the research process that occur sequentially in which the results and
inferences of the first phase inform and condition the formulation of the second phase.304
The sequential logic of the research process allows for the formulation of exploratory
questions that can be later verified through confirmatory questions. In this sense, a
multimethodology research design starts with exploratory questions which create
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theoretical propositions that are either confirmed, refined, explained, or rejected in
subsequent phases of the research.305 Moreover, the nature of a sequential
multimethodology research design deploys both qualitative and quantitative methods in
each phase of the research process in order to strengthen the inference traction of the entire
study, so the formulation of the state argument is conducted under a quantitatively
dominant sequential multimethodology research design.306 The logic of the
multimethodology research design presents a process of qualitative data collection,
analysis, and inference which informs the collection and analysis of quantitative data and
either the confirmation, refinement, or rejection of the previous inferences. Yet temporality
of the premises of the state argument as an explanation of South American political
economy require a chronological logic for the research process. Given that the first phase
of the research process informs and conditions the second phase, and that the analysis and
results of the second phase either confirm, refine, or reject the inferences of the first phase,
the study of the state argument is conducted under a sequential multimethodology with
multistrand research design.307 A sequential multimethodology with multistrand research
design deploys a first phase of exploratory questions that create theoretical knowledge
based on inferences derived from the analysis of initial data. The inferences of the first
phase then inform a second phase in which exploratory questions are examined and the
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validity of the previous inferences is measured. It is at the end of the second phase that the
formulation of explanatory theoretical propositions emerges in the research process. Most
importantly, it is after the second phase that the explanatory validity of theoretical
proposition is supported by the triangulation of data and methods and the confrontation of
exploratory and confirmatory questions through a single research process. Hence, Figure 5
illustrates the sequential multimethodology with multistrand research design to study the
state argument.
Figure 5. Illustration of the Sequential Multimethodology with Multistrand Research
Design
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The sequential multimethodology with multistrand research design provides
significant advantages for the formulation of the state argument. In general, the formulation
of the state argument presents two main objectives: 1) to elaborate on the formation and
consolidation of the South American state; and 2) to measure the impact of the formation
and consolidation of the South American state on the region’s development outcomes. In
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this sense, the state argument proposes that the South American state formed and
consolidated around extracting primary products for export. Moreover, it is the structural
and functional organization of the South American state around exploitative productive
activities that maintains the structures that create socioeconomic distortions in the region.
The sequential multimethodology with multistrand research design permits to engage both
propositions sequentially allowing for the theoretical formulation and validity evaluation
of the state argument. In particular, the first phase of the sequential multimethodology with
multistrand research design engages with the exploratory question regarding the formation
of the South American state. It is in this first phase that the proposition of the state argument
stating that the South American state formed and consolidated around exporting primary
products is elaborated through historical analysis. The inferences from the first phase then
inform the second phase of the sequential multimethodology with multistrand research
design, in which the relationship between the structure of the state and development
outcomes in South America. The second phase of the methodology questions why there is
continuity in South America’s socioeconomic distortions. Informed by the particularities
of the inferences of the first phase, the second phase presents the state argument’s
hypothesis about the specific structure of the South American state as the explanatory
factor behind the region’s development outcomes. It is in the second phase of the
methodology that the study engages with the confirmatory questions about the
hypothesized relationship between the South American state and poverty and inequality.
Ultimately, the inferences of the second phase are then contrasted with the inferences of
the first phase in order to provide a theoretical understanding of the political economy of
South America. By leveraging the advantages of the sequential multimethodology with
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multistrand research design, the stage of meta-inference generates theoretical knowledge
capable of influencing the study of South American political economy and the discipline
of International Relations in general.
In order to leverage the methodological advantages of the multimethodology design
it is necessary to elaborate on the concepts presented by the state argument. As it has been
elaborated before, the state argument establishes a causal relationship between the structure
of the state and development outcomes. In particular, the state argument discusses how the
organization of the South American state around extractive productive activities
perpetuates development challenges like poverty and inequality. Therefore, the concepts
of the state and development are central to the state argument, but their definition is not
without debate in the academic literature. At the heart of study of South American political
economy lies the continuity of socioeconomic distortions. In particular, the region’s
political economy presents a curious dynamic in the fact that there have been different
types of political movements in control of the state yet they all seem to be incapable of
transforming development outcomes. The important level of variance in the ideology and
identity of the political movements that have governed South America points at a
fundamental aspect of the concept of the state: the difference between state and regime.
Much of the variance among the different political movements that have governed the
region lies in their type of regime rather than in any type of structural change of the state.
In this sense, Cardoso’s differentiation between regime and state provides an initial
understanding of the structure of the state for the formulation of the state argument.
Cardoso argues that the concept of regime refers to the rules that regulate the relationship
between various political institutions as well as the norms that define the relationship
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between citizens and rulers.308 The concept of regime points at the hierarchical relationship
between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, as well as the democratic,
oligarchic, totalitarian, autocratic, or monarchic processes through which rulers are elected
and exercise their governing power. In contrast, the concept of the state refers to the basic
“pact of domination” among the different social factors in a specific political unit or
organization.309 The concept of the state refers to the specific hierarchical organization
between dominant classes and the mechanisms devised to maintain their preferred positions
within the structure.
Cardoso’s differentiation between regime and state, then, highlights an important
aspect for the formulation of the state argument: structure and process. There is no
particular combination between regimes and states, meaning that the structural
composition of the state does not necessarily conditions a particular type of regime or vice
versa. In fact, the South American experience highlights how there can be a coexistence
between a particular state and various different regimes, whether they are authoritarian,
corporatist, democratic, or even fascist.310 Therefore, the fact that South America has been
governed by various regimes does not necessarily mean that they have presented different
organizational structures, pointing at the state argument as an explanation for the continuity
of socioeconomic distortions in the region. In other words, development outcomes in South
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America are not a consequence of regime types, they are a consequence of organization.
While focusing on the organization of social classes through a pact of domination
illuminates one aspect of the study of political economy, the literature on state formation
still highlights a problematic area regarding the formation of the South American state.
Following the logic of the state as an organizational function of a pact of domination,
authors like Frederic Lane and Charles Tilly point at security as the main driver motivating
the agreement between dominant classes that create the modern state. As Miguel Angel
Centeno argues, the modern state emerges as nothing more than a “protection racket,” a
social pact in which citizens subjugate themselves to a particular organization in exchange
for protection from internal and external violence.311 In essence, the state is the articulation
of an agreement directed at obtaining security in which social domination, hierarchy, and
privilege are codified and maintained.
Yet the state argument specifically highlights how the formation of the South
American state did not follow the security imperatives described by Lane or Tilly. As it is
discussed later, the South American state formed as a function of the expansion of global
capitalism. When the international economic system expanded dramatically particularly at
the second half of the nineteenth century, the dominant classes in South America found a
motivation for organizing in participating in international trade. Therefore, the South
American pact of domination was articulated into an organizational structure that
responded to economic imperatives. The process of state formation in South America, then,
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follows the logic of the capital-intensive route described by Charles Tilly.312 To various
degrees, dominant classes in South America bargained an agreement of domination in
which they would exchange economic resources for protection, providing an encompassing
motivation to articulate a state capable of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the agreement.
The logical implication of the process of state formation in South America is that the
organizational structure of a state that emerges from a pact motivated by economic
imperatives is going to be different than the organizational structure of a state that emerges
from an agreement based on security imperatives. A state that emerges from a pact of
dominant classes motivated by securing economic resources must necessarily present a
prior agreement outlining how the state must collect and dispose social surplus.313 In fact,
it is the prior agreement regarding the process of surplus collection and distribution what
ultimately determines the organizational structure of the state. In the capital-intensive
route, Tilly argues that dominant classes bargain with state makers in order to articulate an
organization that can secure their privilege access and control to material resources. But
such organization also requires access and control of certain material resources in order to
articulate the mechanisms to guarantee the promises of the pact of domination. Without
material resources, a state sees their capacity to guarantee economic security significantly
diminished, and it is the agreement regarding how to provide the state with resources what
ultimately delimits its organizational structure.
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In South America, the articulation of the agreement of the dominant classes
emerged through the formation of a state capable of guaranteeing the exploitation of
primary products and access to foreign markets. For this, the state needed to guarantee the
control of dominant classes over resources, the security for dominant classes to exploit the
resources, and the access to foreign markets for dominant classes to commercialize
resources. The consequence was a state intrinsically related to exploitative economic
processes, and the pact of domination between dominant classes envisioned the
commercialization of commodities as the mechanism through which the state would
receive its required material resources. Therefore, any analysis of the organizational
structure of the state must observe how the state obtains and disposes of material resources.
Then, the state argument requires an examination of taxation systems in order to fully
understand the organizational structure of the South American state, given that states
organize around certain social sectors and economic processes depending on how they
extract material resources. Taxation provides not only an understanding of which
socioeconomic sectors sustain the state, but also they provide a measure of state strength
and state penetration.314 The state argument states that the South American state organized
around the exploitation of primary resources, meaning that the functioning of the state was
dependent on its organizational capacity to extract material resources from the
commercialization of commodities. It is not only that dominant classes envisioned the
purpose of the South American state to be the protection of exploitative activities, but also
that the viability of the state relied on obtaining revenue from such activities. Any other
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imaginable function or purpose of the South American state required the success of
exploiting primary products, making it imperative to understand the organizational
structure of the state around such economic processes.
To this point, the state is understood as the articulation of an organizational
agreement between social factors. The organizational structure of the state is observable
through the mechanisms by which the state obtains the material resources necessary to
fulfill its agreed promises. Therefore, in order to formulate the state argument, it is
necessary to elaborate on the structure of the South American state. However, the state
argument also contends the functionality of the South American state to be fundamental
for development outcomes in the region. It is not only that the state organized around
exploitative activities, but also how given structural organization affects the state capacity
to fulfill any objective. In other words, when studying development outcomes, it is also
imperative to understand the capabilities of the state. Yet there is not broad consensus
regarding how to measure state capability in the academic literature. In fact, there is an
identifiable divide regarding measuring state capability between those who focus on the
effects of state action versus those who focus on the quality of state functions. Authors like
Robert Rotberg and Craig Boardman argue that state capability should be measured by
observing the quality of the end products of state functions or the success of public
policy.315 If the state is responsible for providing security or education, then an evaluation
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of its capabilities would focus on homicide rates, literacy rates and schooling years. But
measuring state capability through its functional consequences creates comparative
difficulties given the wide array of functions modern states are required to perform. It is
simply impossible to compare state capability by observing the quality of the results if two
states do not share the same functions. In other words, it is impossible to compare the
capability of states to provide education if not all of the compared states are functionally
required to provide public education. In this context, authors like Francis Fukuyama argue
that state capability should be measured by observing the quality of state functions.316
Particularly in the context of development outcomes, state capability is relevant given the
capacity of the state—regardless of their specificity—to establish procedures capable of
delivering autonomous results.
The measurement of state capability is therefore dependent on which aspects affect
the effectiveness of the functions of the state. If the effectiveness of the state is fundamental
for development outcomes, then it is imperative to elucidate the particular factors that make
a state effective. Following the understanding of the state as the articulation of the
agreement of social forces, the functionality of the state is therefore condition by its
structural organization. In this sense, Miguel Centeno and Agustin Ferraro identify four
different areas of state capability relevant to development outcomes. Informed by Max
Weber, Centeno and Ferraro point at territoriality—the monopoly over the means of
violence—as the first aspect of state capability relevant for development outcomes.
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Second, Centeno and Ferraro identify economic capacity as a fundamental aspect of state
capability, pointing at two different functions: promotion and appropriation. What is
important for economic capacity is for the state to be able to appropriate resources through
efficient fiscal systems, providing the state with its required material resources while
promoting economic prosperity. Moreover, informed by Michael Mann, Centeno and
Ferraro point at infrastructural power as the third aspect of state capability. Infrastructural
power is an important aspect of modern states, it relates to the capacity to establish and
mobilize organizational and technical power in order to process information and maintain
communication structures. Finally, Centeno and Ferraro point at symbolic power—or what
Max Weber identifies as legitimacy—as the fourth aspect of state capability. Symbolic
power refers to the capacity of the state to concentrate and diffuse practices of authority
capable of generating conformity and deference.317 These four aspects of state capability
are instrumental for development outcomes, and they become crucial in understanding not
only the organizational structure of the state but ultimately its functionality.
The state argument defines the state as the articulation of the organizational
agreement between the

dominant social factors in a particular geopolitical space.

Dominant social factors find a specific purpose for the state based on their material,
existential, or ideational imperatives. The nature of the imperatives that motivate powerful
social factors to reach a pact of domination and then create an organization to maintain
given pact influences the structure and functionality of the state. The defining feature of
the organizational structure of the state is how it appropriates and disposes the material
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resources required for it to fulfill its functions. In turn, the organizational structure of the
state also influences the nature and effectiveness of state action, conditioning state
capability. Overall, states focus on four main areas that delimit their capability:
territoriality, economic, infrastructure, and legitimacy. The economic capability of the state
is inescapably related to the structural organization of the state. The capacity for the state
to capture, appropriate, or extract material resources from a particular sector of society is
dependent on the nature of such sector, making the original envision and motivation for
the formulation of the state a fundamental aspect of state capability. In this context, Figure
6 illustrates the concept of the state according to the state argument.
Figure 6. Illustration of the Concept of the State
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The state argument formulates a causal relationship between the concept of the state
and the concept of development. In particular, the state argument argues that the
organizational structure and functionality of the South American state perpetuates the
socioeconomic processes that create poverty and inequality in the region. Yet in contrast
to the concept of the state, the concept of development presents profound contradictions in
the academic literature.318 Defining development has become an elusive task, and authors
within the field more often than not present a concept composed of several indicators
without any clear analytical formulation.319 Therefore, as Anthony Payne and Nicola
Phillips suggest, “the concept of development has never been in greater need of analysis
and clarification than in the present era.”320 In this context, it is necessary to present a brief
discussion on the historical evolution of the concept of development given the causal
relationship formulated by the state argument. The concept of development in the English
language can be traced back to the translation of Karl Marx’s book Capital, in which
development is defined as a historical process of collective realization that transcends
economic growth and is marked by the structure of economic relations.321 Nonetheless, in
contrast to Marx’s definition of development, British colonial policy of the early twentieth
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century—through the works of Lord Alfred Milner—considered development to be the
state’s actions directed at exploiting natural resources.322 Yet these definitions ignored the
sociological tradition of the concept of development found in the works of Augusto Comte.
Informed by the drastic socioeconomic transformations of the Industrial Revolution,
Comte understood development as an action taken by the state with the constructivist
purpose of imposing order and balancing society.323 Given the growing socioeconomic
distortions of the Industrial Revolution, Comte considered any action taken by the state to
ameliorate or to influence distributive realities to be development. Hence, the contrasting
definitions by Marx, Milner, and Comte highlight how difficult it is to elaborate a specific
concept of development. More importantly, they stress different aspects of the concept,
from whether it is a deliberate action or a historical process to whether the subject of
development is the economy, society in general, or particular socioeconomic distortions.
The analytical problems derived from the contrasting definitions of development
have not been resolved; they have actually stressed the compartmentalization of
Development Studies in general.324 As a consequence of the compartmentalization of
Development Studies, Development Economics became the most dominant area in the
field. Informed by Area Studies and the post-WWII context, Development Economics
defined development purely in economic terms as a concept to differentiate between
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industrialized and poor societies.325 In this sense, authors like Frank Notestein and Walt
Rostow defined development as a unilinear process of stages transited by all societies in
order to achieve economic growth.326 As a consequence of the dominance of Development
Economics, the concept of development became interchangeable with concepts like
economic development or economic growth. The consolidation of the concept of
development as economic development moved societies toward generating the conditions
for rapid economic growth even if they created environmental degradation or increases in
poverty and inequality.327 The redefinition of development as economic growth and its
practical implications were soon criticized in the academic literature. For instance, Dudley
Seers argued in 1969 that the concept of development should encompass other social
processes beyond economic growth, stressing the importance of issues like poverty,
inequality, and the satisfaction of basic material needs.328 In fact, Nobel Prize Winner
Amartya Sen challenge the concept of development as economic growth and suggested that
development is actually the expansion of political freedoms, economic facilities, social
opportunities, transparency, and security.329 However, by criticizing the concept of
development as economic growth, authors like Seers and Sen created an overspecification
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of the concept that has derived in analytical vagueness. By increasing the aspects relevant
to the concept of development, development became a concept that captures everything,
limiting the analytical usefulness of the term. A clear example of the vagueness of the
concept of development is Hugo Slim’s definition, which states that development “is
essentially about change: not just any change, but a definite improvement—a change for
the better. At the same time, development is also about continuity.”330 It is difficult to
operationalize a concept that is both about the continuity and change of an ephemeral
improvement. The consequence of the expansion of the concept of development is an
ineffective term that refers to everything, and by consequence, to nothing.
It is in this context that operationalizing the concept of development for the
formulation of the state argument becomes increasingly difficult. Yet it is important to
highlight that the causal mechanism presented by the state argument stresses the
relationship between the organizational structure of the state and development outcomes,
not the development process. Informed by the previous discussion on the concept of
development, the state argument understands development to be a process that transcends
mere economic growth. Moreover, informed by the resource curse argument, the state
argument understand poverty and inequality to be the consequence of the economic
processes generated by the exploitation of primary products. Therefore, the state argument
considers development as the process—regardless of the specific phases or parameters of
a process—through which societies generate different development outcomes. In other
words, the state argument states that development is not a certain result but the process to
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reach such result. Studying the particularities of the development process are beyond the
objectives of this study, and therefore the concept of development is not elaborated
thoroughly. Perhaps the organizational structure and functionality of the state are either
part or conditioning factors of the development process, but elucidating their connection is
not part of the state argument. At this point it is important to highlight, then, that
understanding state formation and state capability within the context of the development
process is an important area of investigation in the field of South American political
economy, and it should be explored in subsequent studies. But the objective of this study
is to demonstrate how certain societies with a particular organizational structure of the state
present continuity in certain development outcomes. As it has been described before, the
state argument focuses on two particular development outcomes: poverty and inequality.
These outcomes are considered socioeconomic distortions given their undesirable effect in
the material existence of those societies where they are present. In this sense, the terms
development outcomes and socioeconomic distortions refer to poverty and inequality and
are used interchangeably. Thus, in order to formulate the state argument it is indispensable
to elaborate on the operationalization and measurement of the causal relationship between
the state and development outcomes.

ON BUILDING THE STATE ARGUMENT
The formulation of the state argument requires first to elaborate on the formation
of the state and then to develop the causal relationship between the organizational structure
and functionality of the state and development outcomes. The logical premise of the state
argument rests on a specific understanding of the formation of the South American state.
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In this sense, the first phase of the sequential multimethodology with multistrand research
design responds to: How did the South American state form and develop? The state
argument suggests that the formation of the South American state responded to economic
imperatives, and that it was organized around the exploitation of primary resources.331
Therefore, the state argument relies on the use of historical explanations to understand the
process of state formation in South America. Historical explanations are a methodological
resource widely used in social sciences,332 and they leverage the logic of inference in order
to understand specific outcomes that occurred either in the distant or the recent past.333
Rooted in the idea of causality developed by David Hume, most historical explanations
describe events through the logic of counterfactual and necessary causation.334 In
particular, historical explanations understand outcomes by connecting events that unfold
sequentially over time which are linked as causal factors. In this context, informed by the
philosophy of logic and Paul Lazarsfeld’s elaboration, James Mahoney, Erin Kimball, and
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Kendra Koivu developed the method of sequence elaboration in order to assess the causal
links of historical explanations.335 Therefore, in order to understand the process of state
formation in South America, the first phase of the research design presents a historical
explanation that uses a method of sequence elaboration. It is through the method of
sequence elaboration that the initial explanation of how the South American state formed
presented by the state argument is contextualized.
The method of sequence elaboration requires the formulation of a causal
mechanism between certain initial conditions and a particular outcome. The nature of the
relationship between the initial conditions and the particular outcome is defined through
the logic of necessary and sufficient conditions.336 In this sense, the sequence elaboration
method defines initial conditions either as either necessary or sufficient causes for a
particular outcome to occur through the use of set theory and Boolean logic.337 Logically
under set theory, for an initial condition to be a necessary cause, the observable outcome
must be a subset of the initial condition. The implication for an initial condition to be
necessary is that the observable outcome could occur with or without the presence of such
necessary cause.338 On the contrary, for an initial condition to be a sufficient cause, the
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initial condition must be subset of the observable outcome. The logical implication for an
initial condition to be sufficient is that every time such condition is present then the
observable outcome occurs. However, historical explanations rarely consider initial
conditions to be either independently necessary or independently sufficient causes. In fact,
historical explanations present sequence elaborations that suggest how the combination of
multiple initial conditions generates a particular observable outcome. It is not the presence
or absence of one single initial condition, but the combination of various conditions that
are jointly necessary or sufficient what creates a particular observable outcome.339
Informed by the work of John Lesley Mackie, historical explanations take into account the
combination of multiple initial conditions that work as a necessary cause for a particular
observable outcome as an INUS condition: “An insufficient but necessary part of a
condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.”340 One particular
condition is neither necessary or sufficient, but once it is combined with another initial
conditions, then they are all sufficient for the particular observable outcome to occur.
Nonetheless, given the dominant probabilistic nature of causality in social sciences, INUS
causes are probabilistically necessary, and they can present different combinations of
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variable values capable of creating the observable outcome.341 In this sense, Figure 7
presents a representation of the logic of necessary, sufficient, and INUS causes.
Figure 7. Necessary, Sufficient, and INUS Causes
NECESSAR
Y
X

Y

SUFFICIENT

INUS

Y

X
Y

X

A

X: Initial Condition
A: Initial Condition
Y: Outcome
Historical explanations present a causal relationship between certain initial
conditions and a particular observable outcome. However, the method of sequence
elaboration introduces other conditions either as antecedent or as intervening variables in
order to elaborate on the initial causal relationship. It is through the introduction of other
variables to the initial bivariate relationship that the method of sequence elaboration can
determine causality through set-theory and Boolean logic.342 In this sense, if the historical
explanation presents a relationship between certain initial conditions as necessary causes
for an observable outcome, then the method of sequence elaboration examines the
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relationship between the initial conditions and antecedent conditions in order to examine
the validity of the first relationship. For example, if the antecedent conditions are
determined to be sufficient causes for the observable outcome, then set-theory and logic
suggest that the initial relationship is wrong and spurious.343 Therefore, the introduction of
antecedent or intervening conditions can either contextualize or eliminate an initial
relationship by determining not only how antecedent or intervening conditions interact with
the initial conditions, but also by observing the nature of the relationship between
antecedent or intervening conditions and the observable outcome.344 By introducing either
antecedent or intervening conditions, the method of sequence elaboration presents a
sequence of linked necessary causes in which the probabilistic importance of the conditions
increases logically by chronological approximation to the temporal moment of the
observable outcome.345 Hence, the objective of the method of sequence elaboration is not
to determine the nature of an initial condition either as necessary or sufficient. On the
contrary, the logic of the method of sequence elaboration is designed to evaluate the
relationship of various conditions that are casually linked and exist at different
chronological points of a temporal sequence.346 Thus, the result of the method of sequence
elaboration is to measure the causal mechanisms embedded in a particular historical
explanation.

343

Ibid. p. 133

344

Ibid. pp. 129-31.

345

Ibid. p. 132.

346

Ibid. p. 142.

173

The first phase of the research design presents a historical explanation in which
various causal mechanisms explain the process of state formation in South America. While
a mechanism is the recurrent causal relationships between certain initial conditions and a
particular observable outcome, a process is the specific ordering of various causal
mechanisms in a sequential or chronological logic.347 Mechanisms usually specify why and
how certain realities change, therefore engaging not only with chronological ordering but
ultimately with the temporality of conditions. Time is usually assumed in social sciences
as an independent or self-evident causal force, but temporality is distinct from causal
mechanisms since it delimits the distinction between causes and dynamics.348 Therefore,
any historical explanation for a particular process that presents causal mechanisms requires
the specification of temporality. Temporality not only delimits the period in which a
particular event occurred, it actually presents the ordered dynamic between causal events
present in a process. The method of sequence elaboration presents how certain conditions
interact in a causal mechanism while delineating sequence dynamics explains the duration,
tempo, and timing of each causal mechanism within a particular process.349 First,
delimiting duration requires measuring how much time elapses between the beginning and
the end of a specific mechanism, sequence, or process through the periodization of the
temporal moment under observation. 350 Second, delimiting tempo requires the observation
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of the frequency of certain conditions and events within a particular moment in a
mechanism or process.351 Third, delimiting timing is required to determine the specific
moment in which a particular condition or event unfolded given a particular context.
Timing is not about sequencing or the relationship between conditions within a particular
mechanism or process, timing refers to the exogenous context in which certain conditions,
mechanisms, or processes take place.352 In this sense, the relevance of delimiting timing
lies in its capacity to contextualize a particular condition, mechanism, or process—not on
relation to other aspects of the mechanism—to external conditions that ultimately affect
how future events unfold in the mechanism.353 These aspects of temporality are crucial for
historical explanations since they not only explain the dynamic between mechanisms but
also because they elucidate why and how processes unfold within an overall context.
In this context, the first phase of the research design presents a historical
explanation rooted in the method of sequence elaboration and the definition of important
aspects of temporality. Specifically, the first phase of the research design presents the state
argument’s historical explanation regarding the formation of the South American state. In
this sense, the observed outcome—the specific organizational structure and functionality
of the South American state—is the result of the interaction of certain initial conditions. In
order to do so, the state argument leverages the work of Miguel Angel Centeno and
Fernando López-Alves as alternative explanations to the process of state formation in
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South American. Since the works of Centeno and López-Alves reject that the South
American state formed by following the European model and point at the economic
imperatives at the heart of the process in the region, the state argument presents an initial
causal relationship between the existing conditions in the post-independence period and
the specific organizational structure and functionality of the state in the continent. The state
argument presents a historical explanation composed of sequences in which contingent
events affect the possibilities for further outcomes either through reinforcing a particular
pattern or by triggering a reaction.354 Therefore, while Centeno and López-Alves point at
the nineteenth century, the state argument also focuses on how certain contingent and
preceding events affected the process of state formation in the region.
The fact is that certain local, regional, and global conditions that took place in the
nineteenth century conditioned the formation of the South American state. But these
conditions represented drastic transformations that were the result of long historical
processes ranging from colonialism to the Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the first phase
of the research design focuses on the period of antecedents to the process of state formation
in South America, identifying their initial moment at the colonial period of Spanish and
Portuguese domination in the Americas. There are almost four hundred years between the
moment of Spanish conquest until the Industrial Revolution, stressing the importance on
periodization. Any identifiable period within a historical explanation is marked by four
main starting points: the emergence of new institutions, the transformation of preexisting
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institutions, external or contextual shocks, and variation in causal mechanisms.355 In this
context, the time frame of the first phase of the research design presents four main
chronological periods between the moment of the colonial encounter and the early
twentieth century. While the boundaries between each period are arbitrary, they capture
significant local, regional, and global changes that inform the formulation of the state
argument. More importantly, each period presents important characteristics that influenced
and conditioned the formation of the South American state. Periodization contextualizes
the moment in which sequences unfold given how broader processes can increase or
decrease the likelihood that a particular causal mechanism occurs.356 In other words,
periodization marks the different contexts in which causal mechanisms unfold, and it is the
broader context what ultimately delimits the particular outcome.357
In this sense, the first period of study encompasses the early process of colonial
settlement in South America from the end of the fifteenth century until mid-seventeenth
century. The second period of study encompasses the colonial period from the midseventeenth century until the period of independence in the early nineteenth century. The
first and second periods identify important local, regional, and global transformations that
serve as antecedents to the process of state formation in the nineteenth century. In
particular, the main division between these two periods is the change in colonial policy that
Spain implemented in the eighteenth century and the emergence of Great Britain in the
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global economy. The third period of study focuses on the independence and immediate
post-independence period between the early nineteenth century and mid-nineteenth
century. It is at this point that politically autonomous states form in South America, and
the local and regional context of the continent after the wars of independence conditioned
much of the process of state formation. The fourth period of study stresses the expansion
and consolidation of the South American state between mid-nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, and the main characteristic of the global context is the massive
expansion in international trade that took place at the time. The fourth period of study is
the most important period of the first phase of the research design since it examines how
the South American state developed and consolidated. The first three periods provide
crucial background and analytical information in order to consolidate the premise of the
state argument regarding the formation of the South American state as a function of
economic imperatives in the region. Thus, Table 2 presents a summary of the periodization
of the process of state formation in South America as hypothesized by the state argument.
Table 2. Periodization of the process of state formation in South America
Stage
Antecedents
Antecedents
Formation
Consolidation
Period

1490s – 1650s

Context

Early
colonization

Colonization

Independence

Industrial
Revolution

Conquest

Colonial
Reforms and
British
growth

Napoleon
invasion of
Spain

Britain’s
commercial
expansion

Starting
Point

1650s – 1810s 1810s – 1860s

1860s – 1900s

As discussed above, the first phase of the research design examines the process of
state formation in South America. The state argument presents a historical explanation
discussing the causal mechanism between certain contingent conditions and the particular
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state formation in the region. In light of the existing literature and the logical premise of
the state argument, it is necessary to examine the relevant historical context, the particular
process of state formation, and the economic relationship between the region and the world.
The first phase of the multimethodology research design builds the state argument first by
examining the relevant historical processes between the end of the fifteenth century and
the late nineteenth century. The examination of the historical context and relevant
processes elaborates on secondary sources present in the literature that have chronicled the
socioeconomic history of South America. In this sense, the first phase of the research
design analytically engages with secondary sources in order to elucidate which historical
conditions influenced the formation of the South American state. However, building the
state argument also requires identifying the moment the South American state formed as
well as the particular characteristics it adopted during its consolidation. In addition to
secondary historical sources, determining the process of state formation in the region also
relies on examining various historical databases with quantitative data. The quantitative
data in the first phase of the research design describes three main elements of the state
argument: the moment of state formation and consolidation, the particular characteristics
of the state during its formation and consolidation, and the commercial trends between the
region and the world.
The first phase of the research design focuses on the work of Centeno and LópezAlves in order to determine the moment of formation and consolidation of the South
American state. In particular, Centeno measures centralization and pacification as proxies
for the establishment of modern independent states in South America by identifying the
years in which there was a federalization of capital, the end of major regional revolts, an
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effective end of banditry or Indian revolts, and a national census.358 In fact, Centeno also
identifies the length of railway lines open as an important proxy for state centralization.
Therefore, the first phase of the research design also measures the length of railway line
open in South America from Brian Mitchell’s work on international historical statistics.359
Moreover, the particular characteristics of the state during its formation and consolidation
are measured by the variables on the centralization of political authority in the POLITY II
research database.360 These variables measure the degree of state centralization (cent), the
directiveness of regulation (scope), and the persistence of the particular regime (persist).361
Ultimately, the logical premise of the state argument points at the importance of
international commerce in the formation and consolidation of the South American state.
Hence, the first phase of the research design examines historical statistics on external trade
aggregates and major commodity exports. In fact, it is important to highlight the structural
role of external trade in supporting the state by focusing on customs and royalties as share
of ordinary income, and the economic statistics are obtained from Brian Mitchell and
Miguel Angel Centeno’s work.
In conclusion, the first phase of the research design presents a historical explanation
for the process of state formation in South America. In this sense, it presents a periodization
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of the historical context in which the state emerged, highlighting relevant historical
contingencies that influenced the process of state formation. Relying on secondary
historical sources, the first phase of the research design elaborates on the necessary local
and global conditions that created the particular structure and functionality of the South
American state. Moreover, the first phase of the research design elucidates on the historical
moment in which the state formed and consolidated, paying close attention to the role of
external commerce by observing historical statistics on centralization, pacification, state
concentration, and trade. The logical premise of the state argument states that the South
American state formed as a consequence of economic imperatives in the region, and that it
developed around the commercialization of primary resources. Therefore, the first phase
of the research design shows how the incipient South American state was fragmented and
weak, and how it increased its functional role given its structure around the expansion of
international trade.

ON TESTING THE STATE ARGUMENT
The first phase of the research design examines how the South American stated
formed and consolidated. Building from the works of Centeno and López-Alves, it
discusses the historical contingencies that generated the necessary conditions for the state
to develop as a consequence of economic imperatives. In this sense, it identifies the global
and contextual conditions that interacted with local and regional dynamics in order to shape
the particular characteristics of the South American state. The structural organization of
the state around the exploitation and commercialization of primary products rests at the
heart of the state argument. Yet the state argument suggests that such organizational
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structure not only creates socioeconomic distortions but is actually responsible for their
continuity. Hence, the state argument identifies a causal relationship between the
organizational structure of the state, the state’s function, and development outcomes. In
fact, informed by the literature on South American political economy, the state argument
proposes that the current socioeconomic dynamics of the region are a consequence of the
continuous reliance of the state on the commercialization of commodities. Therefore,
informed by the inferences of the first phase, the second phase of the research design
measures the contemporary validity of the causal propositions of the state argument. The
state argument suggests that the organizational and functional structure of the South
American state creates and maintains socioeconomic distortions in the region. In this sense,
the second phase of the sequential multimethodology with multistrand research design
responds to: Why does South America continues to rely on exporting primary products
given its negative effects on poverty and inequality? The state argument leverages the
explanatory power of quantitative data, statistical regression analysis, and time series
analysis in order to examine the proposed causal relationship between the organizational
structure of the state, global conditions, and development outcomes.
The second phase of the research design has two main objectives: to determine
whether the structural and functional organization of the South American state around the
commercialization of primary resources that emerged and consolidated in the nineteenth
century is still present, and to determine the impact it has on socioeconomic distortions like
poverty and inequality. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), a country is considered to be dependent on commodities when

182

primary products represent 60% of total exports.362 Therefore, in order to determine whether
South American states continue to be dependent on the commercialization of commodities,
the second phase of the research design observes the rates of commodities as a share of total
exports and the rates of commodities as a share of gross domestic product between 1996
and 2017.363 The second objective of the second phase of the research design is to measure
the impact of the dependence on commodity commercialization on the continuity of poverty
and inequality in South America. For this, the second phase of the research design builds a
multivariate linear regression model in which it operationalizes the structural and functional
organization of the state and socioeconomic distortions. Based on the theoretical discussion
presented before, the structural organization of the state is operationalized as resource
dependence and resource appropriation. Therefore, the first aspect of the independent
variable is measured both by the indicators on the rate of commodities as a share of total
exports and gross domestic product as well as the percentage of total natural resource rents
and the share of tax and non-tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product between
1996 and 2017.364 Moreover, the state argument also identifies the functionality of the state
as an important aspect influencing development outcomes. Informed by the discussion on
the literature on the formation of the South American state as well as the literature on
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measuring state capacity, the second phase of the research design measures the functionality
of the state by the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank between
1996 and 2017.365 Therefore, Figure 8 presents the operationalization of the concept of the
state based on the theoretical discussions on the literature on the formation of the South
American state as well as the discussion measuring state capacity presented above.
The second phase of the research design measures the causal relationship between
the structural and functional organization of the South American state and the continuity of
development outcomes. The literature presents important discussions on the concept of
development, and a unified analytical term is not reachable. Therefore, the
operationalization of development outcomes in South America is based on socioeconomic
distortions like poverty and inequality. The operationalization of the dependent variable is
simpler than the operationalization of the concept of the state primarily because of the long
tradition of the use of international economic statistics. Poverty and inequality have been
measured thoroughly in academia, and major statistical institutions present various
indicators referring to both socioeconomic conditions. However, there is important
observations against the use of international economic statistics, particularly because of the
disconnect between the concepts that are described and the exact measurements that
indicators provide.366 In order to reduce the distorting effects of the concept-measurement
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Figure 8. Operationalization of the Concept of the State
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gap, the second phase of the research design uses various indicators to measure poverty and
inequality. First, poverty is measured by using the indicators on the poverty headcount ratio
at national poverty lines (percentage of population), the poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a
day (2011 Purchase Power Parity) (percentage of population), and the poverty headcount
ratio at $5.50 a day (2011 Purchase Power Parity) (percentage of population).367 Second,
inequality is measured by using the indicators on the GINI coefficient, the income share
held by highest 10%, and the income share held by highest 20%.368
The causal relationship hypothesized by the state argument contends that the
continuity of poverty and inequality in South America is because of the structural and
functional organization of the state. In other words, the hypothesized causal relationship of
the state argument proposes that as countries present higher levels of dependence on the
commercialization of commodities while also relying on greater appropriation of its
resources, they will also present higher levels of poverty and inequality. Specifically, the
state argument contends that the states that present higher rates of commodities as a share
of total exports, higher rates of commodities as a share of gross domestic product, higher
rates of total natural resource rents as a share of gross domestic product, and lower rates of
taxes as a share of total revenue, also present higher levels of poverty headcount ratio at
national poverty lines as a percentage of the population, higher levels of poverty headcount
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ratio at US $1.90 a day, higher levels of poverty headcount ratio at US $5.50 a day, a higher
GINI coefficient, higher levels of income share held by highest 10%, and higher levels of
income share held by highest 20%. Moreover, informed by the literature on the resource
curse argument, the state argument contends that the countries that present the highest levels
of state dependence on the commercialization of commodities also present the lowest levels
of state capacity. The causal mechanism identified by the state argument suggests that the
structural organization of the South American state around the commercialization of
commodities deteriorates the capacity of the state, affecting its governing capabilities and
ultimately perpetuating poverty and inequality. Therefore, based on the logical relationship
hypothesized above, the countries that present the higher levels of state dependence on
commodities also present the lower levels of voice and accountability, political stability and
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control
of corruption.
Based on the theoretical formulations of the state argument, there are four
hypotheses measured by the operationalization of the variables. First, the operationalization
of the variables identifies a relationship between the state’s economic dependence on
commercializing commodities and poverty and inequality. Second, the operationalization
of the variables identifies a relationship between the state’s organizational dependence on
appropriating commodity revenue and poverty and inequality. Third, the operationalization
of the variables identifies a relationship between the state’s capacity and poverty and
inequality. Fourth, the operationalization of the variables identifies a relationship between
all the previous aspects of the concept of the state and poverty and inequality. Therefore,
the second phase of the research design builds five main statistical models to test the
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hypothesized relationship of the state argument. The first two models test the first two
hypothesis identified above, while the third model tests the relationship between both the
state’s economic dependence and organizational dependence on the commercialization of
commodities and poverty and inequality. The fourth model tests the third hypothesized
relationship between the state’s capacity and poverty and inequality, while the final model
tests the relationship between the state’s structural and functional organization around the
commercialization of commodities and poverty and inequality. Table 3 summarizes all of
the multivariate statistical models while identifying the general concepts, the variables, the
indicators, and the direction of the hypothesized relationship.
In this context, the second phase of the research design tests the contemporary
validity of the causal relationships hypothesized by the state argument. The second phase
of the research design focuses on testing the relationship between the South American state
and poverty and inequality between 1996 and 2017. Since the state argument emerges from
studying the historical processes that shaped the geopolitical organization of the areas
colonized by Spain, the entire population in question for the statistical analysis is comprised
of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Therefore, the data for the second phase of the research design is organized as panel or
longitudinal data comprised of nine observations or units over twenty two consecutive
points in time.369 Overall, panel or longitudinal data is used in social sciences to measure
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Table 3. Summary of the Multivariate Statistical Models
Model Variable

Concept

Indicator Variable

1

Independent

Economic
Dependence

1
2

Dependent

1

Independent

Economic
Dependence

1
2

Dependent

2

Independent

Structural
Dependence

3
4

Dependent

2

Independent

Structural
Dependence

3
4

Dependent

3

Independent

State
Capability

3

Independent

State
Capability

4

Independent

Structural
Organization

4

Independent

Structural
Organization

5
6
7
8
9
10
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

Dependent

Dependent

Dependent

Dependent

Concept

Indicator Relationship
11
Positive
Poverty
12
Positive
13
14
Positive
Inequality
15
Positive
16
11
Positive
Poverty
12
Negative
13
14
Positive
Inequality
15
Negative
16
Negative
Negative
11
Negative
Poverty
12
Negative
13
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
14
Negative
Inequality
15
Negative
16
Negative
Negative
Positive
11
Positive
Poverty
12
Positive
13
Negative
Positive
14
Positive
Inequality
15
Positive
16
Negative
**
11
Poverty
12
13

Structural 1
6
and
2
7
5
Independent Functional 3
8 Dependent
Organization 4
9
of the State 5
10
Structural 1
6
**
and
2
7
14
5
Independent Functional 3
8 Dependent
Inequality
15
Organization 4
9
16
of the State 5
10
*The indicators are identified by a number as follows: (1) Commodities as share of total exports; (2)
Commodities as share of GDP; (3) Total rents of natural resources as share of GDP; (4) Tax revenue; (5) Voice
and accountability; (6) Political stability and absence of violence; (7) Government effectiveness; (8)
Regulatory quality; (9) Rule of law; (10) Control of corruption; (11) Poverty headcount at national poverty
lines; (12) Poverty headcount at US $1.90 per day; (13) Poverty headcount at US $5.50 per day; (14) GINI
coefficient; (15) Income share held by highest 10%; and (16) income share held by highest 20%.
**The relationship between the independent variable indicators and each of the dependent variable indicators
is the same as in the previous models. For instance, for model 1, the relationship between indicator 1 and
indicators 11, 12, and 13 is Positive, yet in model 2, the relationship between indicator 4 and indicators 11, 12,
and 13 is Negative.
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trends or dynamics of change in different hypothesized relationships.370 Yet the state
argument measures a static relationship between the structural organization of the South
American state and the continuity of poverty and inequality in the region. It is the timeinvariant factors between observational units what explains the hypothesized relationship.
The state argument suggests that while there might be variations between the hypothesized
explanatory parameters between units or subjects, the nature of these explanatory
parameters is homogeneous among all units. In fact, the state argument theorizes that these
parameters do not change over time; they are time-invariant in nature because they have
been present throughout history perpetuating poverty and inequality in South America.
Based on the theoretical understanding of the state argument, the second phase of the
research design treats longitudinal data as a series of cross sectional data, ignoring the time
variant characteristic of each unit and applying an OLS-Pooled Regression Model.371
Ultimately, the second phase of the research design also measures the role of the
global context in the relationship between the structural and functional organization of the
state and development outcomes in South America. Informed by the first phase of the
research design, the second phase of the research design understands the importance of
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global capitalism and the presence of major global consumers of primary products in the
socioeconomic trends of South America. In this sense, the second phase of the sequential
multimethodology with multistrand research design responds to: Why does the
socioeconomic reality of South America present a cyclical dynamic? The state argument
suggests that the cyclical dynamic of socioeconomic trends in South America responds to
the changing conditions of global capitalism. In particular, and informed by the resource
curse argument, the state argument points at the volatility of global commodity markets as
the main explanation for the cyclical dynamic of socioeconomic trends in South America.
In order to measure the role of commodity market volatility, the second phase of the research
design identifies changes in the price index of various commodities as an indicator of
changes in the global economy. The capitalist nature of the global economy, and in
particular the dynamics of supply and demand, condition the price of commodities in the
global market. The state argument suggests that the fluctuation of commodity prices in the
international economy conditions the financial resources available for South American
societies, ultimately affecting the socioeconomic reality of the region. Almost all countries
in the global economy are impacted by changes in commodity prices either as consumers or
as producers. Yet not all societies in the world suffer dramatic changes in their
socioeconomic realities due to changes in the global demand and supply of natural
resources. Therefore, the indicators for changes in the indexes prices of fuels, minerals, and
agricultural commodities are introduced as control variables in the multivariate regression
models.372 The state argument ultimately proposes that it is the structure of the South
372
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American state what explains for the continued presence of poverty and inequality in the
region. By controlling for the effects of the global economy on the cyclical dynamic of
poverty and inequality, the second phase of the research design isolates the actual effect of
the structure of the state on development outcomes.
In conclusion, the second phase of the research design measures the validity of the
causal relationship identified by the state argument through comparative data analysis and
multivariate statistical models. First, the second phase of the research measures the
continuity of South America’s economic dependence on commodity exports. Based on the
definition of commodity dependence of UNCTAD, the second phase of the research
determines whether commodities continue to represent more than 60% of South American
exports. Second, the second phase of the research design measures the relationship between
the structural organization and functionality of the state and poverty and inequality. The
state argument’s causal mechanism is measured by five different statistical models that
wage on various hypothesized relationships. Finally, the second phase of the research design
measures the role of global conditions on the socioeconomic trends of South America. In
this sense, the state argument considers the volatility of commodity prices as an indicator
for changes in the international economy. Changes in the international economy explain the
cyclical dynamic of poverty and inequality in the region, while the structure of the South
American state explains the presence and continuity of development outcomes. In this
context, Table 4 summarizes the research design to study the state argument by pairing the
relevant theoretical observation with its specified period of study, its theorized response,
and the each particular indicator used for measuring the hypothesized relationships.
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Table 4. Studying the State Argument
Period Observation
Question
1490s1900s

State
argument
logical
premise

1490s1900s

Major
paradox

19962017

Second
paradox

19962017

Third
paradox

How did the South
American state
form and develop?

Answer
Based on
economic
imperatives
around
commercializing
commodities

What causes
socioeconomic
Reliance on
distortions like
exporting
poverty and
primary products
inequality in South
America?
Why does South
The state is
America continues
structurally and
to rely on exporting
functionally
primary products
organized around
given its negative
commercializing
effects on poverty
commodities
and inequality?
Changes on
global
Why does the
commodity
socioeconomic
markets
reality of South
influence
America present a
chances in
cyclical dynamic?
socioeconomic
trends

Indicators
Statistics on
centralization,
pacification, trade,
and POLITY II
Commodities as
share of total
exports and gross
domestic product

Total rents from
natural resources
and tax revenue

Variation in
commodity prices
indexes

ON THE STATE ARGUMENT AND SOUTH AMERICA
The state argument is theoretically rooted in the literature on the process of state
formation in South America and in the literature on South American political economy. In
fact, the state argument is informed by the theoretical understanding of global relations
developed by the Dependency approach under the discipline of International Relations and
the sub-field of International Political Economy. The vast lineage of academic literature
that influences the state argument presents an unequivocal reality: both empirically and
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theoretically, the formation of the South American state is particular given the specific
regional conditions in which it emerged and the global context that influenced its
consolidation. While the state argument could reinvigorate the general debate regarding
the role of the state in development outcomes, its specific theoretical propositions and
causal inferences are bound by the contextual reality of South America. The uniqueness of
the regional experience derives from a shared colonial past, a particular process of political
emancipation, and a similar process of integration into global capitalism. While there might
be variation among the different societies in the region, there are sufficient common points
of reference that allow for a shared understanding. It is based on this assumption that the
state argument presents its causal propositions based on the experiences of Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Although
the contemporary socioeconomic reality of Brazil presents important similarities with the
rest of the region, Brazil is not included in the study of the state argument because of its
separate colonial past. Informed by the contextuality of the Dependency approach, the state
argument considers it imperative to differentiate between the colonial processes of Brazil
and the rest of Spanish South America.
Therefore, the state argument is an explanation of the socioeconomic reality of the
contemporary geopolitical territories conquered and colonized by Spain. The different
historical trajectories of the various geopolitical territories under Spanish colonial rule is
stressed in the first phase of the research design. In fact, such geopolitical territories
continue to present drastic contemporary differences among themselves, and such variation
also helps to strengthen the measurement of the state argument’s causal mechanisms. It is
through such variation that the state argument can elucidate which sequences and causal
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mechanisms where determinants in the formation and consolidation of the South American
state. Moreover, it is through such variation that the impact of contemporary regional
conditions and global factors can be measured. Intuitively, the state argument hypothesizes
that given their current development outcomes, countries like Argentina, Uruguay, or Chile
present less dependence on the commercialization of primary products. Yet without such
variation in development outcomes it becomes difficult for the state argument to elucidate
on the mechanisms that maintain the continuity of socioeconomic distortions in South
America. In this sense, the first phase of the research design studies the entire regional and
global dynamics that preceded the process of state formation in the region. The entire
colonial period and the nineteenth century are studied from a regional level of analysis,
only stressing relevant differences analytically through the use of secondary sources. The
second phase of the research design leverages the power of statistical data in order to
elucidate on differences and trends from a national level of analysis. The sequential
multimethodology with multistrand research design used to study the state argument allows
for the combination of different questions, different levels of analysis, and different
inferential stages in order generate robust inferences through inferential triangulation and
comparisons. Thus, the state argument studies the experience of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela from different levels of
analysis both through exploratory and explanatory research questions by leveraging
variation for inference power and validity.
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CHAPTER 4
BUILDING THE STATE ARGUMENT
The process of state formation in South America is a contentious issue both
politically and academically. Whether it is during the colonial period or in the postindependence moment, state makers are considered short of national traitors given the
particular pact of domination that resulted in the state. However, the structural organization
and functionality of the South American state is the result of the geopolitical context of the
nineteenth century. In the absence of socioeconomic and political demands by the vast
majority of the population, state makers in the post-independence period laid claims on the
available power and resources in order to form a state responsive to their own vision and
capacity.373 In fact, the South American state was not the result of a rising sociopolitical
coalition that challenged the colonial domination and fought to replace it. On the contrary,
the political independence of the state as a consequence of the wars of independence was
the result of the collapse of Spanish imperial legitimacy. Therefore, when independence
was achieved, there was no major social group willing or able to establish a strong state;
what dominant elites wanted at the time of independence was as little interference in their
economic activities as possible.374 The absence of an encompassing social pact of
domination is crucial for understanding the particular structure of the South American state
specially under the context of war.
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The fact of the matter is that wars—either the wars of independence or the
subsequent wars during the nineteenth century—present an opportunity for state
formation.375 Wars require states to mobilize resources by building on their capacity to
centralize power, by pacifying societies, and by extracting taxes from the population, which
ultimately represent an opportunity for state growth. The relationship between war and the
state is at the center of the process of state formation in Europe.376 Yet in contrast to the
European experience, few wars in South America actually created an opportunity for state
growth,377 and they were unable to break the existing relations between various dominant
social groups.378 In fact, dominant elites were hesitant to fund the wars of independence or
any other military process in the nineteenth century.379 Therefore, the South American state
emerged as a consequence of the wars of independence, but the local structures did not take
advantage of the opportunity presented by war in order to build a strong state. The collapse
of Spanish colonialism created a context in which sociopolitical fragmentation and lack of
resources hindered state makers’ efforts. Those tasked with creating a politically
independent state solved this challenge by copying the European model of the nation-state.
Yet the European model of the nation-state was superimposed on various geopolitical
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demarcations in which social factors could not embrace the process of state formation.380
In other words, the European model of the nation-state responded to particular
sociopolitical processes, and the post-independence context of South America was
different than that of Europe.
Nineteenth century state makers in South America faced a continent socially
fragmented and economically destroyed after the wars of independence. The lack of social
cohesion and the unwillingness of dominant elites to build a state following the process of
state formation in Europe condition the process of state formation in South America.
Moreover, at the time of post-independence, many elites that resulted victors against Spain
still found it difficult to claim victory in South America. Unresolved conflict and growing
power challenges were also an obstacle for state formation after the wars of independence.
In order to secure centralization and pacification, many leaders had to give tax concessions
to local caudillos. Yet not every challenge to power was coopted, and the state still faced
armed conflict at home while having few resources to appropriate. Therefore, in a context
of sociopolitical fragmentation and few resources, not much else was available to centralize
power in the state except economic imperatives.381 South American state makers found a
mechanism to legitimize and to garner support for the state in economic development,
particularly on maintaining and expanding the region’s participation in foreign trade. It is
success in foreign trade rather than any participation in war what explains the formation of
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the South American state. Participating in foreign trade and appropriating resources from
such participation provided states with the necessary resources to support state
development.382 In fact, the colonial period of European expansionism taught to the
dominant classes in independent South America the importance of controlling natural
endowments for the successful functioning of the state.383 The consequence was a deep
relationship between the South American state and local activities dedicated to foreign
trade.
The South American state found a structure and a function in economic
development, particularly in maintaining and expanding the region’s participation in
foreign trade. States were able to appropriate resources from foreign trade in order to fund
its activities. The main concern of the incipient states was not building an army or
expanding the capacity of the state;384 it was actually the creation of a bureaucracy capable
of collecting custom duties that were then used to reconstruct their ravished economies or
to buy the loyalty of local caudillos. The appropriation of resources from foreign trade and
the availability of massive external funds, combined with the existing sociopolitical
fragmentation, made it impossible for state makers to subjugate local elites under an
overarching and powerful state.385 As a consequence, the South American state grew
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supported by elites involved in foreign trade yet relatively weak given its incapacity to
penetrate all social groups. Therefore, the historical weakness that has characterized the
South American state is rooted in an inadequate tax base caused by the lack of resource
redistribution and the appropriation of tax resources and the state apparatus by dominant
social groups with private interests.386 The fact is that South American states were not able
to create the expected systems of taxation required to maintain a modern state, and any
growth in tax receipts represented an growing connection with the global economy instead
of a growing state.387
Given the post-independence context, the South American state formed around
economic imperatives through the appropriation of resources from foreign trade without
penetrating massive sectors of the population. The historical relationship between the
South American state and the global economy has been characterized by foreign debt, the
commercialization of commodities, and customs.388 The incipient South American states
found an initial source of revenue in foreign credit, yet by the 1820s many had already
defaulted on their loans.389 Once they lost access to foreign markets of credit because of
their defaults, South American states financed their activities by either selling access or
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exploiting commodities. A clear example of this was guano, which allowed for the
Peruvian state to appropriate massive revenues without creating any real connection to
society.390 Yet the most important source of revenue for South American states in the
nineteenth century was tariffs or custom duties on foreign trade. Custom duties and tariffs
on foreign trade were very attractive for state makers in the region for various reasons.
First, custom duties and tariffs on foreign trade represented an easier form of revenue to
collect than any other form of taxation. For the incipient states in the nineteenth century it
was easier to control the ports through which commodities had been exported for over three
hundred years than to build a bureaucracy capable of taxing most of society. Second,
customs duties and tariffs on foreign trade were an attractive source of revenue for South
American states because the entire region had a long tradition of exporting raw materials
since colonial times. In a post-independence context in which South American economies
were devastated, engaging in exporting primary products was easier than creating a new
economy given the central role dominant elites had in exploiting commodities under
colonialism. Third, customs duties and tariffs on foreign trade guaranteed some level of
social order and were the least likely to generate a revolt.391 Since the post-independence
states were dominated by landed proprietors, taxation was deviated towards the consumer,
appropriating revenue from the most visible sectors of the economy.
State makers in post-independence South America, given the social fragmentation
and lack of security imperatives, identified economic development as the main purpose of
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the state. Yet foreign trade became the central aspect of the economy for the state since it
provided the most readily available resources for appropriation. The global context in the
nineteenth century was one of important expansion of the international economic system
described as the first wave of globalization. The South American state is “an offspring of
the first wave of globalization,”392 meaning that it was only logical for state makers to try
to harness the expanding resources of the global economy through the state. However, the
nineteenth century was also characterized by a period of exceptionally rapid divergence
between the industrial centers of the global economy and the rest of the world. Particularly
between 1820 and 1870—a crucial period for the formation of the state in South America—
the economic centers of the world reached massive levels of socioeconomic development
thanks to industrialization while peripheral societies were unable to catch up.393 In the case
of South America, the inability of the region to experience the same levels of economic
development in comparison to global economic centers like the United States or Western
Europe was rooted in its reliance on exporting commodities. The region’s economic
development has always been dependent on favorable conditions for exports in the global
market.394 Such dependence meant that when favorable conditions for commodity exports
in the global market changed, the region’s economic development and consequently the
capacity of the state were significantly reduced. The consequence of the structural
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dependence of the region on favorable conditions for exports in the global market was
reduction in state capacity and state autonomy. Actors in the state would recognize the
importance of global factors for their domestic success, and they would align accordingly
with international actors in order to maintain or improve the conditions for exporting
commodities.395 Therefore, the global context of the nineteenth century not only influenced
the structural formation of the South American state, it also influenced the behavior of state
makers who would secede autonomy in order to align their interest with foreign actors even
in detriment of local sectors of the economy.
The South American state formed and consolidated in a regional context of
sociopolitical fragmentation and a global context of economic expansion. These factors
interacted and shaped a structure of incentives that lead state makers to identify economic
development and foreign trade as the main purpose of the state. But the consequence of
this process is a state incapable of enacting or enforcing effective rules that can reach all
sectors of society within their territories.396 South American states are characterized by a
big divide between their institutional divide and their capacity for rule implementation. The
fact is that while the region has a long tradition of “rules and lofty legal declarations, few
respect and abide by such strictures.”397 The efforts of state makers in the post-
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independence period resulted in the state that was possible given the conditions, yet this
state presented structural characteristics that incentivized behaviors that hindered the
socioeconomic development of the vast majority of society. The South American state
presents important continuities with the political structures of the colonial period given that
the traditional dominant sectors of society perpetuated their system of political power and
control.398 Politically independent South America benefitted from its insulation from major
confrontation and competition for power as well as from the economic expansion of
international commerce at the moment of state formation. However, the consequence of
these benefits was that South American states were able to be successful without having to
consolidate their power by building the infrastructure of a modern state and a modern
economy.399
The state argument postulates that the particular structure of the South American
state creates and perpetuates socioeconomic distortions in the region. The South American
state formed and consolidated around the commercialization of primary products, and these
economic activities create massive inequality and poverty. As discussed above, various
regional and global factors shaped the process of state formation in South America. The
sociopolitical fragmentation of the region and the absence of major security imperatives in
the post-independence period created a legitimacy vacuum for the state. Under these
conditions, local elites identified economic development to be the main purpose of the
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incipient states, and they organized society around economic imperatives. Given the
massive expansion of international commerce in the nineteenth century and the region’s
historical tradition commercializing primary products, the South American state was
organized around exploiting commodities in order to appropriate resources and gain
legitimacy with exporting elites. The works of Wendell Gordon, Charles Anderson,
Fernando Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Victor Bulmer-Thomas, and Agustín Ferraro identify
these conditions as the most influential factors in the process of state formation in South
America. In fact, the works of Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves point at
economic development at the center of the process of state formation in the region while
rejecting other competing explanations. Yet in order to elaborate the state argument it is
necessary to examine the explanation presented above. In this sense, it is imperative to
elucidate on the historical legacies that created the region’s predisposition towards
exporting commodities, the processes that triggered the political independence of South
America, the mechanisms that generated sociopolitical fragmentation in the incipient
republics, and the global dynamics behind the expansion of international commerce in the
nineteenth century. Studying the sequences, causal mechanisms, and historical antecedents
that preceded the South American state in the nineteenth century provides a better
understanding of the role of these factors as necessary conditions for the particular process
of state formation in the region.

THE ANTECEDENTS TO THE FORMATION OF THE STATE 1490s—1650s
The academic literature points at the nineteenth century as the origin of the modern
and politically independent South American state. Yet many of the processes that defined
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the structure and functionality of the South American state after the wars of independence
can be traced back to the pre-colonial and colonial eras. Many sociopolitical characteristics
of the great pre-Hispanic civilizations influenced the colonial process and the structure of
the incipient republics in the nineteenth century. The hierarchical political organization and
social structures of the great civilizations facilitated the Spanish conquest by allowing the
implementation of vertical structures of exploitation and extraction.400 At the time of
conquest, there were three main groups of civilizations in South America: advanced
civilizations based on agricultural surplus, societies based on subsistence agriculture, and
gathering and hunting nomad communities. The vast majority of the indigenous population
in South America by the time of the conquest were part of the Inca empire and other
advanced societies, while the minority lived in tribal communities. Advanced civilizations
in the region were characterized by agricultural production based on technological irrigation
systems, social and political stratification, and a thriving urban economic activity.401 The
Inca empire, which became the center of the initial colonial effort, presented an impressive
social stratification with social classes divided into nobility, soldiers, a religious elite,
merchants, and skilled artisans.402 The great pre-Hispanic civilizations represented the main
focus of conquest for Spanish colonizers given their existing capacity to generate resources
for extraction.
400

For a discussion on the influence of the political structures of pre-Hispanic civilizations on the Spanish
conquest and colonialism, see Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: the
Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business, pp. 7-44.

401

Sunkel, Osvaldo, and Pedro Paz. 1970. El Subdesarrollo Latinoamericano y la Teoria del Desarrollo.
Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, pp. 275-76.

402

Stein, Stanley, and Barbara Stein. 1970. The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic
Dependence in Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 34.

206

Enriching the colonial center of power was at the heart of Spain’s sociopolitical and
economic organization. The Spanish state at the time was organized around a centralized
authority that was strengthened through taxation, through a positive balance of trade, and
through a territorial expansion that guaranteed the appropriation of natural resources and
the exploitation of labor.403 Therefore, the political understanding of the state dominant in
Spain at the time of conquest represented an incipient mercantilist model that organized the
entire colonial effort. Given that the metropolis was enriched through extraction, the
existing richness of the great pre-Hispanic civilizations in South America were at the center
of Spanish colonialism in the Western hemisphere. In this sense, precious metals like gold
and silver became the organizational principle of the Spanish empire in the America.404 The
initial phase of the colonial effort was marked by the appropriation of metals, yet the
Spanish stole existing gold and silver in the hands of the indigenous population relatively
fast.405 The exhaustion of existing metals forced the colonizers to envision bigger efforts in
order to exploit the deposits of gold, and most significantly, silver. The nature of the
accessible deposits of gold condition settlements, which were very short-lived and usually
scattered along the vast territories of South America. However, exploiting accessible silver
mines required an enormous effort, giving rise to “an important urbanization process and
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to the formation of satellite economies.”406 In order to exploit the existing deposits of silver,
the Spanish colonial effort designed an entire sociopolitical system capable of extracting
metals, exploiting labor, and exporting resources.
The colonial effort, focused on extracting metals to strengthen the metropolis,
gravitated around the domination of the Inca empire given its abundance of existing metals,
its vast reservoir of exploitable labor, and its advanced agriculture capable of creating
surplus.407 The effort was first directed by individuals who were responsible for expanding
the territorial dominion of the metropolis, which in exchange granted growing rights to the
conquistadors. What started as a system of concessions between the Spanish crown and
individual conquistador evolved into an entire system of sociopolitical domination to
guarantee the exploitation of resources.408 Characterized by important levels of state
patronage, the initial socioeconomic organization of the colonial effort consisted of various
structures directed at the exploitation of the indigenous population like the encomienda, the
mita, and the reducción a pueblo. The system of the encomienda consisted on the Spanish
crown commending or entrusting a portion of the indigenous population to an individual
conquistador who came to exercise public functions of the state. The conquistador was
required to instruct his entrusted native population into Roman Catholicism, and in
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exchange he was given the right to exploit their labor.409 The encomendero—the
conquistador granted with the encomienda—could either exploit labor by requiring natives
to provide services without retribution or by forcing natives to pay him tribute with
products.410 The system of the mita was a mechanism for the mobilization of the labor force
which required the native population to provide a certain percentage of their members to
work on the mines or other functions. In theory, the mita required for labor to be
compensated, yet in practice the payment represented servitude or even temporary
enslavement. The exploitation of the mita allowed for encomenderos to pay their own tribute
to the Spanish crown since they would “rent” their entrusted natives as labor force.411 Yet
for the mita to be effective, it was necessary to control entire native populations, so the
Spanish colonial effort established the system of reducción a pueblo. The reducción a
pueblo was a relocation mandate for indigenous populations, forcing them to relocate to
specific towns or villages with local authorities from which the conquistadors could easily
extract the mita and guarantee the exploitation of labor.412
Spanish colonialism imposed socioeconomic structures on the native population
with devastating consequences. By the time Spanish colonialism is defeated in the wars of
independence, the population of the Americas was lower than when the first conquistadors
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arrived at the end of the fifteenth century.413 Yet regardless of the massive genocide on the
local population or the growing urban-rural divide, the first phase of the mercantilist
colonial effort was successful for the empire. The emergence of important colonial cities
inhabited by Europeans with high levels of consumption demand signaled the success of the
socioeconomic structures of colonialism.414 These cities became the sociopolitical centers
of the colonial effort, with marked diversification of social classes and the growing presence
of bureaucracies and political authorities. The colonial state was incredibly centralized, with
a hierarchy that emanated from the crown and was represented in the Americas by the
Virreinatos and local governors. The Virreinatos

represented the most important

geopolitical areas of the Spanish empire in the Americas, with the Virreinato of Peru as the
most important political center in South America. Other social groups were represented in
the colonies by the Consejo de Indias, the Reales Audiencias, and the Casa de Contratación.
But beyond the Virreinato, colonial cities also had two important political institutions: the
Cabildo and the Consulado. The Cabildo represented the political interest of the Spanish
residents of the most important colonial cities, while the Consulado represented the interests
of merchants and traders.415 All these institutions responded to the main interest of the
crown, highlighting the political centralization of the colonial domains. More importantly,
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the political organization of the colonial state represented a superimposition of the Spanish
crown over the existing structures of the pre-Hispanic civilizations.
The Spanish crown also centralized commerce in the colonies in order to guarantee
the most extraction of resources as possible. The superimposition of Spanish political
authorities over existing native institutions served to exploit the labor force in societies
marked by racial and class divisions. First, the crown establishes two systems of taxation in
order to appropriate resources from the colonial activities: the almojarifazgo (a customs
duty); and the alcabala (a consumption tax).416 Second, the crown prohibited free commerce
with the colonies, centralizing trade through a handful of ports in Spain and in the Americas.
In this sense, the relationship between the metropolis and the colonies was so centralized
that they were only annexed to the kingdom of Castile, prohibiting other kingdoms in the
Spanish empire to exploit the Americas.417 As a mechanism of control, any commercial
activity in the colonies was to be approved by the Casa de Contratación, and it could only
be exchanged through the ports of Sevilla and Cadiz in Spain, and the ports of La Havana,
Portobello, and Cartagena in South America.418 Third, the crown allowed colonial economic
production only to satisfy the demand of European residents in the Americas and to provide
the necessary agricultural inputs for the exploitation of minerals.419 Vast areas outside the
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colonial mining centers produced agricultural products destined for consumption in the
Americas; for example, the early settlements in Chile and in Argentina produced the food
and textiles that sustained the exploitation of the silver mine of Potosi.420 The success of the
mercantilist colonial model and the emergence of colonial cities that triggered the
formation of regional agricultural producers ultimately generated a characteristic feature
of South American societies, the hacienda. The hacienda represented a social structure of
colonial South America dedicated at producing agricultural products with labor conditions
resembling servitude. Although the hacienda and other landowning social structures like
latifundio spread rapidly during the nineteenth century, their origins lie in the areas
producing agricultural products to satisfy the needs of the mining centers in the colonial
period.421 In fact, latifundios represented another mechanism of political centralization by
the Spanish crown in the colonies. The political domination of the Americas was articulated
through two main mechanisms based on the density of the population. In areas with dense
indigenous populations, Spanish conquistadors ruled by maintaining direct relationship
with traditional chiefs. In remote settlements with scattered tribal communities, Spanish
conquistadors ruled through the establishment of latifundios, ruling through remote lnadowners.422
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The entire organization of the colonial empire created a series of dependent
relationships based on the actual socioeconomic structures of Europe at the time. By the
time of conquest in 1492, Spain was considered a peripheral economy in relation to the rest
of Western Europe, particularly with the Dutch and the French kingdoms.423 While Eastern
Europe provided the European economy with grain, timber, cattle, furs, and ores; Spain
and its colonial empire in the Americas provided silver, gold, sugar, tobacco, hides, and
dye-stuffs.424 In consequence, the Spanish colonial state reproduced in the Americas the
same structural patterns that it had in Europe. The fact is that Spain was still a fragmented
state by the time of conquest, and the connection of the kingdom of Castile and the kingdom
of Aragon was merely political. In practice, all kingdoms in the Spanish peninsula were
socioeconomically fragmented by the 1500s, and they co-existed as separate entities with
disparate rules and regulations.425 In this context, the colonial state followed the same
pattern of political centralization and socioeconomic fragmentation than the one present in
the Spanish peninsula. At the center of the colonial state in South America was the
Virreinato of Peru, which was organized around the exploitation of silver. Yet beyond
dominating the Inca empire, the colonization of less populated areas was only for the
production of goods to satisfy the colonial centers, to guarantee the movement of exports
from South America to Spain, and to diminish the risks of any imperial challenge in the
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Americas.426 Therefore, the colonial effort created a structure of dependency in South
America between the Virreinato of Peru and proximate areas like Chile or northern
Argentina. The Caribbean and other port areas like Colombia or Venezuela created a direct
dependency with Spain, given that their main economic activity was serving as ports for
trade.427 Thus, the entire colonial system represented an incipient structure of dependency,
both in terms of Spain with Western Europe as well as South America with Spain.
Therefore, the early mercantilist colonial system implemented in South America
since 1492 was characterized by economic dependence, with a centralized colonial state
designed to exploit labor for the production of minerals and some agricultural goods which
ultimately created massive discrimination and inequality.428 However, by the midseventeenth century, the mercantilist colonial model started to collapse, affecting the
production of exported goods in South America dramatically. At the center of the collapse
of the mercantilist system was the decimation of mining activities primarily in the
Virreinato of Peru. Silver imports to Spain from the Americas decreased drastically in a
span of fifty years, from an estimate of 2,707,629.00 kilograms at its highest historical
point between 1591 and 1600 to 443,257.00 kilograms between 1651 and 1660.429 Various
factors conflated for the collapse of mining in the Spanish colonies, from the depletion of
superficial mines to a shortage of the mercury. Yet the most profound factor was the
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destruction of labor supply given the sociopolitical structure of exploitation. Between 1492
and 1550, Spanish colonization annihilated the indigenous population, and by 1596 the
short supply of forced labor drastically affected the production of silver in Peru.430 Given
the centrality of mining in the colonial economy, once the exploitation of silver started to
decrease, the entire economic system suffered dramatically. It is the economic recession
triggered by the mining crisis what ultimately imposes drastic transformations and
important unintended consequences to the colonial structure.

THE ANTECEDENTS TO THE FORMATION OF THE STATE 1650s—1810s
The economic recession created by the mining crisis in the Americas signaled the
beginning of important socioeconomic transformations in the region. The colonial structure
of mining centers and agricultural peripheries had already started to create new empowered
social classes, particularly the land owning class.431 However, with the decline in mining by
the mid-seventeenth century, traditional mining elites witnessed a gravitational pull away
from exploiting silver and gold towards agricultural production. Fueled both by the mining
crisis and a growing European demand for tropical agricultural products, there was an
important migration of resources from mining towards agriculture, and access to land
became a pivotal factor in the socioeconomic success of social classes in South America.432
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In this context, Spanish conquistadors found in the hacienda the mechanism to recreate in
the Americas the landed estate of southern Spain, giving rise to the characteristic large
landowner in South America.433 Yet access to land became absolutely central to any
aspiration of socioeconomic success in South America after the abolition of the encomienda
system in 1720.434 The emerging economic activity was agriculture, and having access to
land allowed elites not only to participate in the activity but ultimately to continue exploiting
the native population to increase gains. Although the colonial state experienced important
transformations, social inequality and social discrimination remained because land was
granted only to Europeans or those of European descent.
The social structure based on the exploitation of the indigenous population that
characterized the mercantilist colonial effort since the beginning of the conquest in 1492
transformed into a more rural, fragmented, and agricultural organization. Colonial societies
reorganized around landownership, creating scattered rural communities embodied in the
hacienda. The rural and native population found working in the hacienda as the only
mechanism of socioeconomic survival. Yet the result was that colonial societies organized
in self-sufficient and isolated communities scattered throughout the vast territories of the
region. The hacienda became its own social structure completely separated from the state
or the market, leaving laborers in conditions of servitude and under the direct control of the
landowning class. Since the exploitation of labor was only used in the hacienda, these self-
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contained social units relied on a subsistence economy, stressing the role of land ownership
within the system of social discrimination and political domination. But the effects of the
transformation from a centralized mining society to a scattered agricultural society also
affected dominant elites. Landowners became increasingly important political figures in
colonial South America, yet given that the social organization was based on scattered selfsufficient social units, the new empowered elites had little connection with the metropolis
and operated under strict local horizons.435 In fact, the empowering of the landowning class,
in detriment of traditional mining elites and local bureaucracy, created growing pressures
on the colonial state because of their divergent interests.
The mercantilist colonial system was designed to extract as much revenue as
possible from the colonies while also prohibiting the development of any economic activity
that could challenge Spanish interests. In this sense, the Spanish crown created an entire
system of control directed at centralizing productive activities in South America ranging
from extracting direct tribute to controlling trade routes for primary products traveling to
Spain. Yet the new empowered landowning class found the strict centralization of Spain’s
colonial policy inconvenient in face of their growing economic interests. The consequence
is growing economic and political tensions between the landowning class of European
descent called criollos and the Spanish crown.436 The mercantilist colonial system was
challenged by changes in the economic processes of the colonies, which gave rise to new
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social classes with the power to impose their interests or force traditional elites to
accommodate them.437 However, the growing tensions between social classes during the
second half of the seventeenth century is not resolved until after the war of Spanish
succession. It is with the change of the Habsburgs for the Bourbons as kings of Spain that
several reforms take place, accommodating the growing demands of the criollos and dealing
with important global transformations.
The end of the mercantilist colonial system was precipitated both by regional
changes in the dominant social classes as well as by major shifts in the global context.
While landowners grew important in South America, the British empire was able to
become a major European power by the eighteenth century. From the mid-seventeenth
century onwards, the British empire was able to subjugate rival Portuguese, French, Dutch,
and Spanish empires while imposing global norms on trade that benefited its interests. First,
the British were able to subjugate the Dutch’s maritime supremacy by claiming around
1,700 merchant vessels as prizes between 1652 and 1654.438 Second, the British were able
to open colonial Brazil by signing the Methuen Treaty with Portugal in 1703 during the
war of Spanish succession.439 The treaty granted Britain access to commercial activities
with Brazil in exchange of guaranteeing Portugal’s territorial integrity and access for
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Portuguese wines to England’s market. In fact, the treaty also guaranteed England’s access
to Brazilian gold, which would be fundamental for Britain to defeat the French during the
Napoleonic wars. Third, the British gained important commercial concessions from Spain
in the Treaty of Utrech in 1713 at the end of the war of Spanish succession. Beyond
obtaining Gibraltar in exchange for Spanish domination of the Americas, the British also
gained the supply of slaves440 for the colonies as well as the capacity to sell limited goods
in the region.441 Therefore, the centralized control that Spain had over the economy of its
colonies was permeated by a growing Britain that achieved supremacy through
technological innovation and effective war making.
The war of Spanish succession represented the end of the mercantilist colonial
system established in the Americas since the moment of conquest. Beyond Britain’s
success at gaining commercial access to the Americas, Spain considered it imperative to
implement important reforms to its colonial policy in order to adapt to the changing
environment. With the advent of the Bourbons as kings of Spain, liberalism became the
dominant economic ideology, changing the principles of the colonial policy from
mercantilism to free trade.442 Realizing the importance of commercial trade between the
Americas and Europe, and understanding its precarious position after the Treaty of Utrech,
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the Spanish crown decided to focus on improving its capacity to participate in free trade.
However, many Spanish elites and traditional commercial guilds in Madrid resisted these
changes, retarding transformations to the colonial policy that were necessary for the crown
to regain supremacy in the Americas. The early changes that were adopted despite
resistance concentrated on recovering the concessions that Spain made to England—
particularly on Gibraltar in order to eliminate contraband, stimulating production in
untapped peripheral areas like Caracas or Buenos Aires in order to meet European growing
demand, reinvigorating Spain’s agricultural production, and reducing the influence of
British and French merchants in Cadiz.443 First, the Spanish crown created a series of
commercial companies in order to organize the financial and technical resources needed to
develop activities for agricultural exports in various areas of the Americas. For example,
in 1728 the Spanish created the Guipúzcoa Company in Caracas in order to support the
export of Venezuelan cocoa.444 Second, in order to mitigate the effects of a limited and
decaying royal fleet, Spain allowed for commercial and independent ships to trade with the
colonies under a registry system in 1740.445
Yet profound changes to Spain’s colonial policy did not take place until the fear of
external threats quieted the voices of resistance. British merchants operating in the
Caribbean had threatened to bypass the stipulations of the port of Cadiz in order to access
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the colonial market since 1740. However, it is not until the British invasion of La Havana
and Manila in 1762 that Spain recognizes the need to adapt its colonial policy to avoid
losing commerce in the Americas.446 La Havana was considered an inexpungable fortress
critical for the control of the commercial trade between the Americas and Spain. Once the
British sent around 700 vessels full with goods during the eleven months they controlled
La Havana, the Spanish realized it was indispensable to revamp its colonial policy.447
Hence, in 1765 the crown allows for several Spanish ports—not only Cadiz or Sevilla—to
commercialize directly with the colonies in the Americas.448 The liberalization of trade
culminated in 1789 when all Spanish ports were allowed to trade directly with all major
ports in the Americas, including the port of La Guaira.449 Moreover, in recognition of the
growing influence of Buenos Aires450 in relation to traditional colonial centers like Lima,
Spain created the Virreinato of Río de la Plata in 1776.451 Also, Spain gradually abandoned
the convoyed fleet system used to centralized commerce between Europe and its colonies
in America, eliminating it altogether by 1778. Ultimately, the liberalization broke the
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commercial prohibition on the colonies, allowing for intercolonial trade on products that
did not compete with Spanish goods.452 Thus, the eighteenth century is one of marked
liberalization of the commercial trade, which also affected the regional and local
transformations in terms of the structures of power.
The decline in mining triggered an important change of the regional local structures
of power by empowering the landowning class. The Bourbon reforms and the rise of the
British empire interacted with the regional conditions and reduced the centralization and
control that Spain had over its South American colonies. The war of Spanish succession
and the Treaty of Utrech represented important catalysts for the erosion of Spain in the
region. However, the process of change that would end up in the wars of independence was
also the consequence of Spanish imperial decay. First, Spain suffered drastic demographic
changes in the few hundred years of colonialism. Plagues, wars, the colonial effort, and the
expulsion of Jews and Moors maintained Spain’s population in 1715 at similar levels than
in 1541: 7.5 million people.453 Second, the mercantilist colonial system that Spain
implemented since the moment of conquest had dramatically debilitated the productive
capacity of the metropolis.454 Spain suffered inflation in its price structure given the
massive injection of South American silver into its economy, particularly during the
sixteenth century. The existing industries that developed before 1550 were decimated since
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they could not compete with cheaper imports financed by exploited silver.455 In this sense,
the textile industry of areas like Valencia, Toledo, Burgos, Segovia, and Sevilla collapse
since they could not compete with the cheaper woolens from northern Italy, France, or
Holland. When silver imports started to collapse in the mid-seventeenth century, there were
no existing industries in Spain capable of reactivating industrial activity.456 By the
seventeenth century the import of luxury goods financed by South American silver was the
most important economic activity in the capital of the empire.457 Third, the spread of
dynastic claims and patrimony also factored into Spain’s decay in the eighteenth century.
A growing nobility created an illusion of grandeur and control that was not representative
of the reality.458 Yet with a stagnated population and poor economic capacity, Spain was
required to serve a considerable body of nobility that was not justified for the requirements
of the empire at the moment.
Therefore, regional and global dynamics in the eighteenth century created a process
of Spanish colonial decay that lead to the wars of independence in South America. The
socioeconomic and political structure of the colonies moved from a centralized system of
mining areas surrounded by controlled peripheries and a closed commercial network of
trade to a group of scattered areas characterized by self-sufficient agricultural units with
increased commercial contacts with the rest of the world. During the second phase of the
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colonial effort, Spain reforms moved merchants, miners, and bureaucrats in South America
to exacerbate dependence of agricultural exports in detriment of creating local industry.459
The fact is that while the Bourbon reforms might have created a more efficient colonial
bureaucracy, they also stressed the conditions that drove local landowners towards social
fragmentation.460 Local landowners developed important commercial relations with other
global powers like Britain or the United States, eroding any semblance of centralization in
the region. More importantly, commercial relations with Britain created important
incentives for local landowning elites to favor free trade, which would put them in
contention with the legitimacy of Spanish colonial rule. The empowered and fragmented
landowning class, the imposed permeability of colonial trade imposed by the British
through war, and the decay of the Spanish state confabulated for the process of
independence to take place at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was ultimately the
aggressiveness of the British and the French which shattered the Spanish empire,461 but the
specific process through which South America would gain its independence and then
formed its republics was the result of the socioeconomic transformations of the eighteenth
century. The evolution from a predominantly mining society to an agricultural society
created the socioeconomic fragmentation that informed the process of state formation in
the region. The Bourbon reforms increased the power of landowning elites by giving them
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access to foreign commerce, allowing them to create links with global actors that shaped
their strictly local interests. It is under these conditions that the wars of independence
started at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the colonial structures that the
Spanish established since the time of conquest would continue to influence the region
during the formation of the South American state.

THE FORMATION OF THE STATE 1810s—1860s
The sociopolitical and economic transformations of the eighteenth century
generated growing tensions between Spain and its colonies in South America. The decline
of the mining economy empowered the landowning class given the shift towards the
exploitation of agriculture. Land became the most important aspect of South American
societies, and by consequence the hacienda was established at the center of the region’s
sociopolitical organization. The empowered landowning class found the centralized system
of colonial trade to be detrimental to their own economic interests, particularly given the
expansion the global economy. It is in this context that the role of the British empire as the
uncontested superpower of the world in the eighteenth century becomes pivotal for the
political process of South America. Both the landowning elites in the region and the British
empire were interested in increasing trade in order to position their products in new and
growing markets. The landowning elites were constrained by the political domination of
Spain and the limitations imposed by a liberalizing colonial policy. But the British empire
was only constrained by their capacity to penetrate markets either through war or through
technological innovation and economic prowess. Both the British and the French were able
to permeate the centralized system of trade that Spain imposed on their American colonies,
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first in the context of the war of Spanish succession with the Treaty of Utrech and then
through direct war and contraband. The presence of the British empire in the Caribbean and
the growing commercial relationship it developed with landowning elites in South America
through commerce and contraband fractured the factors of domination Spain had on the
colonies. Landowning elites were able to circumvent Spanish domination thanks to the
material empowerment obtained by establishing commercial relations with the British.
Therefore, growing tensions and important regional and global dynamics created the
conditions for the ultimate collapse of the Spanish domination of South America: the wars
of independence.
The independence wars of South America marked the end of the Bourbon control
over the region, starting the process that would allow for the emergence of independent
republics in the continent. The developments of the eighteenth century created the
conditions that motivated the wars of independence, yet the Napoleonic wars ultimately
precipitated the process. Monarchical Spain was afraid of the deep transformation generated
by the French Revolution, particularly in face of the dangers that could emerge even with
controlled change. Traditionalists in Spain understood the French Revolution as an anarchic
process of regicide and mob-rule, and they decided to break their alliance with France in
1793 and gravitate towards anti-republican England.462 England wanted to deprive France
of Spanish support, but they also wanted to weaken Spain in order to gain access to
commerce with its colonies in America. In the face of England’s attitude towards Spain, the
Spanish crown decided to abandon its ephemeral approach with the British empire and
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renewed its Bourbon allegiance with France in 1796. Yet Spain’s renewed alliance with
France moved them back to the middle of the Anglo-French conflict, and Britain took
aggressive action to deprive France of any Spanish support. Once Napoleon invaded Spain
in 1807 and claimed control over the colonies, the British moved swiftly to deny the French
access to South American resources. The British empire took aggressive action even before
Napoleon invaded Spain with the invasion of Trinidad in 1797, the attempt at occupying
Buenos Aires in 1806, and ultimately the commercial penetration of La Plata through
contraband by 1807.463 However, it is not until the Britain’s most decisive move was to
blockade the Spanish peninsula, effectively severing any commercial trade between the
metropolis and the colonies.464 But Britain’s blockade of the peninsula was not only
designed to deprive France of South American resources, it was also important for England
to access commercial markets in the Americas.
Colonial centers that relied on mining could theoretically sustain any blockade since
silver could be stored, but agricultural products would suffer greatly under a commercial
blockade. Products like sugar, tobacco, cacao, or hides deteriorated rapidly, yet slaves that
produced them needed to be fed.465 Therefore, the landowning elites in places like Caracas
or Buenos Aires felt growing pressure because of the blockade, and they were ready to
consider alternatives to the colonial trade with Spain. From its bastion in Brazil, British
products found their way to La Plata and contraband from the Caribbean flooded Venezuela
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with English and North American goods.466 Therefore, the British created a condition of
tension for elites in the region since they severed commercial relations with Spain while
also providing an alternative for the landowning class through contraband. Yet political
independence from Spain did not become a priority for South American elites until 1808.
When the Bourbons lost their control in Spain and in the Americas between March and May
of 1808, the creation of self-constituted Juntas in throughout the Spanish territories laid the
foundation for independence.467 The fact is that the British had created significant material
pressures for elites to consider independence, but it was actually legitimacy questions that
triggered the process for the formation of independent Juntas468 in South America. The
dominant understanding of sovereignty in Spain stipulated that when the crown collapsed,
power would fall pack to its royal subjects. However, the centralization of political power
in the colonies created contention on the legitimate role of Virreinatos or Capitanias
Generales once the crown seized to exist. Since the Virreinatos and Capitanias Generales
obtained their political legitimacy directly from the crown, once the crown seized to exist
local elites in South America challenged their role in the colonies.469
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Yet the establishment of self-constituted Juntas in South America was a
consequence of the Spanish efforts at maintaining control of the colonial trade. Between
May and September of 1808, the unoccupied territory of Sevilla claimed control over the
colonies. The Junta de Sevilla became the de facto power over colonial trade, and it sent
military agents to South America in order to apprehend the local colonial leaders that
considered pacifying criollos elites.470 However, by mid-1809 the Junta Central gained
relevance of the Junta de Sevilla and started to consider opening up colonial trade. Both the
Junta de Sevilla and the Junta de Cadiz, which represented the traditional merchant classes
that benefited the most from the centralized colonial trade, pressured for the dissolution of
the Junta Central and formed the Consejo de Regencia. The Consejo de Regencia ended the
short-lived control of the Junta Central, and after moving to Cadiz since it was not occupied
by Napoleon in 1810, it eliminated any possibility for opening colonial trade.471 Elites in the
colonies grew desperate by the political developments of the Juntas in Spain, and given
their understanding of sovereignty, they determined that the Consejo de Regencia was
illegitimate and formed their own Juntas in major cities of South America.472 The Junta de
Caracas was established in April and the Junta de Buenos Aires was established in May of
1810, signaling the formal beginning of the process of independence.
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The existing system of colonial trade was no longer tolerable for the South American
elites trapped in the conflict between England and France. By establishing their own Juntas
and claiming sovereignty from the Consejo de Regencia, South American landowning
criollos wanted to establish direct commercial links with the British empire.473 The war was
envisioned as the process by which to create a different pact of domination with the
European metropolis that controlled the region for over three hundred years. Yet the
movement for independence was not supported by all elites, many of which hoped to
maintain allegiance to Spain while also enjoying the benefits of commercial contraband
with England and the United States.474 Therefore, it was not until Spain decided to use
military force against in order to maintain control of colonial trade that open conflict
emerged in South America.475 The sociopolitical fragmentation characteristic of colonial
South America and the division among local elites regarding the role of Spain in South
America characterized the wars of independence. For most of the initial phases of the
conflict, most of the fighting acquired features of a civil war with a succession of victory
claims between those who supported the Spanish crown (realistas) and those who supported
independence (patriotas). Given that the fighting was characteristic of a civil war, the wars
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of independence represented the separation of the systemic substance that maintained the
social and economic life of South America throughout the colonial period.476
It is not after the defeat of Napoleon and the Bourbon restoration that the wars
entered into a more direct confrontation between the Spanish crown and the criollo
insurgency. Once the Bourbons are back in power in Spain in 1814, the Spanish crown
decides to reconquest its colonial territories in South America. The Spanish crown sends
armies to its colonial centers with support of local realistas in order to regain control and
squash the insurgency. In the case of South America, the crown sends an army to the newly
instituted Gran Colombia seeking to regain control of the entire territory. However, by the
time of the Spanish reconquest both England and the United States were already in tacit
support of independence, facilitating the purchase of arms by the patriotas and allowing for
national volunteers to join the war effort.477 In fact, Britain’s support allowed for the
provinces of La Plata to maintain their territorial integrity even in face of the Spanish effort
to reconquest South America.478 Therefore, the wars of independence were a peripheral
effort that succeeded given the regional and global contexts. The bastions of independence,
Caracas and Buenos Aires, were colonial peripheries that were able to launch an insurgency
against Spain thanks to their empowerment after the collapse of mercantilist colonial
system. The Napoleonic wars precipitated a conflict that grew in intensity since the
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seventeenth century, and the emergence of Great Britain as a global superpower was
instrumental for the success of peripheral areas in South America.479 Both the armies of the
Virreinato of Río de La Plata and the Gran Colombia were able to first consolidate their
power in Venezuela and Argentina—two of the most outward areas of colonial South
America—and then move towards the center of the colonial state. Thus, in 1824, after
fourteen years of open conflict, the patriotas defeated the last Spanish bastion in the
Virreinato of Peru at the battle of Ayacucho.480 With Antonio José de Sucre’s triumph in
Ayacucho, the Spanish reconquest effort is ultimately defeated and the new independent
republics of South America are unchallenged by any foreign power.
The South American state emerged from the wars of independence, allowing for the
empowered landowning elites to achieve political control of their territories. The dominant
classes of the post-independence period were characterized by a liberal ideology marked by
their European preferences.481 The fact is that most of the leaders of the wars of
independence were educated in Europe and/or from European descent, and they considered
Europe to be a superior continent in comparison to South America. Therefore, the incipient
republics were marked by an acute racial pessimism that influenced the decision of powerful
elites during the formation of the state. Elites believed that only European immigration
could create the necessary conditions for South American republics to prosper in the
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nineteenth century.482 In fact, the ideological preferences of the dominant classes of the
post-independence period influenced their policy making. First, ruling criollos considered
imports from Europe (and the United States) as a mechanism to civilize what they
considered to be their inferior South American compatriots.483 In comparison to the
lawlessness and weak defense of property characteristic of their context, elites understood
Europeans to be a superior race. Second, informed by their views on the superiority of
Europeans, the dominant patriotas decided build the South American state based on the
proven models of Great Britain, the United States, France, and even the Dutch Republic.484
The ideological preferences of the dominant elites and the policy decisions they made
instilled the idea that the international is superior, civilizing, and modernizing in South
America. Therefore, rather than following what they considered as the utopic model of
unification proposed by Simón Bolívar, elites responded to the dominant localisms of the
era and applied a model of various independent republics in the continent.
One legacy of Spanish colonialism in South America was sociopolitical
fragmentation of the territories in the region. Particularly after the collapse of the
mercantilist colonial system, the economic model of exporting agricultural products
organized societies in self-sufficient and separated productive units like haciendas.
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Landowners might share similar economic incentives, yet they had no social fabric or
political organization that bound them together. Therefore, the elites that led the
independence movement in Caracas and Buenos Aires lack the capacity or political control
that could replace the colonial state, making political localism the main driver of any social
organization.485 In fact, the development process based on exploiting labor and exporting
primary resources that the Spanish implemented in South America failed to create any
intraregional integration. The incipient South American republics would maintain a similar
model of development by exporting similar natural resources while importing
manufactured products from Europe and the United States. The consequence of the
continuation of the colonial model of development was that South American states became
competitors searching for markets to export similar primary resources.486 Yet this
competition and social fragmentation was evident both regionally as well as nationally,
particularly on the role of landowning rural elites. In the post-independence period, the
rural landowning class raised personal or local militias in order to guarantee their economic
interests and to maintain their own property.487 The creation of personal or local militias
took place in detriment of any centralization effort at building an independent state.
Control of the land in post-independence South America was as important as it was
during the colonial period. Perhaps one of the most important heritages of Spanish
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colonialism in South America was the creation of the large estate. The large estate was
embodied by latifundios; vast areas of land capable of producing resources for local
consumption and for export.488 The vast majority of South America’s population resided
in latifundios, which stressed the power of the rural landowning class. In fact, the rural
landowning class was able to assert their power not only because of their militias, but
ultimately because the vast majority of the rural population under their control was under
arms.489 Therefore, the wars of independence leveled the balance of power between urban
and rural elites, ultimately making it difficult for the formation of a centralized and capable
state. In fact, latifundios evolved into self-contained and self-sufficient socioeconomic and
political units. Internally, they maintained integrated social structures reinforced by the
power of landowners. Externally, they had little to no connection with each other, lacking
any type of social or economic link capable of creating an overarching state. Once the state
was created after the wars of independence, its relationship with latifundios was incredibly
superficial, dealing only with powerful landowners.490 The balance of power between the
urban liberal criollos that led the wars of independence and the rural landowning classes
after the wars of independence maintained control of the state in contention for several
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decades after its formation.491 Thus, the incipient independent states in South America were
really weak at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
In this context, two major factors conditioned the formation of the South American
state after independence: the socioeconomic fragmentation of the region based on a
landowning class with no internal linkage, and the ideological preferences of the urban
elites that seek to maintain contacts with the global economy.492 The urban criollos that
considered Europe to be superior to their South American compatriots wanted to maintain
their connection with the rest of the world. Urban elites had historically benefitted the most
from colonial trade, and they wanted to expand the region’s exporting industry. However,
for urban elites to expand the export industry and increased their material benefits it was
necessary to control the production of primary products in the region. In face of the social
fragmentation and the power of local landowners with no incentive for centralizing efforts,
urban elites were required to create an export-oriented alliance that could guarantee the
maintenance of the export industry.493 It is at the intersection between urban and rural
economic interests that they South American state is created. The fact is that landowners
did not require the formation of a centralized state capable of guaranteeing their own
security or their capacity to maintain their property. In the absence of any existential threat
that required the cooperation of scattered landowners, forming a state was secondary to the
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dominant classes of the region. Therefore, elites in South America found a legitimate
purpose for the state in the alignment of economic interests.494 In particular, the South
American state was articulated in order to establish a legitimate order that could guarantee
the exploitation and commercialization of primary resources in the international market. In
this sense, South American elites were able to reach a pact of domination based on their
shared economic incentives, but the particularities of each area depended on the existing
conditions. For instance, in areas where different export lines emerged, urban elites were
able to consolidate rural support by aligning their economic interests and building an
uncontested power coalition. This dynamic was particularly true for agricultural
economies; once urban elites were able to expand the market for a particular agricultural
goods, they would consolidate power with the regional landowners where such products
were produced and then dominate the rest of the regions. In contrast, in areas where mining
was the most important economic activity, the state was able to consolidate around the
control of mineral extraction and commercialization. Exploiting minerals provided a strong
basis for the state, and no regional landowner was capable of challenging the authority of
a state supported by a mining coalition.495 Hence, given the sociopolitical fragmentation
and the absence of any other centralizing incentive, it was economic imperatives what
provided the legitimate purpose for the formation of the South American state.
Yet even after they were able to consolidate power in order to organize society,
elites were required to raise the necessary resources to maintain and fund the state. Spanish
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colonialism and liberalism conditioned criollos against growing the state, but they
recognized the necessity to create a state apparatus capable of appropriating resources.
However, the incipient republics of the region did not have the administrative capacity to
collect resources even in the face of armed conflict.496 It is in this context of poor state
capacity that the incipient republics suffered a collapse of the fiscal system. The removal
of the colonial state represented the elimination of the administrative bureaucracy
responsible for extracting resources from society, ultimately limiting the capacity of the
new states. But the conditions for the incipient states was even more challenging
considering the social fragmentation discussed before. Many powerful landowners had
little incentive in creating a centralized and powerful state to begin with, let alone the
willingness to pay for a more powerful entity to grow and risk their own potential collapse.
Therefore, state makers decided to make early fiscal concessions in order to coopt regional
landowners into supporting the formation of the state while avoiding any political problems
as a result of new taxes.497 But beyond the problem of state capacity and the necessity to
make fiscal concessions in order to consolidate power, incipient South American states
also faced a problem of possibility. The first decades of the nineteenth century were marked
by a massive economic crisis in the region.498 The wars of independence destroyed the
entire material patrimony of the continent, creating a profound challenge not only for the
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formation of the state but ultimately for the prosperity of the entire region. An entire
economic system was simply destroyed since there was no capital market, labor supply
was either reduced or displaced, and socioeconomic inequalities were stressed to the limit
of reducing the capacity of the economy to sustain growth-inducing demand.499 In this
scenario, the problem was not only about elites’ willingness to build a state capable of
appropriating resources. The post-independence context was one of widespread poverty in
South America, making it very difficult for even the most voracious of states to extract
resources from the vast majority of the population.500 Thus, although they were inspired by
existing models of European states, elites were required to envision a specific model to
form the South American state that responded to the region’s socioeconomic challenges.
The dominant elites in the post-independence period had important economic
incentives to create a state capable of guaranteeing their material benefits as owners of the
export industry in South America. But the social fragmentation of the region and the
empowerment of rural landowning elites since the late seventeenth century presented an
important contestation to political centralization. Urban criollos were able to align their
interests with the incentives of rural landowning in order to guarantee political control
through the creation of the state. One important mechanisms used by urban elites to
convince regional landowners was to give them important fiscal concessions, removing
their responsibility in funding the state. The widespread poverty of the continent was
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another complication for the formation of the state since it reduced even further the sectors
of society from which the state could extract resources. While the vast majority of the
population was poor and therefore not taxable, the rich elites were unwilling to provide the
basis for the structure of the state. Therefore, elites decided to use the export industry as
the fiscal basis for the formation of the South American state. It was an inadequate solution,
but tariffs and customs duties were particularly attractive for elites in the postindependence context.501 Appropriating resources from tariffs and customs duties was
attractive for nineteenth century elites because they avoided political unrest from regional
landowners,502 they financed the expansion of export lines (the main interest of urban elites
for the formation of the state), and they did not require a massive state apparatus. As long
as it controlled the ports of export, the state could collect tariffs and customs duties.
The solution that elites found to overcome the various challenges faced in the postindependence period to consolidate power in South America was to create a viable state
able to exploit and commercialize primary resources. First, the region had been
institutionally designed since colonial times to exploit natural resources and export them
primarily to Europe. Second, both urban and rural elites benefited from the export economy
since they controlled the lines of export and the land to produce resources. Once they were
able to align their interests, elites understood the importance of creating an institution
capable of guaranteeing their dominant role in society. Third, taxing exports allowed for
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the state to appropriate resources without creating political animosity from elites that did
not want to either create or fund a centralized authority. Therefore, both the structure and
the function of the incipient South American state gravitated around the extraction and
export of commodities. In this sense, independence not only brought greater access to
foreign commercial partners beyond Spain, but it ultimately increased the region’s
dependence on trade taxes and by consequence on the entire international economy.503
However, the particular structure and functionality of the South American state was not
only conditioned by the socioeconomic fragmentation of the region, the historical legacies
of colonialism, the economic interests of the dominant elites, or the global context of
expanding international commerce. Certain geographical and geological conditions also
affected the way the South American state organized and developed. As described before,
whether economies predominantly produced minerals or agricultural products defined the
processes of power consolidation in the region. Yet geographical and geological factors
also conditioned the specific processes through which South American nations related to
the rest of the world.504 For instance, the geographical and geological conditions of Chile
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differed drastically from those of Colombia, shaping the type of primary resources on
which the state was structured and ultimately affecting how each country developed.505
The entire economic and political organization of South American societies was
based on the export economy. Since the wars of independence were motivated primarily
by the desire to obtain greater access to global commerce, regional conditions after
independence confabulated for economic imperatives to sustain the creation of the South
American state. Therefore, South American societies conditioned their socioeconomic
success on their capacity to expand the commercialization of primary products in the global
economy. Yet any development effort based on the expansion of exports requires vast
capital resources, a functional state, and labor.506 In this sense, South American societies
faced important challenges given the lack of capital—technology, infrastructure, and
financial resources—and the socioeconomic fragmentation that condition the state. By
linking the structure and functionality of the state to the international economy, South
American elites conditioned the capacity of the state to eventual changes in the
commercialization of commodities. In theory, for countries structured on the basis of
commercializing primary products in the global market, any expansion on export lines
allowed for increasing taxes on foreign trade and therefore more resources for the state.
Yet when the global economy contracted, state resources were reduced consequently
affecting state capacity. Beyond this vulnerability, the use of resources particularly under
times of expansion are also critical not only for the capacity of the state but ultimately for
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societies socioeconomic success. Hence, if resources are used primarily to reinforce the
export economy—as it was the case in South America—then other sectors of the economy
would either contract or fail to develop, conditioning the socioeconomic success of the
entire society.507 In the particular case of South American incipient republics, given how
resources were directed at controlling and expanding exports, any expansion of state
resources represented an increased connection to the international economy rather than an
increase in state capacity.508
While the structural design of the South American state solved the challenges of
social fragmentation and the consolidation of state power, it also created a vulnerable state.
The capacity of the state was limited by the resources appropriated from the export
economy, which in turn was susceptible to drastic changes outside the control of regional
states. Yet the vulnerability of South American states became evident immediately after
their foundation. Given the incapacity of states to create a broad fiscal base with which to
finance their efforts at centralizing power and guaranteeing economic success, the incipient
South American republics would use foreign loans as a substitute for domestic taxes.
Nevertheless, most South American republics defaulted on their foreign loans by the late
1820s because of mismanagement, corruption, and global conditions.509 The fact is that the
incipient republics had significant challenges at expanding exports immediately after the
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wars of independence. The end of the Napoleonic wars depressed European demand and
the prices of various agricultural commodities fell dramatically,510 and since South
American states were dependent on resources from exports, they became incredibly weak
for their first decades of existence. Moreover, by linking the fiscal health of the state to the
expansion of the export sector and consequently to the international economy, South
American states were trapped between the difficulty for long-term planning and the
impossibility of losing their foreign trade.511 In areas like Uruguay and Argentina, the
centrality of foreign trade force local elites to concede property claims of the export sector
to British merchants and representatives. The British empire required ownership of the
export industry in order to grant political recognition to the incipient republics of South
America, and regional elites could not risk losing access to a commercial relationship with
England.512 Thus, by organizing society around the export economy, elites were able to
resolve the challenges of political centralization while structuring a state dependent on the
international economy.
Yet the external vulnerability of South America was not the only structural
challenge derived from organizing society around exporting primary resources. Elites were
primarily concerned with generating social control in order to guarantee the maintenance
and expansion of the export industry. The aspiration for independence that was dominant
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among elites at the beginning of the nineteenth century was rooted in their desire to expand
their material privilege. Therefore, the post-independence period allowed for elites to
realize their aspiration by replacing the political domination of Spain with criollos as
leaders of the newly independent states.513 But if wars have been historical catalysts for
sociopolitical changes, the South American wars of independence actually maintained and
reinforced structures of power in the region. The fact is that in terms of economic
structures, South America had transformed into an agricultural society by the late
seventeenth century. Independent elites not only maintained but actually stressed the
importance of colonial economic structures by organizing the state around exploiting
commodities. Nonetheless, the maintenance of colonial economic structures represented
the perpetuation of social structures of exclusion and exploitation. The independent
republics of South America continued to be organized around land and land ownership,
particularly through latifundios and the hacienda.514 South American societies continued
to present discrimination based on race and class, and the dominant elites after the wars of
independence maintained colonial structures of exploitation. For instance, South American
states used property as a mechanism of sociopolitical discrimination immediately after
independence. Access to property was historically determined by race and ethnicity in the
region, yet owning property was an indispensable prerequisite for individuals to be able to
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participate in the political process.515 This is not to say that the wars of independence did
not create opportunities for individuals from lower classes to ascend in the ranks and even
gain access to land and property. But the commitment of liberty and equality criollos
assumed with the lower classes and the native population during the wars was soon reduced
or eliminated once South Americans were politically independent.516 Hence, for the vast
majority of the population, political independence meant the emergence of a new exclusive
and oppressive elite in power.
The issue of social inclusion and discrimination revealed the actual commitment
that elites had to the ideals of liberalism, liberty, equality, and republicanism. It has been
widely documented that the leaders of the wars of independence were ideologically
influenced by the French Revolution, the constitution of the United States, and liberal
republicanism.517 In fact, state makers designed the legal framework of the incipient
republics of South America based on the principles of liberalism. Yet only powerful elites
were able to enjoy the political rights and civil liberties espoused by republican liberalism.
In practice, the legal framework of the incipient republics was not applied in defense of
every individual, and it was unable to actually break the social structures of exploitation
and domination that were perpetuated by agricultural productive processes.518 Therefore,
the exploitation and discrimination that characterized social life in South America
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throughout the nineteenth century stresses the importance of economic imperatives behind
the wars of independence and the formation of the state. Elites wanted political control to
expand their commercial relations with the growing international market, and they actually
maintained the structures of exploitation that had guaranteed the production of natural
resources for export since colonial times. What becomes clear after independence is that
criollos’ commitment to liberal republicanism was as long as it concerned them. When the
benefits of liberal republicanism benefited lower classes and threatened their control of
socioeconomic structures, criollos established the same exploitative mechanism that
guaranteed the success of Spanish colonialism in the Americas.519 But beyond the apparent
hypocrisy of the independence leaders, the fact was that given the maintenance of
exploitative and discriminatory social structures, the South American state emerged as
simply irrelevant for the vast majority of South Americans. Since most of the region
continued to be subjugated in social structures of exclusion, the state did not exercise any
meaningful authority over the lower classes of society.520 In fact, the South American state
was superimposed over an area with which it had little to no actual relationship given that
the vast majority of the region understood authority at supranational and regional levels
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through the large estate.521 Thus, organizing the state around exporting primary products
required the maintenance of social structures of productive exploitation, which in turn
stressed the disconnection and vulnerability of the South American state.
Building an independent state after the wars of independence proved to be a
difficult challenge for state makers. The traditional conditions that through which the
European state emerged were not present in South America, and the political vacuum left
by the colonial state was not easily replaced. Social fragmentation, a massive economic
crisis, and the growing accessibility of foreign funds influenced dominant elites to
consolidate power by relying on the export economy. The consequence of building the state
around exporting commodities was the maintenance of the central role of land, which in
turn perpetuated socioeconomic structures of exploitation and exclusion. In fact, one of the
most important paradoxes of independence in South America was that it simultaneously
brought free trade and private property while also perpetuation regional oligarchies.522 Yet
more deeply rooted in the South American state was an important continuity of problematic
features of the colonial state. First, the incipient South American state was profoundly
centralized around the executive, making local political representation merely nominal and
extremely dependent on the centers of power. Second, the incipient South American
republics maintained the colonial practice of using public office for personal power and
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wealth.523 It is necessary to highlight that early colonial efforts were driven by individuals
who would be granted important privileges while acting on behalf of the state. Moreover,
Spanish nobility was well accustomed to use the state for personal benefit even during the
period of Spanish decay in the eighteenth century. But the abuse of public office for
personal benefit once South America was independent was not necessarily a colonial
legacy. The entire socioeconomic structure of South American republics in the early
nineteenth century provided various incentives to abuse public office. First, the creation of
the state allowed for the concentration and appropriation of resources that were completely
irrelevant for the vast majority of the population. State makers had very narrow demands
from society, which allowed for an environment of public office abuse with little to no
repercussions.524 Second, the maintenance of the export economy and the socioeconomic
structures of exploitation and discrimination created very little opportunities for the vast
majority of the population to improve their material existence. The economic opportunities
for the lower classes of the incipient republics of South America was either under
conditions of exploitation in rural latifundios or under conditions of servitude as urban
proletariats.525 Therefore, having access to the state guaranteed access to massive
resources, and for many this was the only avenue for individual and social advancement.526
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In fact, in societies marked by exploitation and discrimination, controlling the state became an
imperative for many given the lack of other options. But the consequence of understanding the state as the
only avenue for personal gain increased the stakes of political failure, increasing the likelihood of political
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In this context, Table 5 presents a summary of the economic and sociopolitical structures
of South American states by the mid-XIX century.
Table 5. Characteristics of South American States by mid-XIX Century
Colonial Role
Country
Economic Structures
Sociopolitical
Structures
Colonial Center
Peru
Agricultural subsistence.
Anarchy.
Growing exporting tropical Social fragmentation.
agriculture.
Caudillos.
Decaying mining industry.
Colonial
Bolivia
Agricultural subsistence.
Anarchy.
Periphery
Colombia Very limited export of
Social fragmentation.
Ecuador tropical agriculture.
Caudillos.
Colonial
Chile
Growing mining industry. Viable state by 1830s
Periphery
Important agricultural
consolidated on a
sector.
mining conservative
elite.
Distant Colonial
Venezuela Mercantilist hacienda
Traditional elites.
Periphery
system with export
Maintenance of
activities formed in the
colonial social
colonial era.
structures.
Distant Colonial
Argentina Important agricultural
A viable state by 1862
Periphery
Uruguay exports, particularly meat
based on land owners
production.
and empowered by
colonial era
connections with
Great Britain
Own elaboration based on Sunkel, Osvaldo, and Pedro Paz. 1970. El Subdesarrollo Latinoamericano y la
Teoria del Desarrollo. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, pp. 303-05.

In conclusion, the South American state emerged as a consequence of the wars of
independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Yet the specific characteristics of
the structure and functionality of the South American state responded to the particular
conditions of the region immediately after independence. Some conditions were the
immediate result of the wars, while other were actually part of the legacy of Spanish
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colonialism in the region since the late fifteenth century. The specific structure of the South
American state was conditioned by social fragmentation, the absence of existential security
imperatives, the destruction of the regional economy, the historical centrality of the export
economy, and the changing global context. Dominant elites after independence wanted to
control and expand the export economy, and they required the support of rural landowners
in order to guarantee their own material success. Yet landowning elites did not share any
link that could resemble a social fabric with which to build an independent state other that
their own interests in producing and exporting commodities. It is through the alignment of
economic incentives that the South American state is structured, but the existing social
fragmentation and the economic crisis of the period reduced the possible resources that
could fund the state. South American elites resolved this inconvenience by organizing the
state both structurally and functionally around the export economy. The state was funded
by the export economy and its legitimate purpose was to guarantee an order in which elites
could thrive by exploiting commodities. But by structuring the state around the export
economy, state makers maintained many problematic aspects of the colonial society after
independence. Economic exploitation and social discrimination were perpetuated, leaving
the masses with few opportunities for individual advancement. The end result was a state
vulnerable to external changes that maintained precarious conditions internally, which
affected its capacity to consolidate power and to establish an overarching political control.
In other words, “With independence from Spain, Latin American states came into
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existence. A new institution had been appended onto an old society, at the behest of a small
part of the population who felt it relevant to its way of life.”527

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE 1860s—1900s
South American state makers found in the export economy both a legitimate purpose
as well as a structural basis for the state. After the wars of independence, the South American
state was formed in order to guarantee a social control that allowed for dominant elites to
improve their material condition through exports. Yet dominant elites had little political
incentive in funding the state, so they structured the state around the financial resources
appropriated from exporting primary products. However, the early decades of the postindependence period were marked by important economic constraints in the region.
Between the 1820s and the 1850s, South American states found it difficult both to rely and
to expand the export economy. Given the dependence of the state on the international
economy, the precarious condition of exports in the region condition the capacity of the
state. But after 1850, almost the entire region was able to enter a period of greater economic
expansion. The international economy went through important improvements in terms of
integration, which allowed for South American exports to increase considerably.528 The
expansion of South American exports by the mid-nineteenth century responded not only to
the recovery of various export lines lost due to the wars for independence, but also because
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of the introduction of other products for exports.529 In this sense, the expansion of exports
that took place in the mid-nineteenth century represented a reintegration of South America
into the international economy. By the 1840s South America started to experience an
expansion of export channels particularly fueled by the increase of world demand of tropical
agricultural products like cacao and coffee.530 Yet by the 1850s the world demand for
various primary resources increased, providing an opportunity for almost all independent
republics in the continent to expand their exports while incentivizing productive
specialization towards a handful of products. Therefore, increases in the global demand for
wool, meat, and grains allowed Argentina and Uruguay to expand their exports. Moreover,
the development of European agriculture expanded global demand for guano and nitrates,
which in turn developed such industries in Peru and Chile respectively. Ultimately, the
beforementioned demand for tropical agricultural products like coffee or cacao allowed for
Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to expand their export base considerably throughout the
nineteenth century.531 In this context, Figure 9 shows the expansion of South American
exports during the nineteenth century for countries for which data is available in current
monetary values.
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Figure 9. South American Exports in the XIX Century
Argentina

1864

Chile

1899

1857

Colombia

1855

Peru

1900

1858

Uruguay

1862

1900

1900

Venezuela

1900

1855

1900

Own elaboration based on Mitchell, Brian. 1993. International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750 –
1988. United Kingdom: Macmillan Publishers LTD, pp. 433-37.

The expansion of South American exports in the second half of the nineteenth
century was a response to exogenous factors. By the mid-nineteenth century, Europe was
undergoing important economic and demographic changes: both the European economy
and the European population increased dramatically. The expansion of the European
economy meant more industrial activities that required more natural resources and more
consumption capacity. The growing European population combined with more
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consumption capacity translated into more demand for agricultural products.532 Therefore,
South American states were able to expand their exports—and by consequence the amount
of resources they could appropriate—because of the transformations taking place in Europe
in the nineteenth century. At the center of European transformations was the Industrial
Revolution, which by changing socioeconomic structures in Europe it also affected the
entire social organization of South America. The Industrial Revolution allowed for the
drastic demarcation of economic centers and peripheries in the global economy, increasing
the wealth and productive gap between them that already existed for almost four hundred
years.533 However, trade between South America and Europe had also existed since the
time of conquest, which begs the question what aspect of the Industrial Revolution
explained the explosion of commodity exports in the nineteenth century. The Industrial
Revolution brought about a massive transportation revolution with the introduction of the
steam engine. In terms of production, the steam engine freed industry from geographical
limitations, particularly the indispensable requirement to be near bodies of water for energy
or transportation. But in terms of trade, the transportation revolution permitted to expand
the entire volume of exchange both by reducing the time of trade and by increasing the
capacity of transportation vehicles. In the case of South America, the transportation
revolution allowed for the reduction of price differentials for primary products with global
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economic centers.534 More importantly, the transportation revolution allowed for the rapid
integration of most of the South American continent into the world economy. For instance,
the cost of moving a ton of products from England to Montevideo was 2 pounds sterling in
1842, while moving them to Bogota was 52.9 pounds sterling. The price differential was
due to the cost of moving goods from South American ports to the interior. Yet the
transportation revolution allowed for a drastic reduction of the cost of moving goods from
the interior of the continent to South American ports and vice versa. In this sense, the cost
of moving goods from Uruguay into the interior pampas decrease by 3.1% every year
between 1870 and 1913.535 Thus, the Industrial Revolution not only increased the demand
of South American products, but it also removed the difficulties of moving commodities
to Europe.
The transformations triggered both in Europe and in South America by the
Industrial Revolution affected the South American state. The South American state created
the legal and institutional framework required to ensure the region’s integration into the
world economy through its fiscal, credit, and labor policies.536 The state represented mainly
the exporting and landowning class, which had material incentives to expand the region’s
access to the global economy. Therefore, the dominant classes that were involved in the
production of primary products influenced the implementation of free trade policies that
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characterized the region from 1850 onwards.537 But the state was not only responsible for
guaranteeing a free trade legal framework that allowed for the dominant classes to benefit
from the world economic expansion. In a period of rapid commercial growth and financial
integration, the structure and function of the South American state positioned it as a crucial
actor in the global market for capital and skills.538 In this sense, a significant proportion of
the foreign capital that found its way into South America since the 1850s was directed
through instruments of the state, which invested it in order to expand the export economy
with little change in domestic institutions.539 Once it had attracted and directed foreign
trade, the South American state became an instrument of dominant classes by investing
resources mainly towards infrastructure.540 The second half of the nineteenth century was
marked by the state’s investment on major infrastructure projects destined at expanding
and improving the export economy. Most of the infrastructure projects in the region were
designed to facilitate the movement of commodities from the interior of the country
towards an exporting port and ultimately to the global economy.541 Therefore, just as the
Industrial Revolution was central to the expansion of global trade, the South American
state was instrumental for the region’s expansion of commodity exports.
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It is in the context of global commercial expansion that the South American state
is capable of consolidating power. In face of the growing international economy, the South
American state is tasked with responsibilities that are increasingly important to the
dominant urban and rural elites. Yet the power and legitimacy of the state was not only the
result of its increased functions, it was also because of the massive expansion of resources.
The expansion of the volume of exports represented an increase in the monetary value of
trade. Since the South American state was structured on the basis of customs and tariffs,
the nineteenth century provided the state with an ever growing fiscal revenue that allowed
for the consolidation of its central power.542 In this sense, while the second half of the
nineteenth century was characterized by an expansion of free trade, South American states
actually maintained their preestablished tariffs.543 The maintenance of ideologically
protectionist policies in the context of expanding liberalism responded to the centrality of
export revenue in the structure of the state. Throughout the nineteenth century, all South
American states found customs and tariffs to be the majority of their ordinary revenue,
making it impossible for them to threaten their viability by removing export taxes. Table 6
shows the proportion of customs and royalties as share of ordinary income, stressing the
importance they had on the viability of the state.
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Table 6. Customs and Royalties as Share of Ordinary Income
Year

Argentina

Bolivia

Chile

Colombia

0.62

0.32

1840

0.7

1841

0.93

0.07

0.59

0.88

1842

0.92

0.07

0.6

0.73

1843

0.9

0.06

0.55

0.62

1844

0.9

0.06

0.51

0.68

1845

0.89

0.09

0.53

0.67

1846

0.69

1847

0.84

0.07

0.53

1848

0.9

0.07

0.49

1849

0.93

0.09

0.51

1850

0.93

0.56

0.57

1851

0.21

Ecuador

Paraguay

Peru

0.06

0.54

Venezuela
0.74

0.35

0.69

0.6

0.4

0.57

0.62

0.44

0.33

0.37

0.45

0.53

0.49

0.57

0.57

0.74

0.72

0.82

0.66

0.59

0.86

0.77

0.91

0.74

0.47

0.05

Uruguay

0.04

0.57

1852

0.07

0.57

0.6

1853

0.11

0.43

0.59

1854

0.09

0.6

1855

0.1

0.56

0.59

1856

0.09

0.5

0.61

0.11

0.91

0.74

1857

0.58

0.61

0.22

0.95

0.74

1858

0.51

0.65

0.18

0.94

0.53

1859

0.41

0.86

0.63

1860

0.56

0.94

0.56

1861

0.49

0.7

0.95

0.62

0.59

0.86

0.6

0.52

0.56

0.5

0.62

0.57

0.5

0.74

0.74

0.87

0.75

1862

0.1

0.43

1863

0.15

0.47

1864

0.81

0.36

1865

0.92

0.23

1866

1

0.52

0.06

0.25

0.32
0.21

0.05

0.18

0.64

0.09

0.5

0.61

0.11

0.91

0.74

1857

0.58

0.61

0.22

0.95

0.74

1858

0.51

0.65

0.18

0.94

0.53

1859

0.41

0.86

0.63

1860

0.56

0.94

0.56

1861

0.49

0.7

0.95

0.62

0.59

0.86

0.6

0.52

0.56

0.5

0.62

1856

1862

0.1

0.43

1863

0.15

0.47

1864

0.81

0.25

0.32

0.36
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0.57

1865

0.92

0.23

1866

1

0.05

0.18

1867

0.86

0.06

0.28

1868

0.95

0.04

1869

0.97

0.05

1870

0.94

1871

1

1872

0.83

1873

0.83

1874

0.12

0.21

0.5

0.74

0.74

0.64

0.87

0.75

0.62

0.7

0.8

0.47

0.77

0.72

0.89

0.45

0.73

0.47

0.99

0.34

0.73

0.75

0.4

0.45

0.47

0.64

0.96

0.53

0.45

0.53

0.62

0.76

0.33

0.52

0.66

0.76

0.85

0.8

0.5

0.59

0.61

0.94

0.79

1875

0.72

0.38

0.69

0.48

0.72

0.8

1876

0.89

0.4

0.69

0.67

0.73

0.74

1877

0.96

0.36

0.62

0.53

0.85

0.57

1878

0.82

0.37

0.62

0.64

0.9

1879

0.72

0.25

0.62

0.49

0.85

1880

0.79

0.42

0.34

0.61

0.72

1881

0.89

0.31

0.58

0.61

1882

0.78

0.26

0.7

0.68

0.75

1883

0.65

0.63

0.7

0.53

0.72

1884

0.67

0.68

0.68

0.57

0.7

1885

0.62

0.6

0.57

0.5

0.63

1886

0.39

0.48

0.62

0.57

0.69

1887

0.44

0.47

0.74

0.6

0.73

1888

0.71

0.68

0.59

0.7

1889

0.66

0.61

0.61

0.74

0.35

0.52

0.75
0.71
0.7
0.65

1890
0.65
0.8
0.55
0.76
Own elaboration based on Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2002. Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-state in
Latin America. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 123-25.

The Industrial Revolution introduced important changes both in the center and in
the periphery of the international economy. Societies in Europe experienced a demographic
transformation in which their consumption capacity increased considerably, expanding the
global demand for various agricultural products produced in South America. Moreover, the
technological changes introduced by the transportation revolution allowed for an increase
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in the volume of commercial exchanges by increasing the capacity of vehicles while
reducing transportation costs. South America was historically predisposed towards the
production and commercialization of commodities, and once the political impediments of
colonialism and the productive impediments of geography were removed, the incipient
republics of the nineteenth century organized towards exporting primary products and
extracted important benefits. Dominant elites in the region in particular were able to expand
their material benefits while consolidating political power over their societies. In this sense,
the South American state benefitted from the expansion of global capitalism since it was the
expansion of exports what ultimately allowed for its consolidation. Despite some
exceptions, the majority of South American independent states were able to consolidate
their legitimate power either in the second half of the nineteenth century or in the early
twentieth century. It is through the expansion of exports that the South American state was
able to appropriate more resources to fund its activities and subjugate any potential
challenge to its power. More importantly, it is through the expansion of exports that South
American states consolidated their legitimacy by guaranteeing social order for dominant
groups to improve their privileged condition. In this sense, Figure 10 shows the moment
when South American states were able to centralize power in the context of the expansion
of exports during the nineteenth century for those countries for which there is available
export data.
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Figure 10. Centralization of South American States in the Context of Trade
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Dotted line marks the date the state achieved centralization.
Centralization: Chile in 1833, Bolivia in 1900, Ecuador in 1916, and Paraguay in 1820.
Pacification: Argentina in 1881, Bolivia in 1952, Chile in 1881, Colombia in 1950s, Ecuador in 1950s,
Paraguay in 1820, Peru in 1940s, Uruguay in 1900s, Venezuela in 1930s.
Own elaboration based on Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2002. Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-state in
Latin America. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 111.

As the data show, only Chile—and Paraguay—were able to centralize the power of
the state before the expansion of global trade and South American exports. More
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importantly, only Paraguay544 was able to impose the power of the state through the
pacification of other violent challengers before the expansion of trade. In this sense, data
suggests that it was the expansion of exports what provided the states with the necessary
resources to guarantee its viability and dominate belligerent groups. Hence, most South
American states were able to centralized power once they appropriated important resources
from the export economy. A similar yet more nuanced conclusion is also evident when
observing the data on the persistence of political systems and authorities measured by years
without any major interruption. The dataset POLITY II by Ted Robert Gurr measures an
array of characteristics of political structures ranging from type of political regime to
durability of political authority.545 Specifically, POLITY II defines the persistence of the
particular regime as the “measure, in years, of the current age of a polity, i.e. the number
of years since the last, fundamental, abrupt polity change.”546 In this sense, Figure 11 shows
the persistence of South American political structures throughout the nineteenth century.
In the context of the nineteenth century and the growth of South American exports, the
indicator shows how, regardless of the reason explaining an abrupt interruption of a
particular political structure, the countries that experienced a continued expansion of
exports were able to maintain their political structures without major interruptions. For
instance, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela had a continued expansion of exports
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Figure 11. Persistence of South American Political Structures in the XIX Century
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after 1850 and they were able to maintain the authority of political structures uninterrupted
throughout the same period. Moreover, both Peru and Colombia experienced major
fluctuations on their exports after 1850 and the authority of their political structures was
interrupted multiple times in the nineteenth century. The case of Peru is exemplary given
that its exports collapsed dramatically by the late 1870s and its political structures suffered
important interruptions at the same period despite thirty years of stability.
The expansion of world trade and the capacity of South America to integrate into
the international economy provided the necessary resources and the functional legitimacy
to consolidate its power during the nineteenth century. As it has been discussed before, the
socioeconomic conditions of the post-independence period, as well as the historical
legacies of colonialism and the emergence of Great Britain as a major superpower,
influence the particular structure and functionality of the South American state. The South
American state was structured around the exploitation and commercialization of primary
products, and its main function was to guarantee the necessary social order for elites to
improve their privilege condition through expanding exports. The viability and ultimate
success of the South American state did not emerge until the second half of the nineteenth
century with the Industrial Revolution and the expansion of global capitalism. But instead
of creating more freedom, the expansion of global capitalism in the nineteenth century
provided the material basis and justification to perpetuate internal socioeconomic
structures of exploitation and discrimination.547 Since colonial times the extraction and
export of commodities was intimately related to the exploitation and discrimination of the
547
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native population and the lower classes, and the expansion of global capitalism in the
nineteenth century was no exception. The expansion of global capitalism in the nineteenth
century considerably increased the amount of wealth of South American countries.548 Yet
the increase in wealth did not translate in material benefits to the entire population. On the
contrary, the benefits of the expansion of exports were concentrated on a handful of urban
and rural elites given the existing social structures of exclusion, which increased the
already existing social and wealth inequality in South America.549 Therefore, nineteenth
century global capitalism perpetuated the inequality that has characterized South America
at least since colonial times.
The South American state was functionally designed to guarantee social order for
the extraction of primary resources. Throughout the nineteenth century, the South
American state maintained its functional design, taking action in the service of the export
economy. Once again, the POLITY II database substantiates the functional role of the
South American state during the nineteenth century. The data on the characteristics of
political structures developed by Ted Robert Gurr also measures the directiveness of the
state. In this sense, the scope of the state measures “the extent to which all levels of
government combined—national, regional, and local—attempt to regulate and organize the
economic and social life of the citizens and subjects of the state.”550 The measurement
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ranks countries in a continuum ranging from totalitarian (1) to minimal (9), with minimal
meaning states that only engage in basic functions like the maintenance of security
characteristic of “extractive” or “predatory” governments.551 Almost all South American
countries ranked as minimal “extractive” or “predatory” states throughout the nineteenth
century. As Figure 11 shows, only Argentina and Chile were able to move towards a limited
(7) category at the very end of the nineteenth century, providing limited public services
like education, transportation, and postal service.552 Hence, the South American state was
minimal in terms of its societal functions, and it only operated to guarantee the expansion
and success of the export economy. The consequence of the structural and functional
organization of the South American state was the ultimate disenfranchisement of the vast
majority of the population. Similarly to the conclusions based on the measurements on
directiveness, the data on the centralization of power around the executive also shows the
discriminatory and exclusive nature of South American political structures in the second
half of the nineteenth century. The POLITY II data measures the level of centralization in
structural terms, focusing on the conformation of political structures. The centralization
measure identifies whether a political structure is centralized (3) or decentralized (1),
recognizing that centralized political structures present lower levels of political
participation and inclusion, and regional leadership are subservient of central power.553 In
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this sense, Table 7 shows the centralization or decentralization of South American states
throughout the nineteenth century.
Table 7. Centralization and Decentralization of South American States
Year
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874

Argentina
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Bolivia
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1

Chile
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Colombia
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Ecuador
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Paraguay
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Peru
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Uruguay
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

1875
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1876
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1877
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1878
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1879
3
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1880
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1881
2
1
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
1882
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1883
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1884
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1885
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1886
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1887
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1888
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1890
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1891
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1892
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1894
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1895
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1896
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
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2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1898
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
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2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1900
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
2 represents an intermediate category of transition between decentralized and centralized
Own elaboration based on the indicator cent in Gurr, Ted Robert. 1990. “Polity II: Political Structures and
Regime Change, 1800-1986.” ICPSR 9263. Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research.

The data show that the majority of South American states were centralized,
politically disenfranchising the masses and reducing the role of legitimate local leadership.
Most interestingly, the data also supports the conclusions of the state argument regarding
the impact of relying on exporting commodities on political structures. The state argument,
informed by the resource curse argument, proposes that those countries that present higher
levels of export dependence tend to present political processes that reduce both the
participation and the power of the lower classes. The case of Venezuela is illustrative given
that as the levels of exports increased after 1850, political structures move from
decentralized (3) to centralized (1). On the contrary, Argentina moves fairly quickly from
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decentralized (1) to centralized (3) after the expansion of exports in the 1850s, although by
the 1880s it starts moving back towards centralization. Therefore, the data show that South
American states in the nineteenth century were primarily responsive to the interests of
dominant export-oriented elites, maintaining sociopolitical exclusion and socioeconomic
exploitation.
In conclusion, the structure and functionality of the South American state was the
result of the conditions present in the region after the wars of independence. The social
fragmentation and empowerment of rural landowners was the result of both regional and
global processes that started in colonial times. Yet it is this social fragmentation, combined
with an existing economic crisis and the lack of security imperatives in the region, that
forced South American state makers to structure the state around the export economy. The
export economy provided the necessary funds for the state that the dominant classes did
not want to finance while also aligning the economic interests or urban and rural elites.
South America was historically predisposed to produce primary products for export since
before independence, yet the post-independence and post-Napoleonic wars economic crisis
made it difficult for the South American state to appropriate much resources from the
global economy. Therefore, it is the expansion of global capitalism as a result of the
Industrial Revolution what allows for the viability and consolidation of the South American
state in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Industrial Revolution increased the
demand for agricultural products and reduced the cost of global trade, ultimately increasing
the amount of resources appropriated by the state. It is during this period of global
capitalism expansion that the South American state consolidates by centralizing power and
pacifying political challengers. Export-oriented elites benefited massively from the
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consolidation of the state, not only because the state was primarily responsive to them but
also because by centralizing power the state was able to expand the export economy. But
by doing so, the South American state maintained sociopolitical and socioeconomic
structures of exploitation and discrimination, affecting the vast majority of the population
in the region. Thus, while the expansion of global capitalism ensured the viability of the
South American state, it ultimately failed to transform the lives of the vast majority of
South Americans who continued to live under conditions similar to those of the period of
the wars of independence.554
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CHAPTER 5
TESTING THE STATE ARGUMENT
Since the time of conquest, the Spanish had implemented a colonial system that
stressed social and economic fragmentation in South America. The emergence of Great
Britain as a global superpower in the eighteenth century allowed for English merchants and
products to penetrate the Spanish system of colonial trade in the Americas, empowering
criollos relative to the Spanish crown. Therefore, once Napoleon invaded Spain and the
Bourbons lost power, criollos in South America decided to strive for political independence
in order to expand their access to the international economy. However, the postindependence context was marked by the absence of any social fabric on which to build a
viable state in the region. It was through the alignment of economic incentives and the
expansion of global capitalism in the nineteenth century that dominant elites were able to
form and to consolidate the South American state. The state was structurally organized
around the export economy, appropriating resources from commercializing primary
resources while finding purpose in providing the social order under which elites could
expand their material benefit. South America had a structural predisposition to exploit and
export natural resources since colonial times, and elites decided to maintain many of the
structures that guaranteed the expansion of the export economy even after independence.
But the reliance on exporting primary products created significant impediments for the
socioeconomic development of South America. Exploiting natural resources perpetuated
the conditions of poverty and inequality that had characterized the region at least since
colonial times. The industrial economies were able to maintain most of the productivity
gains from the expansion of trade in the mid-nineteenth century, prohibiting peripheral
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economies like South Americans to enjoy the same levels of economic growth and
socioeconomic development as their industrial counterparts.555
The difference between the rates of socioeconomic development experienced by
industrial centers and economic peripheries in the nineteenth century did not mean that the
expansion of global trade did not benefit South America. On the contrary, beyond allowing
for the consolidation of the state, the expansion of global capitalism in the second half of
the nineteenth century also provided greater sustained economic growth for the region. In
this sense, the expansion of global capitalism increased the wealth of South American
nations by increasing both the amount and the value of primary resource exports. But the
increase in wealth did not translate into increased income equality or a reduction of
socioeconomic exploitation in the region. On the contrary, the contemporary reality of the
political economy of South America continues to be characterized by poverty and
inequality. If it is now uncontroversial to affirm that trade increases wealth for every society
involved in the international market, then what explains the undisputable asymmetry
between the historically industrial centers of the global economy and peripheral societies
like South America. The socioeconomic divergence between core and periphery lies in the
nature of the dominant productive activities of each region. While industrial activities
generate increasing and

growing terms of trade, extractive activities tend to create

detrimental conditions for prolonged socioeconomic development. As discussed before,
economic activities that focus on extracting and exporting natural resources tend to create
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three conditions that affect the capacity for societies to develop: rent-seeking political
behavior, de-industrialization, and macroeconomic volatility.556
The state argument not only explains how the South American state formed and
consolidated, it also explores explanations for the continuity of poverty and inequality in
the region. In this sense, it is necessary to assess the validity of the state argument as an
explanation for the current socioeconomic reality of South America. The state argument
proposes that the structural and functional organization of the South American state around
the exploitation and commercialization of commodities not only creates poverty and
inequality but ultimately maintains them. Therefore, assessing the contemporary validity
of the causal proposition of the state argument requires determining whether South
American societies continue to present the structural and functional qualities that created
socioeconomic distortions as well as measuring the actual relationship between such
structure and poverty and inequality. Testing the state argument requires first to elucidate
whether the conditions of rent-seeking political behavior, de-industrialization, and
macroeconomic volatility are present in contemporary South America. In other words,
before measuring the validity of the causal propositions of the state argument, it is
necessary to determine whether South American societies continue to present rent-seeking
political behavior like corruption, to determine whether the region’s economies have been
able to develop industrial sectors or do they continue to depend on the commercialization
of primary products, and to determine whether South American states continue to
experience drastic shifts and volatility because of changes in the international economy.
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CONTEMPORARY CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH AMERICAN STATES
As discussed before, the presence of economic activities centered around
extracting and exporting commodities tends to create incentives for political actors to
engage in rent-seeking behavior. The attractiveness of natural resource rents lies in their
capacity to be easily controlled without generating major political conflict. By controlling
access to the geographical area where natural resources are extracted or access to export
routes, political actors can easily extract resources from the export economy. Moreover,
the centralization of resources allows for political leaders to maintain political control by
engaging in corrupt behavior like bribery. The nature of exploitative productive processes
makes it is easier for political actors to maintain power and the incentives to do so usually
justify corruption and clientelism. In this sense, Figure 12 shows the levels of control of
corruption and the rule of law in South America between 1996 and 2017 obtained from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank Group. Overall,
the WGI are a series of six different composite indicators capturing various aspects of state
governance. The indicators range between -2.5 and 2.5, and they measure the existing
general perception about the state’s capacity to function in a particular area of governance.
In particular, the indicator for rule of law measures “the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence.” 557 Moreover, the indicator control of corruption measures “the extent to
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Figure 12. Control of Corruption and Rule of Law 1996-2017
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which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.”558 The data in
Figure 12 shows that with the exception of Chile and Uruguay, all other South American
states present very low levels of rule of law and control of corruption. In fact, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela present an impressive reduction in their levels of rule of law and
control of corruption between 1996 and 2017. Therefore, the region continues to present
the rent-seeking political behavior characteristic of states structured around the exploitation
of commodities.
Rent-seeking political behavior affects the socioeconomic development of states by
maintaining political exclusion and the use of public office for private gain. Yet the
presence of economic activities around the exploitation of primary resources also affects
political calculations. Political leaders tend to favor policies that alleviate immediate
demands to the detriment of prolonged and sustainable planning since the massive
availability of resources facilitates political relationships through clientelism.
Nevertheless, the high presence of resources from the exploitation of primary products also
affects the productive structure of the economy. As discussed before, the windfall of
foreign currency that appears because of the exploitation of natural resources artificially
overvalues the local currency, making imports cheaper to local manufactured products
which ultimately destroys industry. Yet de-industrialization is not only a consequence of
the overvaluation of the local currency. As prices for commodities increase, economic
actors decide to allocate resources towards exporting natural resources and away from any
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other economic sector, which leads to de-industrialization.559 In fact, in societies that have
traditionally exported primary products, economic actors have little incentive to venture on
industrial activities given that their resources will yield higher returns in the export sector.
South American societies have been historically characterized by a political and economic
structure that disincentivizes industry since the colonial period. In this sense, Figure 13
shows the actual process of de-industrialization experienced in the region between 1996
and 2017 by measuring the export of manufactured goods as a percentage of total exports.
As the data show, contemporary South America is characterized not only by its historically
low levels of industrial output, but also by a marked process of de-industrialization. As
discussed before, contemporary South America experience an expansion of trade primarily
because of the growth of China. The economic growth of China increased the demand for
primary resources in the global market, raising the price of commodities.560 As the price of
commodities increased, South American societies moved resources away from industry
and into the exploitation of natural resources, resulting in the de-industrialization process
showed by Figure 13.
In societies that are organized around the exploitation of primary products, changes
in the price of commodities not only incentivizes de-industrialization but also conditions
government policy. Societies organized around exporting commodities tend to have states
that appropriate resources from exploiting primary products. However, given the capitalist
nature of the global economy and the inherent cycles of commodity commercialization, the
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Figure 13. Manufactured Goods Exports as Share of Total Exports 1996-2017
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Own elaboration based on the indicator “exports of manufactured products as a share of total exports” at
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In the case of Venezuela, the years 2007, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 are based on the indicator
“manufactured goods (SITC 5 to 8 less 667 and 68)” obtained from UNCTADstat
https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
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Figure 14. Commodity Price Index 1996-2017

1996

2017
Fuels

Minerals

Food

Own elaboration based on the indicator “Free market commodity prices indices, annual (2015=100)”
obtained from UNCTADstat https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx

price of commodities tends to change consistently and considerably. As discussed before,
the global commodity market is characterized by important levels of volatility. Beyond the
daily shifts in prices, commodity prices tend to have marked periods of booms with abrupt
moments of busts. Changes in commodity prices affect the amount of revenue that can be
extracted from their commercialization, and for states that are organized around exporting
commodities, volatility translates into sudden crises and the inability for long term planning.
In this sense, South America has been historically affected by the volatility of global
commodity markets. Whether during the nineteenth century or between 1970 and the early
2000s, greater commodity price volatility translated into lower public resources and an
increased need for foreign borrowing, leading to lower public resources and ultimately
lower economic growth.561 Figure 14 shows that the volatility of commodity prices is not
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exclusive of previous eras but a characteristic of the global market that continues to affect
South American states. As the data show, just between 1996 and 2017 the prices of
commodities increased to considerable levels just to drop back to pre-increase levels in just
a few years. In particular, the dynamic of commodity prices between 2004 and 2015—with
a significant drop in prices in 2009—shows the abrupt volatility to which South American
states are subjected in the international economy.
Yet the price of commodities is not an indicator for global socioeconomic trends.
Commodity prices might signal changes either in the supply or demand of a particular
resource, but they do not signal abrupt changes of socioeconomic conditions, particularly
in industrial societies. Therefore, the historical responsiveness of South American states to
changes in commodity prices lies in the region’s structural organization around them. In
this sense, Figure 15 shows the relationship between commodity prices and productive
output in contemporary South America. Between 1996 and 2017, all countries in the region
experience a historic expansion of their exports. Most importantly, the expansion of South
American exports started at the same time that commodity prices increased dramatically, in
2004. In fact, the exports of all South American states between 1996 and 2017 presented
the same dynamic that commodity prices showed in the same period. Beyond individual
differences in magnitude, all South American countries experienced a dramatic drop of total
exports in 2009, and the period of growth seemed to at least deaccelerate in 2015. By 2017
all exports started to pick up again—even in crisis ridden Venezuela—given that the price
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Figure 15. Total Exports 1996-2017
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for food, fuels, and minerals also increased in 2017. Therefore, South American states
continue to be particularly sensitive to changes in the international economy, and the
volatility of commodity prices ultimately creates macroeconomic volatility in the region.
The responsiveness of South American states to changes in commodity prices
becomes clearer given the region’s export structure. Contemporary South America
continues to present the political behavior that hinders socioeconomic development in
societies organized around primary resources. Moreover, contemporary South America
continues to present the de-industrialization characteristic of peripheral societies focused
on exporting commodities. Also, contemporary South America continues to suffer from the
macroeconomic volatility generated by the abrupt changes in commodity prices. Therefore,
the characteristics of contemporary South America all describe a region that continues to
be structurally and functionally organized around natural resources. In this sense, Figure 16
corroborates South America’s structural dependence on exporting primary products. As
discussed before, UNCTAD considers a country to be dependent on natural resources if the
share of commodity exports surpasses 60% of total exports. As Figure 16 shows, all South
American countries continue to be dependent on the commercialization of commodities.
Only Bolivia in 1999, Colombia in 2007, and Uruguay between 2001 and 2002 had a share
of commodity exports below 60% of total exports. However, once commodity prices
increased considerably in 2004, the entire region either maintained or increased their
structural dependence on the commercialization of commodities.
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Figure 16. Commodity Exports as Share of Total Exports 1996-2017
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The fact that South America continues to present the historical characteristics that
have created and perpetuated poverty and inequality becomes more evident by
understanding the product structure of the region’s commodity dependence. Figure 17
shows the product structure of South American commodity exports as share of total exports.
Whether it is agricultural, mineral (fuels), or metal/stone products, all countries in the region
continue to be dependent on commodities. Interestingly, there is discernible pattern based
on geographic distinctions in South America, particularly between the Andes and the rest
of the region. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela show an expansion of
mineral exports particularly after 2005, when commodity prices increased dramatically. On
the contrary, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay maintained their more traditional
commodity structure sustained by agriculture (and metal/stone for Chile). The geographical
and geological conditions that influenced the particular formation of export economies and
the subsequent consolidation of the state in the nineteenth century continue to characterize
contemporary South America. Therefore, the conditions that create poverty and inequality
identified by the state argument are still present in the continent. Given the organization of
the region around exporting primary products, once there is a change in the global
commodity market, the entire region is negatively affected. The volatility of commodity
prices conditions the productive structure of the economy by incentivizing deindustrialization, by increasing the dependence on natural resources, and by affecting the
value of the region’s total output and consequentially state resources. In other words, South
America has been historically dependent on commodities, and it is the structure of the state
what perpetuates the processes that generate poverty and inequality in the region.
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Figure 17. Product Structure of Commodity Exports as Share of Total Exports
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EXPLAINING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AMERICA
The South American state continues to rely on the commercialization of primary
resources. The literature has identified the role of rent-seeking political behavior, deindustrialization, and macroeconomic volatility as the processes that create poverty and
inequality in societies that are organized around the commercialization of primary products.
Despite knowing the pervasive consequences of these productive processes, South
American societies continue to rely on commodities as their main economic activity. In
other words, why is it that South American countries continue to depend on exporting
commodities while knowing that this creates the processes responsible for poverty and
inequality. The reason for the perpetuation of these processes is structural, with the state
organized around the export economy as the epicenter of sociopolitical and economic order
in the region. Since its inception, the South American state has relied on economic
development for legitimacy and resources. The structural conditions that have historically
characterized South American societies since the nineteenth century are still present in the
region. A clear example of this is the region’s susceptibility to the volatility of global
markets. Latin America in general suffered at least three times the volatility of the industrial
centers during the nineteenth century because of drastic price changes of minerals and
sugar.562 The last two decades also show how susceptible the region is to price changes in
fuels, minerals, and agricultural products in general.
This is not to say that there have not been socioeconomic advances in the political
economy of the region in absolute terms. On the contrary, just like the rest of the world, the
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contemporary conditions of poverty in South America are far better than those twenty, fifty,
one hundred, or two hundred years ago. Nevertheless, the improvement of poverty
conditions relative to the past does not mean that the current socioeconomic reality of the
continent is not worrisome. As Figure 14 and Figure 15 show, South America has just
experienced an important period of export expansion, yet its deacceleration has raised the
alarms of looming crises and worsening socioeconomic conditions. It is inevitable to
wonder what happened to the windfall of resources derived from the massive expansion of
global exports. More importantly, it is inevitable to wonder why after such a period of
bonanza South America is once more experiencing the same socioeconomic problems of
the past. The state argument responds to this empirical paradox by suggesting that while
global forces explain the cyclical dynamic of South America’s political economy, it is the
structure and functional organization of the South American state what maintains the
processes of rent-seeking political behavior and de-industrialization that create poverty and
inequality. The organization of the state around the export economy is even more
pronounced in contemporary South America given the role of national industries in the
exploitation of natural resources. While in the nineteenth and twentieth century the private
multinational corporation played a crucial role in the exploitation of commodities in South
America, the twenty first century has been marked by Neo-Extractivism and the centrality
of the state.
Therefore, the state argument provides a comprehensive explanation for the
paradoxical nature of the political economy of South America. The socioeconomic outlook
of the region presents historical variation with periods of improvement and periods of decay.
Yet these variations oscillate within a range that create prolonged stability in poverty and
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inequality. This stability is not explained by the volatility of commodity prices or by the
periodic relative industrialization or de-industrialization of the region. This stability is
explained by a sociopolitical structure that allows for the entire economy to de-industrialize
during moments of commodity boom while maintaining the state vulnerable to changes in
the global market. In other words, the processes identified by the resource curse argument
are the symptoms of a structural disease rooted at the center of social organization: the state.
In this sense, the state argument suggests that those countries that present higher levels of
dependence on commercializing commodities also present the highest levels of poverty and
inequality. In particular, the logical premise of the state argument identifies a positive
relationship between the rate of commodity exports as a share of total exports, the rate of
commodity exports as a share of GDP, and poverty and inequality. Table 8 presents Model
1, the OLS-Pooled Regression model that tests the validity of the first hypothesis proposed
by the state argument.
The data show that the hypothesized relationship between the economic dependence
on the commercialization of commodities and poverty and inequality is generally correct.
The state argument hypothesized that a state organized around higher levels of the rate of
commodities as a share of total exports (indicator 1) would also present higher levels of
poverty and inequality. The model shows that the positive relationship between indicator 1
and poverty and inequality is not statistically significant, challenging the state argument’s
hypothesis. On the contrary, Model 1 shows that the hypothesized relationship between the
rate of commodity exports as a share of GDP (indicator 2) and poverty and inequality is
significant. Yet the state argument hypothesized that this relationship was positive, meaning
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Table 8. Model 1: Economic Dependence and Socioeconomic Outcomes
Poverty
Inequality

Control

Fixed Effects

Income
held by National
National
GINI
GINI
GINI
top
Lines
Lines
20%
1
2
3
4
5
6
1a
4a
1b
4b
Column
0.219
0.591
0.091
0.787
0.071
0.473
0.091
-0.736
-0.115
Commodities 0.479
as
share
of
1
0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.017** 0.050** 0.049** 0.000** 0.017** 0.002** 0.017**
total exports
National
Lines

$1.90 a
day

Income
held by
top 10%

$5.50 a
day

-0.222
-0.309
-0.046
0.008
-0.019
-0.484
-0.046
0.398
0.100
Commodities -0.496
2 as share of
0.000** 0.000** 0.017**
0.294
0.862
0.648 0.000**
0.281 0.035**
0.119
GDP
0.174
0.000**
-0.307
Minerals
price index
0.004**
-0.183
Food price
index
0.227
Constant
29.270
Mean VIF
9.86
Adj R-square
0.538
* 90%
** 95 %
Confidence
Confidence
Fuel price
index

0.051
0.140
0.038
0.027
0.002** 0.000** 0.004** 0.047**
-0.127
-0.357
-0.122
-0.102
0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.004**
-0.065
-0.122
0.002
0.007
0.246
0.363
0.963
0.884
4.944
15.876
49.136
36.818
9.05
9.05
9.05
9.05
0.515
0.553
0.438
0.340
p-values
in italics
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0.030
0.174
0.038
0.098
0.028
0.013** 0.000** 0.003** 0.000** 0.002**
-0.107
-0.424
-0.121 -0.257
-0.101
0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
0.008
0.850
53.969
23.518
49.216 104.389 63.168
9.05
2.57
3.36
0.391
0.536
0.442
0.130
0.350

that for those states organized around higher levels of commodity exports as a share of GDP
would also present higher levels of poverty and inequality. But Model 1 consistently shows
that while indicator 2 is statistically significant in explaining poverty, its relation is actually
negative. The model suggests that, contrary to what the state argument hypothesized, as the
rate of commodities as a share of total exports increases, poverty actually decreases. This
result is consistent for all three indicators on poverty, with or without controls. The negative
relationship between indicator 2 and poverty actually suggests that as the share of
commodities increases relative to the entire economy, South American societies are capable
of decreasing poverty. Such a dynamic suggests that once commodities grow relative to
GDP, states are capable of appropriating more resources and directly distribute them to
alleviate poverty as measured by income.563
However, the relevance of the state argument becomes evident once controlling for
global conditions and dynamics. The state argument is theoretically rooted in the
Dependency approach, therefore understanding socioeconomic trends in the region to be
responsive to global changes. The influence of the Dependency approach on the state
argument is twofold: the state argument examines how the South American state is the
consequence of the interaction of local, regional, and global dynamics since the late fifteen
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This is actually consistent with the creation and expansion of conditional cash transfers programs (CCT)
in the region since the mid-1990s. First originated in Brazil in 1995, conditional cash transfer programs are
an important mechanisms for South American countries to combat poverty which consist in distributing
cash from the state directly to families under conditions of poverty in exchange for various social
conditionalities like health or education. Excluding Venezuela, there are now 15 active CCT programs
between Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Cecchini, Simone,
and Bernardo Atuesta. 2017. Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Coverage and Investment Trends. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Social
Policy Series. Chile: United Nations, pp.15-8.
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century; and the state argument points at the responsiveness and vulnerability of
contemporary South American states to changes in the global market. Therefore, Model 1
measures the role of global dynamics in the relationship between economic dependence and
poverty and inequality by controlling for changes in the price index of three major
commodity groups. As Figure 17 shows, there are three main product groups that represent
the majority of South American commodity exports: agriculture, minerals (fuel), and
metal/stone. In this context, Model 1 controls for changes in the price indices of fuels,
minerals, and food in order to measure the role of global conditions on the relationship
between economic dependence and poverty and inequality. Table 8 shows that once
controlling for global conditions, the relationship between indicator 1 and indicator 2 with
poverty becomes statistically significant. Whether it is poverty at national lines (indicator
11), poverty at $1.90 a day (indicator 12), or poverty at $5.50 a day (indicator 13), both the
rate of commodities as a share of total exports (indicator 1) and the rate of commodities as
a share of GDP (indicator 2) are statistically significant. Moreover, Model 1 shows that
indicator 2 cannot explain inequality in South America. Regardless of how inequality is
measured, indicator 2 is not statistically significant. Informed by the negative relationship
between indicator 2 and poverty, Model 1 suggests that the mechanisms used by the South
American state to alleviate poverty are not effective at reducing income inequality in the
region. Conditional cash transfer programs are able to increase the income of families under
conditions of poverty to a point that it affects the measurement of poverty rates, but such
increases are simply irrelevant when measuring wealth inequality at national levels.
Indicators on inequality, in contrast to indicators on poverty, measure wealth in relative
terms. This means that inequality can either increase or decrease based on changes on both
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extremes of social income. In other words, changes in inequality can be responsive to
decreases in the amount of wealth held by those at the top of society or by increases in the
amount of wealth held by those at the bottom of society. Hence, even if South American
countries are able to increase the income of poor families through conditional cash transfer
programs, it could be possible that the rate of income growth for higher classes is greater,
which would actually increase inequality.
The explanatory validity of the first hypothesis of the state argument becomes even
stronger when correcting for multicollinearity. When applying the controls for changes in
global conditions, Model 1 presented high levels of multicollinearity, which means that the
variance explained by the model is actually inflated. In this sense, Model 1 runs alternative
linear regressions between the independent indicators and calculates a variance inflation
factor (VIF) in order to measure and correct multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors
of the control indicator for changes in the price index of food and for changes in the price
index of minerals showed multicollinearity regardless of the dependent variable indicators.
For instance, the regression that measures the relationship between economic dependence
and poverty at national lines (column 1) with control for global conditions presents a mean
variance inflation factor of 9.86. The main drivers for the mean variance inflation factor are
actually the factors for the indicators on minerals (22.83) and on food (20.8), while the other
factors are below 4. Model 1 also shows that changes in the price index of food are not
statistically significant for poverty and inequality, so the regressions on column 1a and
column 4a remove the control variable on the change of the price index for food in order to
correct for multicollinearity. Given the consistency of the regressions’ results regardless of
the specific indicator for poverty or inequality, Model 1 tests the first hypothesis of the state
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argument while controlling for the price of fuel and minerals only with indicators for
poverty at national lines and inequality measured by the GINI index. The results corroborate
the preexisting multicollinearity given that the mean variance inflation factor drops from
over 9 to below 3.50, while the variance inflation factor for minerals drops from the
previous 22.83 to 3.91.
After correcting for multicollinearity, Model 1 substantiates the first hypothesis of
the state argument. First, the variation of economic dependence of South American states
on the commercialization of commodities explains more than half of the variation of poverty
in the region. The states that are organized around higher levels of commodities as share of
total exports also present higher levels of poverty given that as commodity share increases
across time by 1%, poverty increases by 0.47% (see column 1a). Moreover, states
organized around higher levels of commodities as share of GDP also present lower levels
of poverty given that as commodity share increases across time by 1%, poverty decreases
by 0.48% (see column 1a). Second, the economic dependence of South American states on
the commercialization of commodities explains over a third of the variation of inequality in
the region. After controlling for changes in global conditions, states that are organized
around higher levels of commodities as share of total exports also present higher levels of
inequality given that as commodity share increases across time by 1%, the GINI coefficient
increases by 0.09 points (see column 4a). Ultimately, Model 1 also shows that changes in
global conditions affect socioeconomic outcomes in South America. Specifically, increases
in fuel prices tend to increase poverty and inequality, while increases in the price of minerals
tend to decrease poverty and inequality. When prices on minerals increase, South American
states are able to appropriate more resources from their commercialization and then direct
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them towards reducing poverty. However, when fuel prices increase many other consumer
prices in society increase, affecting income, employment,

and ultimately increasing

poverty. Yet the specific processes that explain the relationship between the price of fuel
and poverty and inequality should be examined further beyond the study of the state
argument.
However, the state argument also provides an opportunity to explain the variation
between different states in within South America. The state argument theorizes that the
continuity of poverty and inequality in South America is the result of structural factors
shared by all states in the region. The nature of the structural organization of the state has
been invariant throughout the continent’s history, yet the state argument recognizes
variation in terms of magnitude between states. In other words, while all South American
states have been structurally organized around the commercialization of primary products,
some states have a higher level of structural reliance un such activities. These differences
in magnitude explain the variation in terms of outcome in the region. While poverty and
inequality are characteristic of the region’s political economy, certain countries present
more levels than others, and this variation is explain by time-variant factors unique of each
state. Therefore, the second phase of the research design also introduces a Fixed-Effects
regression model in order to measure the significance of country-specific parameters on
development outcomes. Statistically, the Fixed-Effects model differs from the OLS-Pooled
Regression model by assigning a particular intercept point of the regression to each
observational unit. By doing this, the Fixed-Effects model controls for time-invariant
factors and measures the impact of heterogeneity on the variance of the indicators for
poverty and inequality.
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Column 1b and column 4b in Model 1 show the results of the Fixed-Effects model
measuring the significance of heterogeneity on contemporary poverty and inequality in
South America. In terms of statistical significance, the Fixed-Effects model corroborates
the results of the OLS-Pooled Regression model, ultimately supporting the logic of the state
argument in explained the process of poverty and inequality change in contemporary South
America. The only difference between the Fixed-Effects model and the OLS-Pooled
Regression model is regarding the directionality of the relationship between the rate of
commodities as share of total exports and poverty and inequality. The Fixed-Effects model
shows that as the rate of commodities as share of total exports increases across time, poverty
and inequality actually decrease in South America. The statistical difference between the
Fixed-Effects model and the OLS-Pooled Regression model suggests that while the
continuity of poverty is explained by time-invariant structural factors, the variation between
states in South America across time is explained by state-specific characteristics particularly
in terms of the role of the rate of commodities as share of total exports. Intuitively, the
differences might be due to the difference in the type of predominant commodities between
states in the region. In any case, the time-variant and state-specific factors that explain the
variation of poverty and inequality between countries in South America requires more
examination.
The state argument also highlights the structural dependence of the South American
state as an explanation for the continuity of poverty and inequality in the region. The first
hypothesis of the state argument examines how the structure of productive output affects
socioeconomic conditions in South America. Yet the second hypothesis of the state
argument examines how the structure of the state affects poverty and inequality in the
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continent. In this sense, the second hypothesis of the state argument suggests that those
countries that present states with the highest levels of structural organization around the
commercialization of primary products also present the highest levels of poverty and
inequality. In particular, the logical premise of the state argument identifies a positive
relationship between the rate of total rents from natural resources as a share of GDP and
poverty and inequality. Conversely, the state argument suggests a negative relationship
between the rate of tax revenue as a share of GDP and poverty and inequality. Logically,
the states that are organized around regular taxes tend to depend less on export taxes,
ultimately presenting a different organizational structure than states that are organized
around resources from natural resources. Table 9 presents Model 2, the OLS-Pooled
Regression model that tests the validity of the second hypothesis proposed by the state
argument.
The data show that the hypothesized relationship between the structural dependence
of the state on the commercialization of commodities and poverty and inequality is correct.
First, the state argument hypothesized that states organized around higher rates of total rents
from natural resources as a share of GDP (indicator 3) also present higher levels of poverty
and inequality. The model shows that indicator 3 is statistically significant with all the
indicators used to measure poverty and inequality under the OLS-Pooled Regression model.
Second, the state argument hypothesized that states organized around lower levels of tax
revenue as a share of GDP (indicator 4) also present higher levels of poverty and inequality.
Other than with extreme poverty (column 2), indicator 4 is statistically significant for all
indicators of poverty and inequality under the OLS-Pooled Regression model. Therefore,
the causal relationship hypothesized by the state argument between the organizational
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Table 9. Model 2: State's Structural Dependence and Socioeconomic Outcomes
Poverty
Inequality
National
Lines
Column
Rents natural
3 resources
(%GDP)
Tax revenue
4
(% GDP)
Fuel price
index
Minerals
price index
Food price
index
Constant
Mean VIF
Adj R-square
* 90%
Confidence

$1.90 a
day

$5.50 a
day

GINI

Income
held by
top 10%

Income
held by
top 20%

Control
National
Lines

GINI

Fixed Effects
National
Lines

GINI

1
2
3
4
5
6
1a
4a
1b
4b
0.629
0.295
1.086
0.409
0.409
0.378
0.733
0.395
0.689
0.071
0.010** 0.029** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.003** 0.000**
0.083*
0.471
-1.885
-0.263
-1.207
-0.514
-0.426
-0.412
-1.909
-0.513
-1.768
0.000**
0.128 0.003** 0.000** 0.002** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.017**
0.163
0.000**
-0.167
0.235
-0.383
0.058*
90.880
9.57
0.663
** 95 %
Confidence

0.029
0.166
-0.114
0.039**
-0.031
0.671
18.890
8.35
0.417
p-values
in italics

0.086
0.78*
-0.297
0.021**
-0.051
0.764
62.228
8.35
0.464

-0.457
0.019**

0.018
0.008
0.012
0.159
0.016
0.132
0.026
0.255
0.618
0.395 0.000**
0.287 0.000** 0.006**
-0.116
-0.095
-0.103
-0.418
-0.091 -0.341
-0.090
0.005** 0.027** 0.008** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
0.039
0.043
0.043
0.483
0.451
0.404
59.260
45.419
61.789
79.277
60.801
73.053
60.497
8.35
8.35
8.35
2.08
3.09
0.478
0.366
0.431
0.649
0.480
0.670
0.440
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structure of the state and socioeconomic outcomes is supported by Model 2. Nevertheless,
Model 2 shows the same issues of multicollinearity present in Model 1. The mean variance
inflation factor for all the regressions controlling for global conditions is above 8, which
means that the variation of the indicators for the independent variable are actually inflating
the explanatory power of the model. The results of Model 2 also corroborate the findings of
Model 1 regarding the different indicators for poverty and inequality. The results are
generally consistent except with extreme poverty (column 2), which shows the validity and
consistency of all the indicators for the dependent variable. Therefore, Model 2 corrects for
multicollinearity and presents two regressions in column 1a and 4a that measure the
relationship between the state’s structural dependence on commodities and poverty and
inequality.
After correcting for multicollinearity, Model 2 substantiates the second hypothesis
of the state argument. First, the structural dependence of South American states on the
commercialization of commodities explains almost two thirds of the variation of poverty in
the region. States organized around higher levels of total rents from natural resources as a
share of GDP also present higher levels of poverty given that as commodity rents increase
across time by 1%, poverty increases by 0.73% (see column 1a). Moreover, states organized
around lower levels of tax revenue as share of GDP also present higher levels of poverty
given that as tax revenue decreases across time by 1%, poverty increases by 1.9% (see
column 1a). Second, after controlling for changes in global conditions, states organized
around higher levels of total rents from natural resources as a share of GDP also present
higher levels of inequality given that as commodity rents increase across time by 1%, the
GINI coefficient increases by 0.36 points (see column 4a). Moreover, states organized
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around lower levels of tax revenue as share of GDP also present higher levels of inequality
given that as tax revenue decreases across time by 1%, the GINI coefficient increases by
0.51 points (see column 4a). Third, Model 2 also shows that changes in global conditions
affect socioeconomic conditions in South America. In fact, Model 2 corroborates both the
statistical significance and the directionality of the relationship between commodity prices
and socioeconomic outcomes in South America present in Model 1. The only difference
appears in the role of the price of fuels on the region’s inequality since the relationship is
not statistically significant. Ultimately, the Fixed-Effects Regression model in Model 2 also
corroborates the findings of the OLS-Pooled Regression model and Model 1. Under the
Fixed-Effects Regression model global conditions are statistically significant in explaining
the variance of poverty and inequality between South American states. Moreover, only the
rate of rents from natural resources as a percentage of GDP is statistically insignificant
under the Fixed-Effects Regression model when explaining the variance of contemporary
inequality between South American states, suggesting that such variance responds to timevariant factors that are state-specific (see column 1b and 4b).
Moreover, the state argument also stresses the role of the functional capacity of the
South American state in explaining socioeconomic outcomes in the region. The third
hypothesis of the state argument examines the relationship between the functional capacity
of the South American state and the continuity of poverty and inequality. In this sense, the
third hypothesis of the state argument suggests that states with the lowest levels of
functional capacity also present the highest levels of poverty and inequality. In particular,

300

Table 10. Model 3: State’s Functional Capacity and Socioeconomic Outcomes
Poverty
Inequality
Income Income
National
$1.90 a $5.50 a
held by held by
GINI
Lines
day
day
top
top
10%
20%
1
2
3
4
5
6
Column

Control

Fixed Effects

National
Lines

GINI

National
Lines

GINI

1a

4a

1b

4b

-4.789
0.002**

-3.297
0.000**

-10.793
0.000**

-1.821
0.019*

5

Voice and
accountability

25.362
0.000**

-1.985
0.395

-14.240
0.001**

-5.962
0.000**

-7.996
0.000**

-6.553
0.000**

6

Political stability

-12.137
0.000**

-2.279
0.025**

-6.793
0.000**

-2.677
0.000**

-2.321
0.001**

-2.426
0.000**

7

Government
effectiveness

2.256
0.619

-3.475
0.037**

-9.319
0.003**

-0.936
0.417

-2.156
0.065*

-1.212
0.261

8

Regulatory
quality

-6.133
0.046**

0.564
0.630

3.111
0.155

-1.132
0.167

-0.840
0.309

-1.225
0.110

9

Rule of law

0.444
0.937

-0.432
0.849

3.006
0.478

8.964
0.000**

11.231
0.000**

9.695
0.000**

10

Control of
corruption

-12.209
0.001**

1.858
0.224

4.705
0.100*

-2.683
0.013**

-2.443
0.024**

-2.321
0.021**

-3.637
0.007**

0.547
0.239

6.547
0.067*

2.213
0.144

Fuel price index

0.114
0.000**

0.017
0.217

0.051
0.050**

0.025
0.012**

0.019
0.058*

0.020
0.027**

0.108
0.001**

0.019
0.079*

0.079
0.001**

0.030
0.001**

Minerals price
index

-0.205
0.035**

-0.091
0.022**

-0.205
0.005**

-0.052
0.059*

-0.027
0.321

-0.040
0.116

-0.313
0.000**

-0.079
0.000**

-0.267
0.000**

-0.099
0.000**

Food price index

-0.163

-0.009
0.858
27.701

-0.045
0.667
96.983

-0.030
0.431
67.500

-0.039
0.309
56.894

-0.028
0.439
71.030

70.169

59.699

58.880

53.567

12.03
0.613

12.03
0.794

12.03
0.687

12.03
0.671

12.03
0.675

2.83
0.627

3.09
0.575

0.440

0.400

Constant

0.240
51.030

Mean VIF
Adj R-square

16.48
0.680
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the logical premise of the state argument identifies a negative relationship between the
levels of voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption and poverty and
inequality. Informed by the resource curse argument, the state argument suggests that states
organized around the commercialization of commodities present lower levels of functional
capacity. Consequentially, states with the lowest functional capacity also present the highest
levels of poverty and inequality. Therefore, Table 10 presents Model 3, the OLS-Pooled
Regression model that tests the validity of the third hypothesis proposed by the state
argument.
The data show that the hypothesized relationship between the functional capacity of
the state and poverty and inequality is generally correct. Model 3 corroborates the findings
of Model 1 and Model 2 regarding the role of global conditions in socioeconomic outcomes
as well as regarding the different indicators for poverty and inequality. However, Model 3
presents serios problems of multicollinearity beyond the correlation between the price index
of food and the price index of fuel and minerals. All the regressions in Model 3 present
very high means of variance inflation factors, with the lowest mean variance inflation factor
being 9.19. Therefore, it is evident that there is strong correlation among the indicators for
the functional capacity of the state. In fact, based on the first regression of Model 3 (column
1), the variance inflation factor of the indicators for the functional capacity of the state are
well above 10. The only indicator with a lower variance inflation factor is political stability
with 6.49, which stresses the importance to correct for multicollinearity. In this sense, Table
11 shows the correlation between the indicators for the functional capacity of the state. As
the table shows, other than regulatory quality (indicator 8) with political stability and
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absence of violence (indicator 6), all the indicators are highly correlated. In fact, all
indicators are highly correlated with control of corruption (indicator 10), with political
stability and absence of violence (indicator 6) as the lowest one. Therefore, Model 3 corrects
for the correlation of the parameters by maintaining indicator 6 and indicator 10 as proxies
for the indicators for the functional capacity of the state. Indicator 6 presents the lowest
levels of correlation with all other indicators, and indicator 10 is maintained because of
theoretical reasons explained in Model 5.
Table 11. Correlation of Indicators for the Functional Capacity of the State
i5
i6
i7
i8
i9
i5
1.0000
i6
0.8298
1.0000
i7
0.8751
0.6611
1.0000
i8
0.7600
0.4595
0.8676
1.0000
i9
0.9178
0.7030
0.9424
0.9063
1.0000
i10
0.9019
0.7069
0.9360
0.8220
0.9419
More importantly, Model 3 corroborates the third hypothesis proposed by the state
argument. First, states with lower levels of political stability and absence of violence also
present higher levels of poverty given that as political stability decreases across time by 1
point, poverty increases by 4.79%. Moreover, states with lower levels of control of
corruption also present higher levels of poverty given that as control of corruption decreases
across time by 1 point, poverty increases by 3.64% (see column 1a). Second, states with
lower levels of political stability and absence of violence also present higher levels of
inequality given that as political stability decreases by 1 point, the GINI coefficient
increases by 3.30 points (see column 4a). Third, Model 3 also shows that changes in global
conditions affect socioeconomic conditions in South America. In fact, Model 3 corroborates
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both the statistical significance and the directionality of the relationship between
commodity prices and socioeconomic outcomes in South America present in Model 1 and
in Model 2. Ultimately, column 1b and column 4b in Model 3 present a Fixed-Effects
Regression model, which also corroborate the results of the OLS-Pooled Regression model.
The only difference appears in the directionality of the relationship between control of
corruption and inequality. After controlling for heterogeneity and time-invariant factors, the
Fixed-Effects Regression model suggests that as control of corruption increases across time,
the variance of inequality in contemporary South America also increases, contradicting the
hypothesized relationship of the state argument and established understandings in the
literature (see column 4b).

Therefore, after correcting for multilinearity and after

controlling for changes in global conditions, Model 3 corroborates the relationship between
the functional capacity of the state and socioeconomic outcomes in South America
hypothesized by the state argument.
However, Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 measure various aspects of the logical
premise of the state argument independently. Yet the state argument suggests that it is
actually the combination of various structural conditions that ultimately perpetuate poverty
and inequality in South America. Therefore, Table 12 presents Model 4, the OLS-Pooled
Regression model that measures the relationship between the structural organization of the
South American state and poverty and inequality. In accordance with the multimethodology
research design, Model 4 is informed by the inferences from Model 1, Model 2, and Model
3 regarding the multicollinearity of the indicators that measure changes on global conditions
and on the consistency of the indicators for poverty and inequality. Therefore, Model 4
presents three regressions that measure the statistical relation between the rate of
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commodities as a share of total exports (indicator 1), the rate of commodity exports as a
share of GDP (indicator 2), total rents from natural resources as a percentage of GDP
(indicator 3), the rate of tax revenue as a share of GDP (indicator 4), and poverty and
inequality. Yet Model 4 focuses only on the indicators on poverty rates at national lines
(indicator 11), poverty rate at $1.90 a day (indicator 12), and the GINI coefficient (indicator
14) while only controlling for changes in the price index of fuels and changes in the price
index of minerals.
Table 12. Model 4: State's Structural Organization and Socioeconomic Outcomes
Poverty
Inequality
Fixed Effects

1

National
National
$1.90 a day
GINI
GINI
Lines
Lines
1
2
3
Column
1a
3a
0.331
0.239
-0.602
-0.267
Commodities 0.365
as share of
0.049**
0.000**
0.000**
0.042**
0.670
total exports

2

-0.461
-0.238
0.942
-0.081
Commodities -0.850
as share of
0.000**
0.000**
0.000**
0.048**
0.444
GDP

3

0.278
0.327
0.034
0.157
Rents natural 0.806
resources
0.001**
0.023**
0.001**
0.949
0.270
(%GDP)

4

Tax revenue
(% GDP)

-2.486
-0.442
-0.567
-1.121
-0.448
0.000**
0.006**
0.000**
0.131
0.026**

0.186
0.000**
-0.399
Minerals
price index
0.000**
Constant
66.366
Mean VIF
2.27
Adj R-square
0.786
* 90%
** 95 %
Confidence
Confidence
Fuel price
index

0.049
0.028
0.192
0.027
0.008**
0.057*
0.002**
0.006**
-0.135
-0.097
-0.278
-0.091
0.000**
0.000**
0.000**
0.000**
-1.078
45.794
98.120
63.221
2.91
2.91
0.566
0.557
0.190
0.440
p-values in
italics

305

In this sense, Model 4 corroborates the inferences from Model 1, Model 2, Model
3, as well as the logical premises of the state argument. After controlling for changes in
global conditions, Model 4 stresses the importance of the structural organization of the state
on regional socioeconomic outcomes. First, states organized around higher levels of
commodities as a share of total exports also present the higher levels of poverty given that
as commodity share increases across time by 1%, poverty increases by 0.37%. Similarly,
states organized around higher levels of rents from natural resources also present the higher
levels of poverty given that as natural rents increase across time by1% poverty increases by
0.81%. Moreover, states organized around higher levels of commodities as a share of GDP
also present lower levels of poverty given that as commodities as share of GDP increase
across time by 1%, poverty decreases by 0.85%. Ultimately, states organized around higher
levels of tax revenue as share of GDP present lower levels of poverty given that as tax
revenue increases across time by 1%, poverty decreases by 2.49% (see column 1). Second,
states organized around higher levels of commodities as a share of total exports also present
the higher levels of inequality given that as commodity share of total exports increases
across time by 1%, the GINI coefficient increases by 0.24 points. In addition, states
organized around higher levels of rents from natural resources also present the higher levels
of inequality given that as natural rents increase across time by 1%, the GINI coefficient
increases by 0.33. Also, states organized around higher levels of commodities as a share of
GDP also present lower levels of inequality given that as commodities as share of GDP
increases across time by 1%, the GINI coefficient decreases by 0.29 points. Finally, states
organized around higher levels of tax revenue as share of GDP present lower levels of
inequality given that as tax revenue increases across time by 1% , the GINI coefficient
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decreases by 0.57 points (see column 3). Thus, Model 4 corroborates the causal relationship
proposed by the state argument regarding the structural organization of the South American
state and socioeconomic outcomes in the region .
In addition, Model 4 also corroborates the validity of the state argument regarding
the structural organization of the state and extreme poverty. In this sense, states organized
around higher levels of commodities as a share of total exports also present higher levels of
extreme poverty given that as commodities share increases across time by 1%, extreme
poverty increases by 0.33%. Similarly, states organized around higher levels of rents from
natural resources also present higher levels of poverty given that as natural rents increase
across time by 1%, extreme poverty increases by 0.28%. Moreover, states organized around
higher levels of commodities as a share of GDP also present lower levels of poverty given
that as commodities as share of GDP increase across time by 1%, extreme poverty decreases
by 0.46%. Also, states organized around higher levels of tax revenue as share of GDP
present lower levels of poverty given that as tax revenue increases across time by 1%,
extreme poverty decreases by 0.44% (see column 2). Similarly to previous models, Model
4 corroborates the role of global conditions on poverty and inequality in south America by
suggesting that changes in the price index of fuels have a statistically significant and
positive relationship with poverty, extreme poverty, and inequality in South America while
changes in the price index of minerals have a statistically significant and negative
relationship.
However, the Fixed-Effects Regression model in Model 4 presents differences with
the OLS-Pooled Regression model previously discussed. In terms of poverty, the FixedEffects Regression model presents different results regarding the relationship between
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indicator 1 and 2 with poverty and inequality (see column 1a and 3a respectively). The
OLS-Pooled Regression model shows that between South American countries, as the rate
of commodities as a share of total exports increases (indicator 1), poverty at national lines
and the GINI index also increase (see column 1 and column 3). However, the Fixed-Effects
Regression model suggests that within each individual country, as the rate of commodities
as a share of total exports increases (indicator 1), poverty at national lines and the GINI
index actually decrease (see column 1a and column 3a). Moreover, while the OLS-Pooled
Regression model shows a negative relationship between the rate of commodities as a share
of GDP (indicator 2) and poverty at national lines in South America (see column 1), the
Fixed-Effects Regression model suggests a statistically significant yet positive relationship
between the rate of commodities as share of GDP and poverty at national lines (see column
1a). The results of the Model 4 suggest that while increasing commodities as a share of total
exports reduces poverty and inequality within each country, this improvement is superficial
since in general terms the region actually suffers as a whole when commodities increase.
Therefore, while the OLS-Pooled Regression model in Model 4 validates the logical
premise and the hypothesized relationship of the state argument when explaining the
continuity of South American poverty and inequality, the Fixed-Effects Regression model
suggests that the intracontinental variation responds to state-specific and time-variant
factors.
Ultimately, the state argument suggests that it is the structural and functional
organization of the South American state that explains the continuity of poverty and
inequality in the region. The literature on the resource curse has identified three processes
that create poverty and inequality in countries that are organized around the
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commercialization of commodities: rent-seeking political behavior, de-industrialization,
and macroeconomic volatility. However, the state argument suggests that these processes
are not responsible for the continuity of socioeconomic distortions in the region. The state
argument suggests that socioeconomic distortions in South America can’t be understood
solely by observing the political behavior of actors, rates of industrialization, or changes in
global markets. The logical premise of the state argument responds to a simple observation:
if South American states have known for decades that these processes create poverty and
inequality, then why is it that they have not change them. The region has experience periods
of more or less industrialization, with administrations that have been more or less corrupt,
and under global contexts of more or less volatility. Yet the rate of poverty and inequality
fluctuate accordingly to the relationships corroborated by Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and
Model 4. What the models ultimately suggest, corroborating the main hypothesis of the
state argument, is that the continuity and inequality in South America is the structural and
functional organization of the state. Chapter 4 elaborates on the historical processes that
influenced the specific formation and consolidation of the South American state, pointing
at how the structure of the South American state responded to economic imperatives and
was organized around the export economy. This particular structure continues to
characterize South American states, regardless of the changes in magnitude between the
late nineteenth century and the twenty first century. In other words, the state argument
suggests that the resource curse argument has identified a spurious relationship between
rent-seeking political behavior, de-industrialization, macroeconomic volatility, and poverty
and inequality. The resource curse has identified processes, the state argument identifies the
structure that creates the incentives and possibilities for processes to take place.
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The state argument is not a rebuttal of the resource curse argument, it presents a
resolution to a pivotal challenge to the resource curse argument: why is it that other
countries that have an important presence of natural resources do not present the same
processes of rent-seeking political behavior, de-industrialization, and macroeconomic
volatility? Why is it that Canada or Australia do not suffer drastic socioeconomic distortions
once the global commodity market changes? The state argument responds by pointing at
the structural and functional organization of the state. Based on the experience of the South
American state, the state argument hypothesizes that the reason why Canada or Australia
do not suffer drastic socioeconomic distortions once the global commodity market changes
is because they have not organized their societies, their economies, and their states around
exporting primary products. In this sense, Table 13 presents Model 5, the OLS-Pooled
Regression model that operationalizes the main hypothesis of the state argument. Informed
by the results of Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4, Model 5 combines the indicators
that measure the structural organization of the state (indicators 1, 2, 3, and 4) and the
indicators that measure the functional capacity of the state (indicators 6 and 10) while
controlling for changes in the global commodity market. However, in order to test the
validity of the state argument claims about the role of the structure of the state instead of
the process of de-industrialization in perpetuating poverty and inequality in the region,
Model 5 introduces an indicator measuring the rate of manufactured exports as a share of
total exports as shown in Figure 13.
The data show that the state argument explains poverty in South America, while it
is not definitive on the validity of the state argument explaining inequality. Column 1 of
Model 5 shows the relationship between structural and functional organization of the state
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Table 13. Model 5: The State Argument
Poverty
Inequality
National Lines
1
2
0.302
0.210
Commodity
-0.561 -0.561
2
(%GDP)
0.003** 0.003**
0.482 0.482
3 Rents
(%GDP)
0.091* 0.091*
-1.226 -1.226
4 Tax (%
GDP)
0.035** 0.035**
Pol.
-3.444 -3.444
6
stability
0.133 0.133
C.
of
-2.278 -2.278
10
corruption
0.417 0.417
Manufacture
-0.302
(%exports)
0.210
Fuel price
0.158 0.158
index
0.000** 0.000**
Minerals
-0.386 -0.386
price index
0.000** 0.000**
Constant
65.61 95.83
Mean VIF
4.38
4.38
Adj R0.787 0.787
square
* 90%
** 95%
Confidence Confidence
Column
Commodity
1
(%exports)

GINI
3
0.277
0.000**
-0.239
0.001**
0.153
0.093*
-0.725
0.000**
-3.467
0.000**
3.083
0.000**

Fixed Effects
National Lines

4

1a
2a
-0.219
0.372
-0.239 1.788 1.788
0.001** 0.000** 0.000**
0.153 -1.138 -1.138
0.093* 0.023** 0.023**
-0.725 -0.450 -0.450
0.000** 0.474 0.474
-3.467 -9.480 -9.480
0.000** 0.001** 0.001**
3.083 19.231 19.231
0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
-0.277
0.22
0.000**
0.372
0.027
0.027 0.052 0.052
0.038* 0.038* 0.078* 0.078*
-0.085 -0.085 -0.223 -0.223
0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
44.63
72.38 21.64 -0.254
3.46
3.46
0.662
0.662 0.040 0.040

GINI
3a
-0.074
0.534
0.125
0.319
-0.074
0.653
-0.362
0.088*
-1.368
0.117
3.570
0.052*

4a

0.150

0.150

0.125
0.319
-0.074
0.653
-0.362
0.088*
-1.368
0.117
3.570
0.052*
0.046
0.534
0.019 0.019
0.061* 0.061*
-0.075 -0.075
0.000**0.000**
55.02 50.28

p-values in
italics

and poverty at national lines while controlling for changes in global conditions. The results
show that variance in the structural organization of the state—not its functional capacity—
and changes in the global commodity market explain almost four fifths of the variance of
poverty in South America. The rate of commodities as share of GDP (indicator 2), the rate
of total rents from natural resources as a share of GDP (indicator 3), and the rate of tax

311

revenue as share of GDP (indicator 4) are statistically significant in explaining the variation
of poverty in the region (see column 1). The more rents from natural resources the more
poverty, while the less rate of commodities as share of GDP or the less tax revenue the more
poverty in the region. Most strikingly, the results in column 1 also corroborate the role of
global conditions in explaining poverty in South America. Column 2 of Model 5 tests the
logical improvement of the state argument on the literature of the resource curse. By
including indicators that measure rent-seeking political behavior (indicator 10), deindustrialization (cmanufacture), and volatility (cfuels and cminerals), column 2 shows the
results that measure whether poverty in South America is a result of structural conditions
or political and economic processes. The data suggest that variance in poverty is the result
of structural conditions and macroeconomic volatility. The model in column 2 omits
indicator 1 given its correlation with cmanufacture in order to avoid multicollinearity, and
it shows that only one (volatility) of the three processes identified by the resource curse to
explain poverty is statistically significant. Informed by the Dependency approach, the state
argument actually identifies the importance of global conditions in explaining poverty in
South America, which means that the results shown in column 2 corroborate the main
hypothesis of the state argument.
In contrast, the data is not as straightforward regarding inequality as it is regarding
poverty. Column 3 in Model 5 shows that the structural organization, the functional
capacity, and global conditions explain almost two thirds of the variation of inequality in
South America. The only results that directly contradict the hypothesized relationships of
the state argument are the direction of the relationship between indicator 2 and indicator 10
with poverty and inequality. The state argument hypothesized a positive relationship

312

between indicator 2 and poverty and inequality. Similarly to Model 1 and Model 3, Model
5 shows a negative relationship between indicator 2 and inequality. Moreover, the state
argument hypothesized a negative relationship between indicator 10 and inequality, yet
Model 5 shows a positive relationship. The statistical results regarding indicator 10 directly
contradict the theoretical understanding of the role of corruption on socioeconomic
outcomes. The literature on the resource course is unequivocal in identifying the negative
role of corruption on poverty and inequality, yet Model 5 shows that for every point increase
across time in the control of corruption, the GINI coefficient increases by 3.083 (see column
3). This means that the countries that present the lower levels of control of corruption (or
the higher levels of corruption) also present the lower levels of inequality. Although the
relationship between corruption and inequality challenges conventional wisdom, logic, and
the existing literature; the results of Model 3 and Model 5 require further examination. Yet
beyond the contradiction of the results with the hypothesized relationship between indicator
10 and the GINI index, column 4 in Model 5 shows that every single indicator is statistically
significant. This result contradicts the logical premise of the state argument which
understands the relationship between rent-seeking political behavior and deindustrialization with poverty and inequality to be spurious. Model 5 actually shows that
inequality in South America is explained by the combination of the structural organization
and functional capacity of the state, the existing rent-seeking political behavior, deindustrialization, and macroeconomic volatility. The theoretical implication of the results
shown in column 4 is that the hypothesized relationship of the state argument is not correct.
The state argument hypothesizes that once the structural and functional organization of the
South American state is accounted for, the relationship between the processes identified by
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the resource curse argument and socioeconomic distortions is spurious. Model 5 shows that
while that is the case for poverty, the state argument does not provide a comprehensive
explanation of inequality in South America.
Ultimately, the Fixed-Effects Regression model in Model 5 contradicts the results
of the OLS-Pooled Regression model. Regarding poverty, the Fixed-Effects Regression
model suggests that the rate of commodities as share of total exports and the rate of tax
revenue are not statistically significant. Moreover, while the rate of commodities as a share
of GDP, the rate of natural rents, and control of corruption are statistically significant, the
direction of their relationship with poverty contradicts previous models and the
hypothesized relationship of the state argument. Only the levels of political stability and
absence of violence present a statistically significant and negative relationship with poverty,
supporting the hypothesized relationship of the state argument. Regarding inequality, the
Fixed-Effects Regression model presents contradicting results to those of the OLS-Pooled
Regression model and the hypothesized relationships of the state argument. The FixedEffects Regression model suggests that the rate of commodities as share of total exports,
the rate of commodities as share of GDP, and the rate of natural rents is not statistically
significant in explaining the variation of inequality between South American states. Only
the rate of tax revenue presents a statistically significant and theoretically consistent
relationship with inequality under the Fixed-Effects Regression model, suggesting the
variation of inequality between South American states responds to time-variant and
country-specific factors. Yet what is clear both from the OLS-Pooled Regression model and
the Fixed-Effects Regression model is the statistically significant relationship between
global conditions and poverty and inequality. All the models elaborated on the second phase
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of the research design suggest that the variation in the price index of fuels and in the price
index of minerals explains the contemporary variation of poverty and inequality in South
America. Thus, both types of regression models show the importance of global condition in
South American development outcomes.
In conclusion, the state argument explains the continuity of poverty and inequality
in contemporary South America. Table 14 summarizes the main results of each multivariate
regression model after controlling for changes in global conditions and correcting for
multicollinearity. Overall, the state argument provides a powerful explanation for the
continuity of poverty in South America. In this sense, Model 4 and Model 5 show the most
theoretically consistent results regarding poverty. When controlling for commodity price
volatility, the structural organization of the South American state explains the variation of
poverty in the region. The only result that contradicts the relation hypothesized by the state
argument is indicator 2, which shows a consistently negative and statistically significant
relationship with poverty. However, it is possible that as the rate of commodity exports as
a percentage of GDP increases, states are able to appropriate more resources and direct them
towards alleviating poverty through conditional cash transfer programs. Nevertheless, once
the rate of commodities as a share of GDP decreases poverty increases because public funds
drop.
Yet Table 14 shows that the state argument’s explanation for inequality is not as
clear as it is for poverty. The state argument suggests that once the structural and functional
organization of the South American state is introduced in the relationship, the processes
identified by the resource curse argument would not be statistically significant. However,
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Table 14. Summary of the Models

1

Model
Commodity
(%exports)

2

Commodity
(%GDP)

3

Rents
(%GDP)

4

Tax (%
GDP)

6

Pol. stability

10

C. of
corruption
Manufacture
export rate
Fuel price
index

1
0.473
0.000**
-0.484
0.000**

2

Poverty
3

0.733
0.003**
-1.909
0.000**

0.174
0.159
0.000** 0.000**
-0.424
-0.418
Minerals
price index
0.000** 0.000**
23.518
79.277
Constant
2.57
2.08
Mean VIF
Adj R-square
0.536
0.649
* 90%
** 95%
Confidence
Confidence

4
0.365
0.049**
-0.850
0.000**
0.806
0.001**
-2.486
0.000**

-4.789
0.002**
-3.637
0.007**

0.108
0.186
0.001** 0.000**
-0.313
-0.399
0.000** 0.000**
70.169
66.366
2.83
2.27
0.627
0.786
p-values in italics

5

-0.561
0.003**
0.482
0.091*
-1.226
0.035**
-3.444
0.133
-2.278
0.417
-0.302
0.210
0.158
0.000**
-0.386
0.000**
95.833
4.38
0.787
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1
0.091
0.017**
-0.046
0.281

2

Inequality
3

0.395
0.000**
-0.513
0.000**

4
0.239
0.000**
-0.238
0.000**
0.327
0.001**
-0.567
0.000**

-3.297
0.000**
0.547
0.239

0.038
0.003**
-0.121
0.000**
49.216
3.36
0.442

0.016
0.287
-0.091
0.000**
60.801
3.09
0.480

0.019
0.079*
-0.079
0.000**
59.699
3.09
0.575

0.028
0.057*
-0.097
0.000**
45.794
2.91
0.557

5

-0.239
0.001**
0.153
0.093*
-0.725
0.000**
-3.467
0.000**
3.083
0.000**
-0.277
0.000**
0.027
0.038*
-0.085
0.000**
72.383
3.46
0.662

both rent-seeking political behavior and de-industrialization are statistically significant in
Model 5. In fact, rent-seeking political behavior presents a positive relationship with
inequality, which is theoretically inconsistent since the literature suggests that those
countries that present higher levels of control of corruption also present lower levels of
inequality. Nevertheless, Model 5 suggests that those countries that present lower levels of
control of corruption are the ones that present lower levels of inequality in the region.
Therefore, Table 14 shows the inconsistency of results in terms of inequality throughout all
the multivariate regression models, which suggests that the state argument does not provide
a robust explanation for inequality in contemporary South America. Either under an OLSPooled Regression model or a Fixed-Effects Regression model, the state argument does not
provide an empirically consistent explanation of inequality in contemporary South America.
The results of the second phase of the research design suggest that the structural and
functional organization of the South American state do not explain the continuity of
inequality in the region. In fact, the statistical results suggest that the variation of inequality
between states in contemporary South America responds to factors outside the ones
measured by the state argument. Regardless of whether they are time-variant or statespecific factors, what is clear is that understanding the continuity and the variation of South
American inequality requires further exploration, and that the state argument is at least
poorly equipped to provide a totalizing explanation.
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CONCLUSION
REFLECTING ON THE STATE ARGUMENT
The current socioeconomic reality of South America is marked by the presence of
high levels of poverty and income inequality. The emergence of China as a global consumer
of primary products triggered the expansion of commodity exports that allowed for South
American societies to increase their revenue and improve their socioeconomic reality.
However, the socioeconomic improvements of the region since the early 2000s have not
actually consolidated. As Figure 14 shows, the prices of commodities started to decrease
in 2014, stabilizing at prices similar to those of 2005. Yet with the decrease of commodity
prices the entire socioeconomic outlook of the region started to shake. Economic growth
has deaccelerated in South America, and the danger of massive poverty and inequality is
still lingering over the vast majority of the population. The cyclical dynamic of South
American political economy is not only a characteristic of the twenty first century. The
region in general has already experienced periods of industrialization and deindustrialization, and moments of improved socioeconomic conditions succeeded by
prolonged socioeconomic crises.564 Therefore, the contemporary characteristic of South
American political economy is another instance of the cyclical dynamic of socioeconomic
conditions in the region.
In this sense, socioeconomic distortions are a chronic condition of South American
political economy. There are periods of reduced poverty and inequality, yet once the global
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market of commodities changes, socioeconomic improvements soon dissipate. The
literature presents various explanations for the presence of socioeconomic distortions in
South America, but one after the other they seem incapable of resolving the empirical
paradoxes of the region’s political economy. Since South America became independent,
scholars and policy makers have pointed at the region’s cultural heritage as the explanation
for the pervasive presence of socioeconomic distortions. Observations that South
Americans are Catholic and therefore submissive, culturally predisposed to accept
centralism and even oppression, and ultimately prone to be corrupt and disrespect the rule
of law have been used as explanations for the region’s poverty and inequality. But these
observations are not only one step away from dangerous racist and xenophobic arguments,
they are also empirically incorrect given the development outcome of other Catholic
societies in Western Europe. Others have pointed at geographic conditions as an
explanation for socioeconomic outcomes in South America, arguing that the vast territories
and rough terrain of the region make it difficult for economic success. Yet beyond actual
studies that have tested the validity of geography arguments and found them inconclusive
at the very least, the fact is that there are other societies with rough terrains and even
landlocked that have been able to prosper. The case of Switzerland is perhaps illustrative
given its lack of access to the sea and the fragmented and mountainous nature of its terrain.
The answer to South American socioeconomic distortions must lie beyond the
region’s culture and geography. Current academic works propose a different answer: the
resource curse argument. The resource curse argument suggests that the presence of
abundant natural resources tends to create conditions that are unfavorable for
socioeconomic success. Although there is great diversity in the literature on the resource
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curse argument, its general proposition suggests that the exploitation of natural resources
tends to create rent-seeking political behavior, macroeconomic volatility, and deindustrialization, which in turn create poverty and inequality. The merits of the resource
curse argument have been studied thoroughly in the academic literature, and the validity of
its propositions empirically corroborated in various disciplines. Yet the resource curse
argument presents an important theoretical challenge based on the observation of societies
with high presence of natural resources without high incidence of poverty and inequality.
The United States is perhaps an important illustration of the limitations of the resource
curse argument given its capacity to exploit primary products without the incidence of
poverty and inequality characteristic of South American societies. Therefore, it is necessary
to elucidate the observations that present an empirical challenge to the proposition of the
resource curse argument.
The logical consequence of questioning the validity of the resource curse argument
is to examine which factors create rent-seeking political behavior, de-industrialization, and
macroeconomic volatility in some countries while not in others when they all present high
levels of natural resources. The state argument responds to the empirical challenge to the
resource curse argument by stressing that the defining factor for countries with abundant
natural resources is their sociopolitical organization. In this sense, the state argument
suggests that poverty and inequality are higher in countries that have organized around the
exploitation and commercialization of primary resources. It is not merely the presence of
natural resources but the sociopolitical organization around commodities that creates
poverty and inequality. In this sense, the state argument is premised on the idea that the
South American state, as the main representation of sociopolitical organization in the

320

region, formed and developed around commercializing commodities. The particular
organization of the South American state ultimately creates a structure that incentivizes
rent-seeking political behavior and de-industrialization, which in turn amplifies the
region’s dependence on the global market increasing macroeconomic volatility. Therefore,
the state argument is not a direct contradiction of the resource curse argument. On the
contrary, the state argument provides a structural framework for the processes identified by
the resource curse argument. The processes that create poverty and inequality in South
America are possible given the region’s sociopolitical structure explained by the state
argument, which provides for differentiation among societies with high presence of natural
resources yet lower incidence of poverty and inequality.
Perhaps the difference between the state argument and the resource curse argument
is best explained by questioning the continuity of the processes that create poverty and
inequality in the region. At least since the early twentieth century, South American
academics and policy makers have been aware of the pervasive consequences of relying on
commercializing commodities. Nevertheless, South American societies have been unable
to break their reliance on exporting commodities. The most illustrative example of the
region’s impossibility in breaking with commodity dependence is the self-proclaimed
progressive governments that have dominated the political landscape of the region in the
twenty first century. The political movements behind these governments have historically
criticized the extractivist nature of the South American economy. Yet when they reached
power, they actually increased their dependence on natural resources aggravating rentseeking political behavior, accelerating de-industrialization, and ultimately increasing
macroeconomic volatility. This dynamic is best explained by Fernando Coronil, who states:
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Even when these nations try to break their colonial dependence to
commodity exports through the implementation of development plans
designed at diversifying their economies, in general they based themselves
in the revenue obtained by exporting commodities, with which they
intensify their dependency to them. Paradoxically, by trying to take benefit
from their comparative advantage, these exporting nations consistently
assume their colonial role as producers of primary goods, a role that is
rationalized through the neoliberal capitalist ideology. For these nations,
post colonialism follows neocolonialism.565
In light of the dominance of Neo-Extractivism in South America, it is therefore necessary
to wonder why is it that the region has not changed their socioeconomic outlook. It is in
this context that the state argument points at the structural organization of the South
American state as the reason behind the continuity of processes that perpetuate poverty and
inequality.
The state argument responds to two main questions of South American political
economy: how did the South American state form and develop?; and what explains the
continuity of South American poverty and inequality? The state argument responds to the
first question by suggesting that the South American state formed and developed as a
response to economic imperatives. South American state makers not only responded to
economic imperatives but ultimately to the existing social fragmentation of the region and
the expansion of global capitalism in the nineteenth century. In fact, the factors that
conditioned the specific structure of the South American state were the consequence of
historical processes that date as back as the moment of colonial conquest. The social
fragmentation imposed by Spanish colonialism and reinforced by British commercial
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policy combined with the internal productive structures of exploitation and discrimination
conditioned the formation of a state around the commercialization of commodities.
Nineteenth century South American elites were not interested in forming a state, and it was
only through the alignment of their export interests that they decided to support a viable
state. But the state was required to appropriate resources from exports since the vast
majority of South Americans were poor and elites were not inclined to fund it. It is therefore
the connection between the state and the export economy what maintains the region’s
dependence on commercializing primary products. Without massive resources form
exports, elites would lose their privileged position in society and the state would not be
able to appropriate the necessary resources to fulfill its responsibilities.
Although there are important differences in terms of magnitude, contemporary
South American states continue to be structurally organized around commercializing
commodities. In fact, they continue to present the processes that create poverty and
inequality. In this context, the state argument suggests that what explains the continuity of
poverty and inequality in contemporary South America is the structure of the state. Through
various statistical models, the state argument validates the role of the structure of the South
American state in explaining poverty and inequality in the region. Overall, the state
argument finds that the countries that present higher levels of structural organization around
commercializing commodities also present higher levels of poverty. Specifically, the data
show that countries with higher levels of commodities as share of total exports, higher
levels of rents from natural resources, and lower levels of taxes as share of total revenue
tend to present higher levels of poverty and inequality. The socioeconomic conditions in
contemporary South America corroborate the state argument given that countries like

323

Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia present both higher levels of structural
organization around primary products as well as higher levels of poverty. However, the
findings on inequality are not as conclusive as those regarding poverty. Countries with
higher levels of structural organization around commodities do present high levels of
inequality, yet countries with low levels of structural organization around commodities like
Chile also present higher levels of inequality. The data show that while the continuity of
poverty responds to structural conditions and cycles in the global commodity market, the
connection between the structural organization of the state and South American income
inequality is not clear. The multivariate linear regression model shows statistically
significant results explaining inequality, but the results contradict the relationships
hypothesized by the state argument. Therefore, explaining inequality in contemporary
South America requires elaborating on the causal propositions of the state argument.
In this context, state argument provides a structural explanation for the continuity
of South American poverty. The structural organization of the South American state
conditions the specific behavior of political actors in the region, favoring the maintenance
of the continent’s reliance on commodities and consequently perpetuating the specific
processes that create poverty. In examining the formation of the South American state, the
existing literature identified the necessary conditions that influenced the particular political
organization of the region. The work of Centeno and Lopez-Alves showed how the
formation of the South American state did not respond to any security imperatives. On the
contrary, the formation of the South American state responded to economic imperatives,
and both the post-independence conditions of the region as well as global changes in the
nineteenth century ultimately shaped the particular structural organization of the state. The
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state argument elaborates on the formation of the South American state by examining the
historical processes that shaped the conditions that ultimately influenced state development
in the region. Through the introduction of antecedent conditions, the state argument
elaborates a historical explanation for the continuity of poverty in South America. Yet the
state argument primarily elaborates on the structural organization under which the political
economy of the region operates by demarcating, explaining, and contextualizing the
processes that create South American poverty.
The current elaboration of the state argument advances the understanding of South
American political economy while also expanding the discipline’s understanding of
different experiences of state formation. The state argument shows how particular regional
experiences interacted with global processes both at the moment of conquest as well as at
the moment of capitalist expansion and conditioned the formation of the South American
state. Both by providing theoretical knowledge from South America as well as by
contrasting the region’s experience with Europe’s, the state argument engages with the USEurocentrism of the discipline of International Relations and attempts to decenter it.
Moreover, the state argument also influences the literature on International Political
Economy by stressing the central role of the state in developmental outcomes. The state
argument stresses that what differentiates developmental outcomes in countries with
abundant natural resources is the organization of the state. In other words, the state
argument explains the theoretical inconsistencies of the resource curse argument by
contextualizing rent-seeking political behavior, de-industrialization, and macroeconomic
volatility. Ultimately, the state argument explains the contemporary dynamics of
socioeconomic conditions in the region. By stressing the relationship between global
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conditions and regional political structures, the state argument explains the contemporary
cyclical dynamic of socioeconomic distortions in South America. Yet even in the face of
various theoretical and empirical benefits, the explanatory limitations showed by the data
regarding inequality highlight the necessity to expand the state argument.
In order to provide a historical and totalizing explanation of socioeconomic
distortions in South America, it is necessary to expand and refine the state argument. The
multimethodology research design provided the historical and theoretical foundations for
the elaboration of state argument. However, the current elaboration of the state argument
does not review the relevant historical processes that took place during the twentieth
century. Although the literature and the data stress the continuity of South America’s
socioeconomic and political structures, during the twentieth century there were important
processes relevant to the structure of the state and socioeconomic outcomes. For instance,
it is during the twentieth century that South American countries moved from having most
of the population living in rural areas and became a predominantly urban region. Moreover,
it is during the twentieth century that South American states expanded their functional
responsibilities, mirroring the legal arrangements of modern welfare states. In fact, it is
during the twentieth century that South American countries experienced a serious process
of industrialization under ISI, regardless of the controversial results of the policy.
Ultimately, the twentieth century witnessed the definitive emergence of the United States
as the uncontested global superpower under an increasingly transformative globalization
process. Therefore, examining the relationship between the consolidated South American
state and regional and global processes in the twentieth century could expand the
explanatory power of the state argument.
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The state argument provides a structural framework under which to understand
processes of political economy in the region. As mentioned in previous sections, the
socioeconomic distortions characteristic of South America have been understood through
various explanations. Yet the elaboration of the state argument allows for the
contextualization of these explanations, ultimately providing a historically relevant
narrative about poverty and inequality in the region. Hence, further areas of elaboration
transcend examining the historical processes of the twentieth century. Expanding the state
argument to encompass a totalizing explanation of processes of political economy in South
America would require not only elaborating on the structural organization of the region but
ultimately identifying the particular processes characteristic of the continent. Once the state
argument establishes the particular characteristics and structural organization of South
American states, regional processes of political economy are contextualized rather than
dismissed as an anomaly on certain preconceived standards defined by the historical
experiences of the United States and Western Europe. For instance, given the specific
structure of South American states and the historical processes of the twentieth century,
populism can be understood not as a political anomaly of the region but as an specific
rational process incentivized by the continent’s context.
Most importantly, expanding the study of the state argument can elucidate the
specific structural conditions or processes that explain inequality in South America. The
current understanding of the state argument showed inconsistent results regarding the
factors that explain contemporary dynamics of income inequality in the region. Yet
introducing the historical processes of the twentieth century and their relationship with the
structure of the South American state could illuminate the mechanisms that explain
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contemporary inequality. For instance, the state argument requires an understanding of how
the structural organization of the South American state affects the processes of income
redistribution in the region. Specifically, the distribution of income in predominantly urban
countries must differ drastically from rural societies. While access to land continues to be
a distributional imperative at least in the collective imaginary of South American
progressive movements, twentieth century urban unemployment or informal employment
provide a better measurement of contemporary income inequality. For the state argument
to be a totalizing explanation of South American development outcomes, it is therefore
necessary to explore how the structure of the state relates to twenty first century conditions
like massive informal economic sectors or global chains of production.
In conclusion, the state argument provides a structural explanation for the continuity
of poverty in South America. It examines how the South American state formed and
developed by building on the existing literature on the subject while providing a historical
causal mechanism relevant to the experience of the region. In doing so, the state argument
stresses the centrality of the state in development outcomes, influencing the existing
literature on International Political Economy. In fact, the data measuring the causal
relationship proposed by the state argument suggests that the continuity of poverty in South
America is the consequence of the structural organization of the state rather than because
of cultural values, geography, natural resources, rent-seeking political behavior, deindustrialization, or macroeconomic volatility. This is not to say that these factors do not
aggravate the conditions of poverty and inequality in the region, but they are intervening
processes perpetuated by historical structures. For instance, rent-seeking political behavior
is incentivized by an organizational structure that facilitates the centralization of power, the
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appropriation of resources for political gain, and a society responsive to distributional
schemes designed to alleviate material difficulties. So far the state argument establishes the
central role of the organizational structure of the state in South American political
economy, yet it still requires profound elaboration in order to elucidate how it affects
inequality in the region. The resource curse argument identifies how rent-seeking political
behavior, macroeconomic volatility, and de-industrialization are detrimental to
development outcomes. But the state argument resolves the theoretical and empirical
challenges of the resource curse argument by answering why various countries with
abundant natural resources present such dissonant development outcomes. Even in the case
of South American countries, with similar historical processes and structural organizations,
the state argument is able to explain the intra-regional differences in terms of poverty. By
stressing the centrality of the structural organization of the state in development outcomes,
the state argument explains why there are degrees of variation between the levels of poverty
in Uruguay in comparison to Ecuador, for instance. Thus, while the current study elaborates
on the fundamental aspects of the state argument, it ultimately has the potential to
contextualize and explain the processes and outcomes of South American political
economy.
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